From: jeffxu@chromium.org
To: jeffxu@google.com
Cc: jeffxu@chromium.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
cyphar@cyphar.com, dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com,
dverkamp@chromium.org, hughd@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org,
keescook@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
pobrn@protonmail.com, skhan@linuxfoundation.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org, David Rheinsberg <david@readahead.eu>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/2] memfd: fix MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL to be non-sealable by default
Date: Fri, 24 May 2024 03:39:30 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240524033933.135049-2-jeffxu@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240524033933.135049-1-jeffxu@google.com>
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
By default, memfd_create() creates a non-sealable MFD, unless the
MFD_ALLOW_SEALING flag is set.
When the MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL flag is initially introduced, the MFD created
with that flag is sealable, even though MFD_ALLOW_SEALING is not set.
This patch changes MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL to be non-sealable by default,
unless MFD_ALLOW_SEALING is explicitly set.
This is a non-backward compatible change. However, as MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL
is new, we expect not many applications will rely on the nature of
MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL being sealable. In most cases, the application already
sets MFD_ALLOW_SEALING if they need a sealable MFD.
Additionally, this enhances the useability of pid namespace sysctl
vm.memfd_noexec. When vm.memfd_noexec equals 1 or 2, the kernel will
add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL if mfd_create does not specify MFD_EXEC or
MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, and the addition of MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL enables the MFD
to be sealable. This means, any application that does not desire this
behavior will be unable to utilize vm.memfd_noexec = 1 or 2 to
migrate/enforce non-executable MFD. This adjustment ensures that
applications can anticipate that the sealable characteristic will
remain unmodified by vm.memfd_noexec.
This patch was initially developed by Barnabás Pőcze, and Barnabás
used Debian Code Search and GitHub to try to find potential breakages
and could only find a single one. Dbus-broker's memfd_create() wrapper
is aware of this implicit `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING` behavior, and tries to
work around it [1]. This workaround will break. Luckily, this only
affects the test suite, it does not affect
the normal operations of dbus-broker. There is a PR with a fix[2]. In
addition, David Rheinsberg also raised similar fix in [3]
[1]: https://github.com/bus1/dbus-broker/blob/9eb0b7e5826fc76cad7b025bc46f267d4a8784cb/src/util/misc.c#L114
[2]: https://github.com/bus1/dbus-broker/pull/366
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230714114753.170814-1-david@readahead.eu/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 105ff5339f498a ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC")
Signed-off-by: Barnabás Pőcze <pobrn@protonmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Rheinsberg <david@readahead.eu>
---
mm/memfd.c | 9 ++++----
tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
index 7d8d3ab3fa37..8b7f6afee21d 100644
--- a/mm/memfd.c
+++ b/mm/memfd.c
@@ -356,12 +356,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
inode->i_mode &= ~0111;
file_seals = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file);
- if (file_seals) {
- *file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL;
+ if (file_seals)
*file_seals |= F_SEAL_EXEC;
- }
- } else if (flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) {
- /* MFD_EXEC and MFD_ALLOW_SEALING are set */
+ }
+
+ if (flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) {
file_seals = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file);
if (file_seals)
*file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c
index 95af2d78fd31..8579a93d006b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c
@@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@ static void test_noexec_seal(void)
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL);
mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666);
- mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
+ mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_EXEC);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
close(fd);
}
@@ -1169,6 +1169,14 @@ static void test_sysctl_sysctl0(void)
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, 0);
mfd_assert_chmod(fd, 0644);
close(fd);
+
+ fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_0_dfl",
+ mfd_def_size,
+ MFD_CLOEXEC);
+ mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0777);
+ mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SEAL);
+ mfd_assert_chmod(fd, 0644);
+ close(fd);
}
static void test_sysctl_set_sysctl0(void)
@@ -1206,6 +1214,14 @@ static void test_sysctl_sysctl1(void)
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
close(fd);
+
+ fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_1_noexec_nosealable",
+ mfd_def_size,
+ MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL);
+ mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666);
+ mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC | F_SEAL_SEAL);
+ mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
+ close(fd);
}
static void test_sysctl_set_sysctl1(void)
@@ -1238,6 +1254,14 @@ static void test_sysctl_sysctl2(void)
mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
close(fd);
+
+ fd = mfd_assert_new("kern_memfd_sysctl_2_noexec_notsealable",
+ mfd_def_size,
+ MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL);
+ mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666);
+ mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC | F_SEAL_SEAL);
+ mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
+ close(fd);
}
static void test_sysctl_set_sysctl2(void)
--
2.45.1.288.g0e0cd299f1-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-24 3:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-24 3:39 [PATCH v2 0/2] memfd: fix MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL to be non-sealable jeffxu
2024-05-24 3:39 ` jeffxu [this message]
2024-05-24 14:15 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] memfd: fix MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL to be non-sealable by default David Rheinsberg
2024-05-29 21:30 ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-29 21:46 ` Barnabás Pőcze
2024-05-29 22:24 ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-31 18:56 ` Barnabás Pőcze
2024-06-07 15:59 ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-24 3:39 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] memfd:add MEMFD_NOEXEC_SEAL documentation jeffxu
2024-05-24 3:42 ` Jeff Xu
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