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From: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
To: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
	Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
	Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 12/35] kmsan: Support SLAB_POISON
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2024 17:34:14 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240613153924.961511-13-iii@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240613153924.961511-1-iii@linux.ibm.com>

Avoid false KMSAN negatives with SLUB_DEBUG by allowing
kmsan_slab_free() to poison the freed memory, and by preventing
init_object() from unpoisoning new allocations by using __memset().

There are two alternatives to this approach. First, init_object()
can be marked with __no_sanitize_memory. This annotation should be used
with great care, because it drops all instrumentation from the
function, and any shadow writes will be lost. Even though this is not a
concern with the current init_object() implementation, this may change
in the future.

Second, kmsan_poison_memory() calls may be added after memset() calls.
The downside is that init_object() is called from
free_debug_processing(), in which case poisoning will erase the
distinction between simply uninitialized memory and UAF.

Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
---
 mm/kmsan/hooks.c |  2 +-
 mm/slub.c        | 13 +++++++++----
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
index 267d0afa2e8b..26d86dfdc819 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ void kmsan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
 		return;
 
 	/* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */
-	if (unlikely(s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)))
+	if (unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
 		return;
 	/*
 	 * If there's a constructor, freed memory must remain in the same state
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 1373ac365a46..4dd55cabe701 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -1139,7 +1139,12 @@ static void init_object(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, u8 val)
 	unsigned int poison_size = s->object_size;
 
 	if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) {
-		memset(p - s->red_left_pad, val, s->red_left_pad);
+		/*
+		 * Use __memset() here and below in order to avoid overwriting
+		 * the KMSAN shadow. Keeping the shadow makes it possible to
+		 * distinguish uninit-value from use-after-free.
+		 */
+		__memset(p - s->red_left_pad, val, s->red_left_pad);
 
 		if (slub_debug_orig_size(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE) {
 			/*
@@ -1152,12 +1157,12 @@ static void init_object(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, u8 val)
 	}
 
 	if (s->flags & __OBJECT_POISON) {
-		memset(p, POISON_FREE, poison_size - 1);
-		p[poison_size - 1] = POISON_END;
+		__memset(p, POISON_FREE, poison_size - 1);
+		__memset(p + poison_size - 1, POISON_END, 1);
 	}
 
 	if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
-		memset(p + poison_size, val, s->inuse - poison_size);
+		__memset(p + poison_size, val, s->inuse - poison_size);
 }
 
 static void restore_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, char *message, u8 data,
-- 
2.45.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-06-13 15:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-06-13 15:34 [PATCH v4 00/35] kmsan: Enable on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 01/35] ftrace: Unpoison ftrace_regs in ftrace_ops_list_func() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 16:21   ` Steven Rostedt
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 02/35] kmsan: Make the tests compatible with kmsan.panic=1 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 03/35] kmsan: Disable KMSAN when DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is enabled Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 04/35] kmsan: Increase the maximum store size to 4096 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 07/35] kmsan: Remove a useless assignment from kmsan_vmap_pages_range_noflush() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 08/35] kmsan: Remove an x86-specific #include from kmsan.h Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 09/35] kmsan: Expose kmsan_get_metadata() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-18 15:35   ` Alexander Potapenko
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 11/35] kmsan: Allow disabling KMSAN checks for the current task Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-18 12:22   ` Alexander Potapenko
2024-06-13 15:34 ` Ilya Leoshkevich [this message]
2024-06-13 23:30   ` [PATCH v4 12/35] kmsan: Support SLAB_POISON SeongJae Park
     [not found]     ` <5a8a3c85760c19be66965630418e09a820f79277.camel@linux.ibm.com>
2024-06-18 15:05       ` Alexander Potapenko
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 13/35] kmsan: Use ALIGN_DOWN() in kmsan_get_metadata() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 15/35] mm: slub: Let KMSAN access metadata Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-18 14:21   ` Alexander Potapenko
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 17/35] mm: kfence: Disable KMSAN when checking the canary Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 18/35] lib/zlib: Unpoison DFLTCC output buffers Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 19/35] kmsan: Accept ranges starting with 0 on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 20/35] s390/boot: Turn off KMSAN Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 21/35] s390: Use a larger stack for KMSAN Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 22/35] s390/boot: Add the KMSAN runtime stub Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 23/35] s390/checksum: Add a KMSAN check Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 25/35] s390/cpumf: Unpoison STCCTM output buffer Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 26/35] s390/diag: Unpoison diag224() " Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-18  9:26   ` Alexander Potapenko
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 27/35] s390/ftrace: Unpoison ftrace_regs in kprobe_ftrace_handler() Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 28/35] s390/irqflags: Do not instrument arch_local_irq_*() with KMSAN Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 29/35] s390/mm: Define KMSAN metadata for vmalloc and modules Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 30/35] s390/string: Add KMSAN support Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 33/35] s390/unwind: Disable KMSAN checks Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 34/35] s390: Implement the architecture-specific KMSAN functions Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-13 15:34 ` [PATCH v4 35/35] kmsan: Enable on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2024-06-18 15:36   ` Alexander Potapenko
     [not found] ` <20240613153924.961511-33-iii@linux.ibm.com>
2024-06-18  9:24   ` [PATCH v4 32/35] s390/uaccess: Add KMSAN support to put_user() and get_user() Alexander Potapenko
     [not found]     ` <e91768f518876ec9b53ffa8069b798107434d0dd.camel@linux.ibm.com>
2024-06-18  9:52       ` Alexander Potapenko
     [not found] ` <20240613153924.961511-15-iii@linux.ibm.com>
2024-06-18 14:37   ` [PATCH v4 14/35] kmsan: Do not round up pg_data_t size Alexander Potapenko
     [not found] ` <20240613153924.961511-17-iii@linux.ibm.com>
2024-06-18 14:38   ` [PATCH v4 16/35] mm: slub: Unpoison the memchr_inv() return value Alexander Potapenko

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