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From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
	 Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	 Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,  Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	 Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	 "Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	 Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	 Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	 Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	 Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	 Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>,
	 Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>,
	 Yury Khrustalev <yury.khrustalev@arm.com>,
	 Wilco Dijkstra <wilco.dijkstra@arm.com>,
	 linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	 kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	 linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
	 David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	 "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	 Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH v11 01/39] mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 02:15:04 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240822-arm64-gcs-v11-1-41b81947ecb5@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240822-arm64-gcs-v11-0-41b81947ecb5@kernel.org>

Since multiple architectures have support for shadow stacks and we need to
select support for this feature in several places in the generic code
provide a generic config option that the architectures can select.

Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig   | 1 +
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 2 +-
 include/linux/mm.h | 2 +-
 mm/Kconfig         | 6 ++++++
 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 007bab9f2a0e..320e1f411163 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1957,6 +1957,7 @@ config X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
 	depends on AS_WRUSS
 	depends on X86_64
 	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+	select ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
 	select X86_CET
 	help
 	  Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index 5f171ad7b436..0ea49725f524 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -984,7 +984,7 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR
 		[ilog2(VM_UFFD_MINOR)]	= "ui",
 #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR */
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
 		[ilog2(VM_SHADOW_STACK)] = "ss",
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index c4b238a20b76..3357625c1db3 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
 #endif
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
 /*
  * VM_SHADOW_STACK should not be set with VM_SHARED because of lack of
  * support core mm.
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index b72e7d040f78..3167be663bca 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -1263,6 +1263,12 @@ config IOMMU_MM_DATA
 config EXECMEM
 	bool
 
+config ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+	bool
+	help
+	  The architecture has hardware support for userspace shadow call
+          stacks (eg, x86 CET, arm64 GCS or RISC-V Zicfiss).
+
 source "mm/damon/Kconfig"
 
 endmenu

-- 
2.39.2



  reply	other threads:[~2024-08-25 18:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-22  1:15 [PATCH v11 00/39] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` Mark Brown [this message]
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 02/39] arm64/mm: Restructure arch_validate_flags() for extensibility Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 03/39] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 04/39] mman: Add map_shadow_stack() flags Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 05/39] arm64: Document boot requirements for Guarded Control Stacks Mark Brown
2024-08-22  8:58   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 06/39] arm64/gcs: Document the ABI " Mark Brown
2024-08-22 10:04   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 07/39] arm64/sysreg: Add definitions for architected GCS caps Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 08/39] arm64/gcs: Add manual encodings of GCS instructions Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 09/39] arm64/gcs: Provide put_user_gcs() Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 10/39] arm64/gcs: Provide basic EL2 setup to allow GCS usage at EL0 and EL1 Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 11/39] arm64/cpufeature: Runtime detection of Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 12/39] arm64/mm: Allocate PIE slots for EL0 guarded control stack Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 13/39] mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for arm64 when we support GCS Mark Brown
2024-08-22 10:14   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 14/39] arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack Mark Brown
2024-08-22 10:19   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 15/39] KVM: arm64: Manage GCS access and registers for guests Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 16/39] arm64/idreg: Add overrride for GCS Mark Brown
2024-08-22 11:30   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 17/39] arm64/hwcap: Add hwcap " Mark Brown
2024-08-22 11:31   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 18/39] arm64/traps: Handle GCS exceptions Mark Brown
2024-08-22 11:31   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 15:44   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 16:31     ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 19/39] arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts Mark Brown
2024-08-22 16:12   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 16:44     ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 17:19       ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 17:30         ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 20/39] arm64/gcs: Context switch GCS state for EL0 Mark Brown
2024-08-22 16:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 21/39] arm64/gcs: Ensure that new threads have a GCS Mark Brown
2024-08-22 16:17   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 16:24     ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 22/39] arm64/gcs: Implement shadow stack prctl() interface Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 23/39] arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 24/39] arm64/signal: Set up and restore the GCS context for signal handlers Mark Brown
2024-08-23  9:11   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 25/39] arm64/signal: Expose GCS state in signal frames Mark Brown
2024-08-23  9:37   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-23 10:25     ` Mark Brown
2024-08-23 15:59       ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-23 22:01         ` Mark Brown
2024-08-26 10:00           ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-28 17:32             ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 26/39] arm64/ptrace: Expose GCS via ptrace and core files Mark Brown
2024-08-23  9:41   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 27/39] arm64: Add Kconfig for Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2024-08-23  9:48   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 28/39] kselftest/arm64: Verify the GCS hwcap Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 29/39] kselftest/arm64: Add GCS as a detected feature in the signal tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 30/39] kselftest/arm64: Add framework support for GCS to signal handling tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 31/39] kselftest/arm64: Allow signals tests to specify an expected si_code Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 32/39] kselftest/arm64: Always run signals tests with GCS enabled Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 33/39] kselftest/arm64: Add very basic GCS test program Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 34/39] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS test program built with the system libc Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 35/39] kselftest/arm64: Add test coverage for GCS mode locking Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 36/39] kselftest/arm64: Add GCS signal tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 37/39] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS stress test Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 38/39] kselftest/arm64: Enable GCS for the FP stress tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 39/39] KVM: selftests: arm64: Add GCS registers to get-reg-list Mark Brown

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