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X-CSE-ConnectionGUID: 7JCVlW62RyGuWO66xmyN9Q== X-CSE-MsgGUID: dPPIh98SRdmAouV5DsZ+Fw== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6700,10204,11222"; a="50849051" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.11,199,1725346800"; d="scan'208";a="50849051" Received: from fmviesa004.fm.intel.com ([10.60.135.144]) by orvoesa101.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 14 Oct 2024 16:12:19 -0700 X-CSE-ConnectionGUID: f1kfSAY3SWuClTYUrGSBLg== X-CSE-MsgGUID: 9pzGx3MVS5uN76D7k+YaeQ== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.11,203,1725346800"; d="scan'208";a="82332348" Received: from lkp-server01.sh.intel.com (HELO a48cf1aa22e8) ([10.239.97.150]) by fmviesa004.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 14 Oct 2024 16:12:12 -0700 Received: from kbuild by a48cf1aa22e8 with local (Exim 4.96) (envelope-from ) id 1t0UEU-000HIh-0C; Mon, 14 Oct 2024 23:12:10 +0000 Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2024 07:11:43 +0800 From: kernel test robot To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= , Al Viro , Christian Brauner , Kees Cook , Linus Torvalds , Paul Moore , Serge Hallyn , Theodore Ts'o Cc: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev, LKML , =?iso-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= , Adhemerval Zanella Netto , Alejandro Colomar , Aleksa Sarai , Andrew Morton , Linux Memory Management List , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Casey Schaufler , Christian Heimes , Dmitry Vyukov , Elliott Hughes , Eric Biggers , Eric Chiang , Fan Wu , Florian Weimer , Geert Uytterhoeven , James Morris , Jan Kara , Jann Horn , Jeff Xu , Jonathan Corbet Subject: Re: [PATCH v20 2/6] security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits Message-ID: <202410150702.GVWMEEA4-lkp@intel.com> References: <20241011184422.977903-3-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20241011184422.977903-3-mic@digikod.net> X-Rspam-User: X-Rspamd-Server: rspam04 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 767E014000F X-Stat-Signature: j9pdkischk7zbi8c7wduy38fspqoe1hk X-HE-Tag: 1728947535-626189 X-HE-Meta: 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 gz3JAbg0 D9CAwqCTp+qpMLnq4tFpz25ZXCrbjer8cPKm51owFV3T/LNjCUtakRRQG/JP57fLnNM24pg1/QfF0whX/a3Ayt6NAJneYjQBaBB+Mu6yWnXg1oc15RUDewLlUnStveXKoaolTc6ouvf5d+MVurWJBd53YrfPLvivgtmA2wd4TuCIu8ddRmyNAvNycZ2x4gpXXODAdPam301V1cHg+lLSFnMlNuArxFuoQyZqc7E+B70hrDXPtCG2POqTcCCU8dAvlODexFspF5pk/rtOstAgxHpfjS4mnSugH4hhmWv6Xs3siXIJ+oEouwvExrn05QQLdlVb0yg1Txuogao9m3vEOpRKwrwjUcDUY5NfeXWB2kWVFUlVlf/AqaUL9Pgcfxa3HmbJoXDP3WMZ/Mlz3L0tFRZ5ozmPPSjQpGdpgPQCEgCAAsu6JWfhdC97nKvIVcWbv8RpfosMPA8tnjAVjHIrPA29vYg== X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Hi Mickaël, kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings: [auto build test WARNING on 8cf0b93919e13d1e8d4466eb4080a4c4d9d66d7b] url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Micka-l-Sala-n/exec-Add-a-new-AT_CHECK-flag-to-execveat-2/20241012-024801 base: 8cf0b93919e13d1e8d4466eb4080a4c4d9d66d7b patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241011184422.977903-3-mic%40digikod.net patch subject: [PATCH v20 2/6] security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits config: alpha-allnoconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241015/202410150702.GVWMEEA4-lkp@intel.com/config) compiler: alpha-linux-gcc (GCC) 13.3.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241015/202410150702.GVWMEEA4-lkp@intel.com/reproduce) If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202410150702.GVWMEEA4-lkp@intel.com/ All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>): In file included from include/linux/securebits.h:5, from include/linux/init_task.h:13, from init/init_task.c:2: >> include/uapi/linux/securebits.h:135:23: warning: "/*" within comment [-Wcomment] 135 | * (e.g. sh /tmp/*.sh). This makes sense for (semi-restricted) user | vim +135 include/uapi/linux/securebits.h 97 98 #define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE)) 99 #define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED \ 100 (issecure_mask(SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED)) 101 102 /* 103 * When SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE is set, a process should never interpret 104 * interactive user commands (e.g. scripts). However, if such commands are 105 * passed through a file descriptor (e.g. stdin), its content should be 106 * interpreted if a call to execveat(2) with the related file descriptor and 107 * the AT_CHECK flag succeed. 108 * 109 * For instance, script interpreters called with a script snippet as argument 110 * should always deny such execution if SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE is set. 111 * 112 * This secure bit may be set by user session managers, service managers, 113 * container runtimes, sandboxer tools... Except for test environments, the 114 * related SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED bit should also be set. 115 * 116 * See the SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE documentation. 117 * 118 * Here is the expected behavior for a script interpreter according to 119 * combination of any exec securebits: 120 * 121 * 1. SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=0 SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=0 (default) 122 * Always interpret scripts, and allow arbitrary user commands. 123 * => No threat, everyone and everything is trusted, but we can get ahead of 124 * potential issues thanks to the call to execveat with AT_CHECK which 125 * should always be performed but ignored by the script interpreter. 126 * Indeed, this check is still important to enable systems administrators 127 * to verify requests (e.g. with audit) and prepare for migration to a 128 * secure mode. 129 * 130 * 2. SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=1 SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=0 131 * Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, but allow 132 * arbitrary user commands. 133 * => The threat is (potential) malicious scripts run by trusted (and not 134 * fooled) users. That can protect against unintended script executions > 135 * (e.g. sh /tmp/*.sh). This makes sense for (semi-restricted) user 136 * sessions. 137 * 138 * 3. SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=0 SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=1 139 * Always interpret scripts, but deny arbitrary user commands. 140 * => This use case may be useful for secure services (i.e. without 141 * interactive user session) where scripts' integrity is verified (e.g. 142 * with IMA/EVM or dm-verity/IPE) but where access rights might not be 143 * ready yet. Indeed, arbitrary interactive commands would be much more 144 * difficult to check. 145 * 146 * 4. SECURE_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE=1 SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE=1 147 * Deny script interpretation if they are not executable, and also deny 148 * any arbitrary user commands. 149 * => The threat is malicious scripts run by untrusted users (but trusted 150 * code). This makes sense for system services that may only execute 151 * trusted scripts. 152 */ 153 #define SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE 10 154 #define SECURE_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED 11 /* make bit-10 immutable */ 155 -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki