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From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
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	<ashish.kalra@amd.com>, <nikunj.dadhania@amd.com>,
	<pankaj.gupta@amd.com>, <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Subject: [PATCH v15 20/20] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command
Date: Wed, 1 May 2024 03:52:10 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240501085210.2213060-21-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240501085210.2213060-1-michael.roth@amd.com>

When requesting an attestation report a guest is able to specify whether
it wants SNP firmware to sign the report using either a Versioned Chip
Endorsement Key (VCEK), which is derived from chip-unique secrets, or a
Versioned Loaded Endorsement Key (VLEK) which is obtained from an AMD
Key Derivation Service (KDS) and derived from seeds allocated to
enrolled cloud service providers (CSPs).

For VLEK keys, an SNP_VLEK_LOAD SNP firmware command is used to load
them into the system after obtaining them from the KDS. Add a
corresponding userspace interface so to allow the loading of VLEK keys
into the system.

See SEV-SNP Firmware ABI 1.54, SNP_VLEK_LOAD for more details.

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
 Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst | 19 ++++++++++++++
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c          | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h          | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst b/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
index e1eaf6a830ce..de68d3a4b540 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst
@@ -176,6 +176,25 @@ to SNP_CONFIG command defined in the SEV-SNP spec. The current values of
 the firmware parameters affected by this command can be queried via
 SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS.
 
+2.7 SNP_VLEK_LOAD
+-----------------
+:Technology: sev-snp
+:Type: hypervisor ioctl cmd
+:Parameters (in): struct sev_user_data_snp_vlek_load
+:Returns (out): 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+When requesting an attestation report a guest is able to specify whether
+it wants SNP firmware to sign the report using either a Versioned Chip
+Endorsement Key (VCEK), which is derived from chip-unique secrets, or a
+Versioned Loaded Endorsement Key (VLEK) which is obtained from an AMD
+Key Derivation Service (KDS) and derived from seeds allocated to
+enrolled cloud service providers.
+
+In the case of VLEK keys, the SNP_VLEK_LOAD SNP command is used to load
+them into the system after obtaining them from the KDS, and corresponds
+closely to the SNP_VLEK_LOAD firmware command specified in the SEV-SNP
+spec.
+
 3. SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
 ============================
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index 2102377f727b..97a7959406ee 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -2027,6 +2027,39 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_set_config(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable
 	return __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_CONFIG, &config, &argp->error);
 }
 
+static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_vlek_load(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable)
+{
+	struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
+	struct sev_user_data_snp_vlek_load input;
+	void *blob;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev->snp_initialized || !argp->data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!writable)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&input, u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), sizeof(input)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (input.len != sizeof(input) || input.vlek_wrapped_version != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	blob = psp_copy_user_blob(input.vlek_wrapped_address,
+				  sizeof(struct sev_user_data_snp_wrapped_vlek_hashstick));
+	if (IS_ERR(blob))
+		return PTR_ERR(blob);
+
+	input.vlek_wrapped_address = __psp_pa(blob);
+
+	ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_VLEK_LOAD, &input, &argp->error);
+
+	kfree(blob);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 {
 	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
@@ -2087,6 +2120,9 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 	case SNP_SET_CONFIG:
 		ret = sev_ioctl_do_snp_set_config(&input, writable);
 		break;
+	case SNP_VLEK_LOAD:
+		ret = sev_ioctl_do_snp_vlek_load(&input, writable);
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
index b7a2c2ee35b7..2289b7c76c59 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ enum {
 	SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS,
 	SNP_COMMIT,
 	SNP_SET_CONFIG,
+	SNP_VLEK_LOAD,
 
 	SEV_MAX,
 };
@@ -214,6 +215,32 @@ struct sev_user_data_snp_config {
 	__u8 rsvd1[52];
 } __packed;
 
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_snp_vlek_load - SNP_VLEK_LOAD structure
+ *
+ * @len: length of the command buffer read by the PSP
+ * @vlek_wrapped_version: version of wrapped VLEK hashstick (Must be 0h)
+ * @rsvd: reserved
+ * @vlek_wrapped_address: address of a wrapped VLEK hashstick
+ *                        (struct sev_user_data_snp_wrapped_vlek_hashstick)
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_snp_vlek_load {
+	__u32 len;				/* In */
+	__u8 vlek_wrapped_version;		/* In */
+	__u8 rsvd[3];				/* In */
+	__u64 vlek_wrapped_address;		/* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_snp_vlek_wrapped_vlek_hashstick - Wrapped VLEK data
+ *
+ * @data: Opaque data provided by AMD KDS (as described in SEV-SNP Firmware ABI
+ *        1.54, SNP_VLEK_LOAD)
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_snp_wrapped_vlek_hashstick {
+	__u8 data[432];				/* In */
+} __packed;
+
 /**
  * struct sev_issue_cmd - SEV ioctl parameters
  *
-- 
2.25.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-05-01  9:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-01  8:51 [PATCH v15 00/20] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 01/20] Revert "KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level" Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 02/20] KVM: x86: Add hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2024-05-02 23:11   ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-05-07 17:48   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-01 17:39   ` [PATCH] Fixes: f32fb32820b1 ("KVM: x86: Add hook for determining max NPT mapping level") Ackerley Tng
2024-08-01 17:57     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-01 17:59       ` Yosry Ahmed
2024-08-01 18:15     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 03/20] KVM: SEV: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 04/20] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 05/20] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 06/20] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 07/20] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 08/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 09/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-05-16  8:28   ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-16 17:23     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-21  0:49       ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-21 21:49         ` Michael Roth
2024-05-27 12:25           ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-28 10:39             ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-29 20:02               ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-31  1:22                 ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-31 13:10                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 16:47           ` Zhi Wang
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 10/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 11/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 12/20] KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 13/20] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2024-05-20 10:16   ` Huang, Kai
2024-05-20 17:35     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-20 21:57       ` Huang, Kai
2024-05-20 23:15         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-20 23:41           ` Huang, Kai
2024-05-21  0:30             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-20 19:14     ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 14/20] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 15/20] KVM: x86: Implement hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 16/20] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 17/20] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 18/20] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 19/20] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST " Michael Roth
2024-05-13 23:48   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-14  2:51     ` Michael Roth
2024-05-14 14:36       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-15  1:25         ` [PATCH] KVM: SEV: Replace KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT with KVM_EXIT_SNP_REQ_CERTS Michael Roth
2024-08-16 21:50           ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-08-16 21:58             ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-05-01  8:52 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2024-05-07 18:04 ` [PATCH v15 00/20] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:14   ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10  2:34     ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10  1:58 ` [PATCH v15 21/23] KVM: MMU: Disable fast path for private memslots Michael Roth
2024-05-10  1:58   ` [PATCH v15 22/23] KVM: SEV: Fix return code interpretation for RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2024-05-10 13:58     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-10 15:36       ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 16:01       ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 16:37         ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 16:59           ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 17:25             ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-14  8:10             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-10  1:58   ` [PATCH v15 23/23] KVM: SEV: Fix PSC handling for SMASH/UNSMASH and partial update ops Michael Roth
2024-05-10 17:09     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 19:08       ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 13:47   ` [PATCH v15 21/23] KVM: MMU: Disable fast path for private memslots Sean Christopherson
2024-05-10 13:50     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 15:27       ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 15:59         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-10 17:47           ` Isaku Yamahata

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