From: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek" <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>,
"Aleksa Sarai" <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
"Tycho Andersen" <tycho@tycho.pizza>,
"Tycho Andersen" <tandersen@netflix.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] exec: fix up /proc/pid/comm in the execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) case
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2024 14:37:31 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241030203732.248767-1-tycho@tycho.pizza> (raw)
From: Tycho Andersen <tandersen@netflix.com>
Zbigniew mentioned at Linux Plumber's that systemd is interested in
switching to execveat() for service execution, but can't, because the
contents of /proc/pid/comm are the file descriptor which was used,
instead of the path to the binary. This makes the output of tools like
top and ps useless, especially in a world where most fds are opened
CLOEXEC so the number is truly meaningless.
Change exec path to fix up /proc/pid/comm in the case where we have
allocated one of these synthetic paths in bprm_init(). This way the actual
exec machinery is unchanged, but cosmetically the comm looks reasonable to
admins investigating things.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tandersen@netflix.com>
Suggested-by: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
CC: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Link: https://github.com/uapi-group/kernel-features#set-comm-field-before-exec
---
v2: * drop the flag, everyone :)
* change the rendered value to f_path.dentry->d_name.name instead of
argv[0], Eric
v3: * fix up subject line, Eric
v4: * switch to no flag, always rewrite approach, with some cleanup
suggested by Kees
---
fs/exec.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
include/linux/binfmts.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 6c53920795c2..3b559f598c74 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1347,7 +1347,16 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
perf_event_exec();
- __set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
+
+ /*
+ * If argv0 was set, alloc_bprm() made up a path that will
+ * probably not be useful to admins running ps or similar.
+ * Let's fix it up to be something reasonable.
+ */
+ if (bprm->argv0)
+ __set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->argv0), true);
+ else
+ __set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
/* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
group */
@@ -1497,9 +1506,28 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename)
kfree(bprm->interp);
kfree(bprm->fdpath);
+ kfree(bprm->argv0);
kfree(bprm);
}
+static int bprm_add_fixup_comm(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+ struct user_arg_ptr argv)
+{
+ const char __user *p = get_user_arg_ptr(argv, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * If p == NULL, let's just fall back to fdpath.
+ */
+ if (!p)
+ return 0;
+
+ bprm->argv0 = strndup_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN);
+ if (bprm->argv0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EFAULT;
+}
+
static struct linux_binprm *alloc_bprm(int fd, struct filename *filename, int flags)
{
struct linux_binprm *bprm;
@@ -1906,6 +1934,12 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename,
goto out_ret;
}
+ if (unlikely(bprm->fdpath)) {
+ retval = bprm_add_fixup_comm(bprm, argv);
+ if (retval != 0)
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
retval = count(argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS);
if (retval == 0)
pr_warn_once("process '%s' launched '%s' with NULL argv: empty string added\n",
diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
index e6c00e860951..bab5121a746b 100644
--- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
+++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct linux_binprm {
of the time same as filename, but could be
different for binfmt_{misc,script} */
const char *fdpath; /* generated filename for execveat */
+ const char *argv0; /* argv0 from execveat */
unsigned interp_flags;
int execfd; /* File descriptor of the executable */
unsigned long loader, exec;
base-commit: c1e939a21eb111a6d6067b38e8e04b8809b64c4e
--
2.34.1
next reply other threads:[~2024-10-30 20:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-30 20:37 Tycho Andersen [this message]
2024-10-30 20:37 ` [PATCH 2/2] selftests/exec: add a test for execveat()'s comm Tycho Andersen
2024-11-27 14:25 ` Mark Brown
2024-11-27 15:00 ` Tycho Andersen
2024-11-27 15:03 ` Mark Brown
2024-10-31 22:10 ` [PATCH 1/2] exec: fix up /proc/pid/comm in the execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) case Kees Cook
2024-11-02 11:29 ` Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
2024-11-02 19:58 ` Kees Cook
2024-11-06 10:06 ` Christian Brauner
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