From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>,
Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>,
Yury Khrustalev <yury.khrustalev@arm.com>,
Wilco Dijkstra <wilco.dijkstra@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v11 23/39] arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack()
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 02:15:26 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240822-arm64-gcs-v11-23-41b81947ecb5@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240822-arm64-gcs-v11-0-41b81947ecb5@kernel.org>
As discussed extensively in the changelog for the addition of this
syscall on x86 ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall") the
existing mmap() and madvise() syscalls do not map entirely well onto the
security requirements for guarded control stacks since they lead to
windows where memory is allocated but not yet protected or stacks which
are not properly and safely initialised. Instead a new syscall
map_shadow_stack() has been defined which allocates and initialises a
shadow stack page.
Implement this for arm64. Two flags are provided, allowing applications
to request that the stack be initialised with a valid cap token at the
top of the stack and optionally also an end of stack marker above that.
We support requesting an end of stack marker alone but since this is a
NULL pointer it is indistinguishable from not initialising anything by
itself.
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 64 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
index 5eb746fdd872..d9614900c910 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
@@ -67,6 +67,70 @@ unsigned long gcs_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk,
return addr;
}
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags)
+{
+ unsigned long alloc_size;
+ unsigned long __user *cap_ptr;
+ unsigned long cap_val;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int cap_offset;
+
+ if (!system_supports_gcs())
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (flags & ~(SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN | SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(addr))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (size == 8 || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 8))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * An overflow would result in attempting to write the restore token
+ * to the wrong location. Not catastrophic, but just return the right
+ * error code and block it.
+ */
+ alloc_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
+ if (alloc_size < size)
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+
+ addr = alloc_gcs(addr, alloc_size);
+ if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+ return addr;
+
+ /*
+ * Put a cap token at the end of the allocated region so it
+ * can be switched to.
+ */
+ if (flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN) {
+ /* Leave an extra empty frame as a top of stack marker? */
+ if (flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER)
+ cap_offset = 2;
+ else
+ cap_offset = 1;
+
+ cap_ptr = (unsigned long __user *)(addr + size -
+ (cap_offset * sizeof(unsigned long)));
+ cap_val = GCS_CAP(cap_ptr);
+
+ put_user_gcs(cap_val, cap_ptr, &ret);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ vm_munmap(addr, size);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure the new cap is ordered before standard
+ * memory accesses to the same location.
+ */
+ gcsb_dsync();
+ }
+
+ return addr;
+}
+
/*
* Apply the GCS mode configured for the specified task to the
* hardware.
--
2.39.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-22 1:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-22 1:15 [PATCH v11 00/39] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 01/39] mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 02/39] arm64/mm: Restructure arch_validate_flags() for extensibility Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 03/39] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 04/39] mman: Add map_shadow_stack() flags Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 05/39] arm64: Document boot requirements for Guarded Control Stacks Mark Brown
2024-08-22 8:58 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 06/39] arm64/gcs: Document the ABI " Mark Brown
2024-08-22 10:04 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 07/39] arm64/sysreg: Add definitions for architected GCS caps Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 08/39] arm64/gcs: Add manual encodings of GCS instructions Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 09/39] arm64/gcs: Provide put_user_gcs() Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 10/39] arm64/gcs: Provide basic EL2 setup to allow GCS usage at EL0 and EL1 Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 11/39] arm64/cpufeature: Runtime detection of Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 12/39] arm64/mm: Allocate PIE slots for EL0 guarded control stack Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 13/39] mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for arm64 when we support GCS Mark Brown
2024-08-22 10:14 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 14/39] arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack Mark Brown
2024-08-22 10:19 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 15/39] KVM: arm64: Manage GCS access and registers for guests Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 16/39] arm64/idreg: Add overrride for GCS Mark Brown
2024-08-22 11:30 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 17/39] arm64/hwcap: Add hwcap " Mark Brown
2024-08-22 11:31 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 18/39] arm64/traps: Handle GCS exceptions Mark Brown
2024-08-22 11:31 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 15:44 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 16:31 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 19/39] arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts Mark Brown
2024-08-22 16:12 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 16:44 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 17:19 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 17:30 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 20/39] arm64/gcs: Context switch GCS state for EL0 Mark Brown
2024-08-22 16:15 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 21/39] arm64/gcs: Ensure that new threads have a GCS Mark Brown
2024-08-22 16:17 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 16:24 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 22/39] arm64/gcs: Implement shadow stack prctl() interface Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` Mark Brown [this message]
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 24/39] arm64/signal: Set up and restore the GCS context for signal handlers Mark Brown
2024-08-23 9:11 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 25/39] arm64/signal: Expose GCS state in signal frames Mark Brown
2024-08-23 9:37 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-23 10:25 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-23 15:59 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-23 22:01 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-26 10:00 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-28 17:32 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 26/39] arm64/ptrace: Expose GCS via ptrace and core files Mark Brown
2024-08-23 9:41 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 27/39] arm64: Add Kconfig for Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2024-08-23 9:48 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 28/39] kselftest/arm64: Verify the GCS hwcap Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 29/39] kselftest/arm64: Add GCS as a detected feature in the signal tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 30/39] kselftest/arm64: Add framework support for GCS to signal handling tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 31/39] kselftest/arm64: Allow signals tests to specify an expected si_code Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 32/39] kselftest/arm64: Always run signals tests with GCS enabled Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 33/39] kselftest/arm64: Add very basic GCS test program Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 34/39] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS test program built with the system libc Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 35/39] kselftest/arm64: Add test coverage for GCS mode locking Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 36/39] kselftest/arm64: Add GCS signal tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 37/39] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS stress test Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 38/39] kselftest/arm64: Enable GCS for the FP stress tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 39/39] KVM: selftests: arm64: Add GCS registers to get-reg-list Mark Brown
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