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From: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	 Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	 Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	 Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	 Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>,
	 Jan Setje-Eilers <jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
	 Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	 Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
	Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>,
	 Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
	Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
	 Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	 Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>,
	Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>, Reiji Watanabe <reijiw@google.com>,
	 Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>,
	Ofir Weisse <oweisse@google.com>,
	 Yosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>,
	Patrick Bellasi <derkling@google.com>,
	 KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>,
	Alexandra Sandulescu <aesa@google.com>,
	 Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@google.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	 kvm@vger.kernel.org, Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 10/26] mm: asi: Avoid warning from NMI userspace accesses in ASI context
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2024 17:00:28 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240712-asi-rfc-24-v1-10-144b319a40d8@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240712-asi-rfc-24-v1-0-144b319a40d8@google.com>

nmi_uaccess_okay() emits a warning if current CR3 != mm->pgd.
Limit the warning to only when ASI is not active.

Co-developed-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index 02f73a71d4ea..e80cd67a5239 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -1326,6 +1326,24 @@ void arch_tlbbatch_flush(struct arch_tlbflush_unmap_batch *batch)
 	put_cpu();
 }
 
+static inline bool cr3_matches_current_mm(void)
+{
+	struct asi *asi = asi_get_current();
+	pgd_t *cr3_pgd;
+
+	/*
+	 * Prevent read_cr3_pa -> [NMI, asi_exit] -> asi_get_current,
+	 * otherwise we might find CR3 pointing to the ASI PGD but not
+	 * find a current ASI domain.
+	 */
+	barrier();
+	cr3_pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
+
+	if (cr3_pgd == current->mm->pgd)
+		return true;
+	return asi && (cr3_pgd == asi_pgd(asi));
+}
+
 /*
  * Blindly accessing user memory from NMI context can be dangerous
  * if we're in the middle of switching the current user task or
@@ -1341,10 +1359,10 @@ bool nmi_uaccess_okay(void)
 	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!loaded_mm);
 
 	/*
-	 * The condition we want to check is
-	 * current_mm->pgd == __va(read_cr3_pa()).  This may be slow, though,
-	 * if we're running in a VM with shadow paging, and nmi_uaccess_okay()
-	 * is supposed to be reasonably fast.
+	 * The condition we want to check that CR3 points to either
+	 * current_mm->pgd or an appropriate ASI PGD. Reading CR3 may be slow,
+	 * though, if we're running in a VM with shadow paging, and
+	 * nmi_uaccess_okay() is supposed to be reasonably fast.
 	 *
 	 * Instead, we check the almost equivalent but somewhat conservative
 	 * condition below, and we rely on the fact that switch_mm_irqs_off()
@@ -1353,7 +1371,7 @@ bool nmi_uaccess_okay(void)
 	if (loaded_mm != current_mm)
 		return false;
 
-	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(current_mm->pgd != __va(read_cr3_pa()));
+	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!cr3_matches_current_mm());
 
 	return true;
 }

-- 
2.45.2.993.g49e7a77208-goog



  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-07-12 17:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-07-12 17:00 [PATCH 00/26] Address Space Isolation (ASI) 2024 Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 01/26] mm: asi: Make some utility functions noinstr compatible Brendan Jackman
2024-10-25 11:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-25 13:21     ` Brendan Jackman
2024-10-29 17:38       ` Junaid Shahid
2024-10-29 19:12         ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-11-01  1:44           ` Junaid Shahid
2024-11-01 10:06             ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-01 20:27             ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-11-05 21:40               ` Junaid Shahid
2024-12-13 14:45               ` Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 02/26] x86: Create CONFIG_MITIGATION_ADDRESS_SPACE_ISOLATION Brendan Jackman
2024-07-22  7:55   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 03/26] mm: asi: Introduce ASI core API Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 04/26] objtool: let some noinstr functions make indirect calls Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 05/26] mm: asi: Add infrastructure for boot-time enablement Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 06/26] mm: asi: ASI support in interrupts/exceptions Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 07/26] mm: asi: Switch to unrestricted address space before a context switch Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 08/26] mm: asi: Use separate PCIDs for restricted address spaces Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 09/26] mm: asi: Make __get_current_cr3_fast() ASI-aware Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` Brendan Jackman [this message]
2024-07-14  3:59   ` [PATCH 10/26] mm: asi: Avoid warning from NMI userspace accesses in ASI context kernel test robot
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 11/26] mm: asi: ASI page table allocation functions Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 12/26] mm: asi: asi_exit() on PF, skip handling if address is accessible Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 13/26] mm: asi: Functions to map/unmap a memory range into ASI page tables Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 14/26] mm: asi: Add basic infrastructure for global non-sensitive mappings Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 15/26] mm: Add __PAGEFLAG_FALSE Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 16/26] mm: asi: Map non-user buddy allocations as nonsensitive Brendan Jackman
2024-08-21 13:59   ` Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 17/26] mm: asi: Map kernel text and static data " Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 18/26] mm: asi: Map vmalloc/vmap data as nonsesnitive Brendan Jackman
2024-07-13 15:53   ` kernel test robot
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 19/26] percpu: clean up all mappings when pcpu_map_pages() fails Brendan Jackman
2024-07-16  1:33   ` Yosry Ahmed
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 20/26] mm: asi: Map dynamic percpu memory as nonsensitive Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 21/26] KVM: x86: asi: Restricted address space for VM execution Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 22/26] KVM: x86: asi: Stabilize CR3 when potentially accessing with ASI Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 23/26] mm: asi: Stabilize CR3 in switch_mm_irqs_off() Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 24/26] mm: asi: Make TLB flushing correct under ASI Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 25/26] mm: asi: Stop ignoring asi=on cmdline flag Brendan Jackman
2024-07-12 17:00 ` [PATCH 26/26] KVM: x86: asi: Add some mitigations on address space transitions Brendan Jackman
2024-07-14  5:02   ` kernel test robot
2024-08-20 10:52   ` Shivank Garg
2024-08-21  9:38     ` Brendan Jackman
2024-08-21 16:00       ` Shivank Garg
2024-07-12 17:09 ` [PATCH 00/26] Address Space Isolation (ASI) 2024 Brendan Jackman
2024-09-11 16:37 ` Brendan Jackman

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