From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>,
Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>,
Yury Khrustalev <yury.khrustalev@arm.com>,
Wilco Dijkstra <wilco.dijkstra@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH v11 01/39] mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 02:15:04 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240822-arm64-gcs-v11-1-41b81947ecb5@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240822-arm64-gcs-v11-0-41b81947ecb5@kernel.org>
Since multiple architectures have support for shadow stacks and we need to
select support for this feature in several places in the generic code
provide a generic config option that the architectures can select.
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 2 +-
include/linux/mm.h | 2 +-
mm/Kconfig | 6 ++++++
4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 007bab9f2a0e..320e1f411163 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1957,6 +1957,7 @@ config X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
depends on AS_WRUSS
depends on X86_64
select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+ select ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
select X86_CET
help
Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index 5f171ad7b436..0ea49725f524 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -984,7 +984,7 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR
[ilog2(VM_UFFD_MINOR)] = "ui",
#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR */
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
[ilog2(VM_SHADOW_STACK)] = "ss",
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index c4b238a20b76..3357625c1db3 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
/*
* VM_SHADOW_STACK should not be set with VM_SHARED because of lack of
* support core mm.
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index b72e7d040f78..3167be663bca 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -1263,6 +1263,12 @@ config IOMMU_MM_DATA
config EXECMEM
bool
+config ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+ bool
+ help
+ The architecture has hardware support for userspace shadow call
+ stacks (eg, x86 CET, arm64 GCS or RISC-V Zicfiss).
+
source "mm/damon/Kconfig"
endmenu
--
2.39.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-25 18:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-22 1:15 [PATCH v11 00/39] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` Mark Brown [this message]
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 02/39] arm64/mm: Restructure arch_validate_flags() for extensibility Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 03/39] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 04/39] mman: Add map_shadow_stack() flags Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 05/39] arm64: Document boot requirements for Guarded Control Stacks Mark Brown
2024-08-22 8:58 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 06/39] arm64/gcs: Document the ABI " Mark Brown
2024-08-22 10:04 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 07/39] arm64/sysreg: Add definitions for architected GCS caps Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 08/39] arm64/gcs: Add manual encodings of GCS instructions Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 09/39] arm64/gcs: Provide put_user_gcs() Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 10/39] arm64/gcs: Provide basic EL2 setup to allow GCS usage at EL0 and EL1 Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 11/39] arm64/cpufeature: Runtime detection of Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 12/39] arm64/mm: Allocate PIE slots for EL0 guarded control stack Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 13/39] mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for arm64 when we support GCS Mark Brown
2024-08-22 10:14 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 14/39] arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack Mark Brown
2024-08-22 10:19 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 15/39] KVM: arm64: Manage GCS access and registers for guests Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 16/39] arm64/idreg: Add overrride for GCS Mark Brown
2024-08-22 11:30 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 17/39] arm64/hwcap: Add hwcap " Mark Brown
2024-08-22 11:31 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 18/39] arm64/traps: Handle GCS exceptions Mark Brown
2024-08-22 11:31 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 15:44 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 16:31 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 19/39] arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts Mark Brown
2024-08-22 16:12 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 16:44 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 17:19 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 17:30 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 20/39] arm64/gcs: Context switch GCS state for EL0 Mark Brown
2024-08-22 16:15 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 21/39] arm64/gcs: Ensure that new threads have a GCS Mark Brown
2024-08-22 16:17 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 16:24 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 22/39] arm64/gcs: Implement shadow stack prctl() interface Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 23/39] arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 24/39] arm64/signal: Set up and restore the GCS context for signal handlers Mark Brown
2024-08-23 9:11 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 25/39] arm64/signal: Expose GCS state in signal frames Mark Brown
2024-08-23 9:37 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-23 10:25 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-23 15:59 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-23 22:01 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-26 10:00 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-28 17:32 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 26/39] arm64/ptrace: Expose GCS via ptrace and core files Mark Brown
2024-08-23 9:41 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 27/39] arm64: Add Kconfig for Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2024-08-23 9:48 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 28/39] kselftest/arm64: Verify the GCS hwcap Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 29/39] kselftest/arm64: Add GCS as a detected feature in the signal tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 30/39] kselftest/arm64: Add framework support for GCS to signal handling tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 31/39] kselftest/arm64: Allow signals tests to specify an expected si_code Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 32/39] kselftest/arm64: Always run signals tests with GCS enabled Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 33/39] kselftest/arm64: Add very basic GCS test program Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 34/39] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS test program built with the system libc Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 35/39] kselftest/arm64: Add test coverage for GCS mode locking Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 36/39] kselftest/arm64: Add GCS signal tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 37/39] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS stress test Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 38/39] kselftest/arm64: Enable GCS for the FP stress tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22 1:15 ` [PATCH v11 39/39] KVM: selftests: arm64: Add GCS registers to get-reg-list Mark Brown
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