From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>,
Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>,
David Spickett <david.spickett@arm.com>,
Yury Khrustalev <yury.khrustalev@arm.com>,
Wilco Dijkstra <wilco.dijkstra@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v13 24/40] arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack()
Date: Tue, 01 Oct 2024 23:59:03 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241001-arm64-gcs-v13-24-222b78d87eee@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241001-arm64-gcs-v13-0-222b78d87eee@kernel.org>
As discussed extensively in the changelog for the addition of this
syscall on x86 ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall") the
existing mmap() and madvise() syscalls do not map entirely well onto the
security requirements for guarded control stacks since they lead to
windows where memory is allocated but not yet protected or stacks which
are not properly and safely initialised. Instead a new syscall
map_shadow_stack() has been defined which allocates and initialises a
shadow stack page.
Implement this for arm64. Two flags are provided, allowing applications
to request that the stack be initialised with a valid cap token at the
top of the stack and optionally also an end of stack marker above that.
We support requesting an end of stack marker alone but since this is a
NULL pointer it is indistinguishable from not initialising anything by
itself.
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Yury Khrustalev <yury.khrustalev@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 64 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
index 61a80de6baf8..5c46ec527b1c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
@@ -68,6 +68,70 @@ unsigned long gcs_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk,
return addr;
}
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags)
+{
+ unsigned long alloc_size;
+ unsigned long __user *cap_ptr;
+ unsigned long cap_val;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int cap_offset;
+
+ if (!system_supports_gcs())
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (flags & ~(SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN | SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(addr))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (size == 8 || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 8))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * An overflow would result in attempting to write the restore token
+ * to the wrong location. Not catastrophic, but just return the right
+ * error code and block it.
+ */
+ alloc_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
+ if (alloc_size < size)
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+
+ addr = alloc_gcs(addr, alloc_size);
+ if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+ return addr;
+
+ /*
+ * Put a cap token at the end of the allocated region so it
+ * can be switched to.
+ */
+ if (flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN) {
+ /* Leave an extra empty frame as a top of stack marker? */
+ if (flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER)
+ cap_offset = 2;
+ else
+ cap_offset = 1;
+
+ cap_ptr = (unsigned long __user *)(addr + size -
+ (cap_offset * sizeof(unsigned long)));
+ cap_val = GCS_CAP(cap_ptr);
+
+ put_user_gcs(cap_val, cap_ptr, &ret);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ vm_munmap(addr, size);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure the new cap is ordered before standard
+ * memory accesses to the same location.
+ */
+ gcsb_dsync();
+ }
+
+ return addr;
+}
+
/*
* Apply the GCS mode configured for the specified task to the
* hardware.
--
2.39.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-01 23:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-01 22:58 [PATCH v13 00/40] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 01/40] mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 02/40] mm: Define VM_HIGH_ARCH_6 Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 03/40] arm64/mm: Restructure arch_validate_flags() for extensibility Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 04/40] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack Mark Brown
2024-10-01 23:13 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 05/40] mman: Add map_shadow_stack() flags Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 06/40] arm64: Document boot requirements for Guarded Control Stacks Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 07/40] arm64/gcs: Document the ABI " Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 08/40] arm64/sysreg: Add definitions for architected GCS caps Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 09/40] arm64/gcs: Add manual encodings of GCS instructions Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 10/40] arm64/gcs: Provide put_user_gcs() Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 11/40] arm64/gcs: Provide basic EL2 setup to allow GCS usage at EL0 and EL1 Mark Brown
2024-10-09 20:49 ` Nathan Chancellor
2024-10-10 15:18 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-10-10 17:16 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-10-11 12:55 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-10-14 16:31 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-10-15 13:05 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 12/40] arm64/cpufeature: Runtime detection of Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 13/40] arm64/mm: Allocate PIE slots for EL0 guarded control stack Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 14/40] mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for arm64 when we support GCS Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 15/40] arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 16/40] KVM: arm64: Manage GCS access and registers for guests Mark Brown
2024-10-02 0:24 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-10-02 15:55 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-10-02 18:24 ` Mark Brown
2024-10-02 19:29 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-10-03 14:50 ` Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 17/40] arm64/idreg: Add overrride for GCS Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 18/40] arm64/hwcap: Add hwcap " Mark Brown
2024-10-03 16:25 ` Yury Khrustalev
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 19/40] arm64/traps: Handle GCS exceptions Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:58 ` [PATCH v13 20/40] arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 21/40] arm64/gcs: Context switch GCS state for EL0 Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 22/40] arm64/gcs: Ensure that new threads have a GCS Mark Brown
2024-10-04 11:18 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-10-04 11:50 ` Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 23/40] arm64/gcs: Implement shadow stack prctl() interface Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` Mark Brown [this message]
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 25/40] arm64/signal: Set up and restore the GCS context for signal handlers Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 26/40] arm64/signal: Expose GCS state in signal frames Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 27/40] arm64/ptrace: Expose GCS via ptrace and core files Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 28/40] arm64: Add Kconfig for Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 29/40] kselftest/arm64: Verify the GCS hwcap Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 30/40] kselftest/arm64: Add GCS as a detected feature in the signal tests Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 31/40] kselftest/arm64: Add framework support for GCS to signal handling tests Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 32/40] kselftest/arm64: Allow signals tests to specify an expected si_code Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 33/40] kselftest/arm64: Always run signals tests with GCS enabled Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 34/40] kselftest/arm64: Add very basic GCS test program Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 35/40] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS test program built with the system libc Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 36/40] kselftest/arm64: Add test coverage for GCS mode locking Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 37/40] kselftest/arm64: Add GCS signal tests Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 38/40] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS stress test Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 39/40] kselftest/arm64: Enable GCS for the FP stress tests Mark Brown
2024-10-01 22:59 ` [PATCH v13 40/40] KVM: selftests: arm64: Add GCS registers to get-reg-list Mark Brown
2024-10-04 13:52 ` (subset) [PATCH v13 00/40] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace Catalin Marinas
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20241001-arm64-gcs-v13-24-222b78d87eee@kernel.org \
--to=broonie@kernel.org \
--cc=Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=aou@eecs.berkeley.edu \
--cc=ardb@kernel.org \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=david.spickett@arm.com \
--cc=debug@rivosinc.com \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
--cc=hjl.tools@gmail.com \
--cc=james.morse@arm.com \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=kvmarm@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=maz@kernel.org \
--cc=oleg@redhat.com \
--cc=oliver.upton@linux.dev \
--cc=palmer@dabbelt.com \
--cc=paul.walmsley@sifive.com \
--cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
--cc=ross.burton@arm.com \
--cc=shuah@kernel.org \
--cc=suzuki.poulose@arm.com \
--cc=thiago.bauermann@linaro.org \
--cc=wilco.dijkstra@arm.com \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=yury.khrustalev@arm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox