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From: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
To: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	<akpm@linux-foundation.org>, <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	<rppt@kernel.org>, <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	<mingo@redhat.com>, <bp@alien8.de>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, <hpa@zytor.com>, <willy@infradead.org>,
	<graf@amazon.com>, <derekmn@amazon.com>, <kalyazin@amazon.com>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-mm@kvack.org>, <dmatlack@google.com>, <tabba@google.com>,
	<chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>, <xmarcalx@amazon.co.uk>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 7/8] mm: secretmem: use AS_INACCESSIBLE to prohibit GUP
Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2024 14:20:35 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240709132041.3625501-8-roypat@amazon.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240709132041.3625501-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk>

Inside of vma_is_secretmem and secretmem_mapping, instead of checking
whether a vm_area_struct/address_space has the secretmem ops structure
attached to it, check whether the address_space has the AS_INACCESSIBLE
bit set. Then set the AS_INACCESSIBLE flag for secretmem's
address_space.

This means that get_user_pages and friends are disables for all
adress_spaces that set AS_INACCESIBLE. The AS_INACCESSIBLE flag was
introduced in commit c72ceafbd12c ("mm: Introduce AS_INACCESSIBLE for
encrypted/confidential memory") specifically for guest_memfd to indicate
that no reads and writes should ever be done to guest_memfd
address_spaces. Disallowing gup seems like a reasonable semantic
extension, and means that potential future mmaps of guest_memfd cannot
be GUP'd.

Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy <roypat@amazon.co.uk>
---
 include/linux/secretmem.h | 13 +++++++++++--
 mm/secretmem.c            |  6 +-----
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/secretmem.h b/include/linux/secretmem.h
index e918f96881f5..886c8f7eb63e 100644
--- a/include/linux/secretmem.h
+++ b/include/linux/secretmem.h
@@ -8,10 +8,19 @@ extern const struct address_space_operations secretmem_aops;
 
 static inline bool secretmem_mapping(struct address_space *mapping)
 {
-	return mapping->a_ops == &secretmem_aops;
+	return mapping->flags & AS_INACCESSIBLE;
+}
+
+static inline bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
+
+	if (!file)
+		return false;
+
+	return secretmem_mapping(file->f_inode->i_mapping);
 }
 
-bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 bool secretmem_active(void);
 
 #else
diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
index 3afb5ad701e1..fd03a84a1cb5 100644
--- a/mm/secretmem.c
+++ b/mm/secretmem.c
@@ -136,11 +136,6 @@ static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
-{
-	return vma->vm_ops == &secretmem_vm_ops;
-}
-
 static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = {
 	.release	= secretmem_release,
 	.mmap		= secretmem_mmap,
@@ -218,6 +213,7 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
 
 	inode->i_op = &secretmem_iops;
 	inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &secretmem_aops;
+	inode->i_mapping->flags |= AS_INACCESSIBLE;
 
 	/* pretend we are a normal file with zero size */
 	inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
-- 
2.45.2



  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-07-09 13:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-07-09 13:20 [RFC PATCH 0/8] Unmapping guest_memfd from Direct Map Patrick Roy
2024-07-09 13:20 ` [RFC PATCH 1/8] kvm: Allow reading/writing gmem using kvm_{read,write}_guest Patrick Roy
2024-07-09 13:20 ` [RFC PATCH 2/8] kvm: use slowpath in gfn_to_hva_cache if memory is private Patrick Roy
2024-07-09 13:20 ` [RFC PATCH 3/8] kvm: pfncache: enlighten about gmem Patrick Roy
2024-07-09 14:36   ` David Woodhouse
2024-07-10  9:49     ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-10 10:20       ` David Woodhouse
2024-07-10 10:46         ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-10 10:50           ` David Woodhouse
2024-07-09 13:20 ` [RFC PATCH 4/8] kvm: x86: support walking guest page tables in gmem Patrick Roy
2024-07-09 13:20 ` [RFC PATCH 5/8] kvm: gmem: add option to remove guest private memory from direct map Patrick Roy
2024-07-10  7:31   ` Mike Rapoport
2024-07-10  9:50     ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-09 13:20 ` [RFC PATCH 6/8] kvm: gmem: Temporarily restore direct map entries when needed Patrick Roy
2024-07-11  6:25   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-07-09 13:20 ` Patrick Roy [this message]
2024-07-09 21:09   ` [RFC PATCH 7/8] mm: secretmem: use AS_INACCESSIBLE to prohibit GUP David Hildenbrand
2024-07-10  7:32     ` Mike Rapoport
2024-07-10  9:50       ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-10 21:14         ` David Hildenbrand
2024-07-09 13:20 ` [RFC PATCH 8/8] kvm: gmem: Allow restricted userspace mappings Patrick Roy
2024-07-09 14:48   ` Fuad Tabba
2024-07-09 21:13     ` David Hildenbrand
2024-07-10  9:51       ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-10 21:12         ` David Hildenbrand
2024-07-10 21:53           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-10 21:56             ` David Hildenbrand
2024-07-12 15:59           ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-30 10:15             ` David Hildenbrand
2024-08-01 10:30               ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-22 12:28 ` [RFC PATCH 0/8] Unmapping guest_memfd from Direct Map Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2024-07-26  6:55   ` Patrick Roy
2024-07-30 10:17     ` David Hildenbrand
2024-07-26 16:44 ` Yosry Ahmed

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