From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] alloc_tag: Tighten file permissions on /proc/allocinfo
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2024 16:47:18 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240425164718.e8e187dd0c5b0a87371d8316@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202404251532.F8860056AE@keescook>
On Thu, 25 Apr 2024 15:42:30 -0700 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > The concern about leaking image layout could be addressed by sorting the
> > output before returning to userspace.
>
> It's trivial to change permissions from the default 0400 at boot time.
> It can even have groups and ownership changed, etc. This is why we have
> per-mount-namespace /proc instances:
>
> # chgrp sysmonitor /proc/allocinfo
> # chmod 0440 /proc/allocinfo
>
> Poof, instant role-based access control. :)
Conversely, the paranoid could set it to 0400 at boot also.
> I'm just trying to make the _default_ safe.
Agree with this.
Semi-seriously, how about we set the permissions to 0000 and force
distributors/users to make a decision.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-25 23:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-25 20:08 Kees Cook
2024-04-25 20:45 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-25 20:51 ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-04-25 21:04 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-25 21:21 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2024-04-25 21:25 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-25 21:38 ` Andrew Morton
2024-04-25 21:45 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-26 8:32 ` Pavel Machek
2024-04-26 8:46 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-25 22:42 ` Kees Cook
2024-04-25 23:02 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-25 23:47 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2024-04-26 0:27 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-26 0:43 ` Kees Cook
2024-04-26 0:58 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-26 3:25 ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-04-26 3:35 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-26 8:34 ` Pavel Machek
2024-04-26 0:39 ` Kees Cook
2024-04-25 20:57 ` Kees Cook
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20240425164718.e8e187dd0c5b0a87371d8316@linux-foundation.org \
--to=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kent.overstreet@linux.dev \
--cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=surenb@google.com \
--cc=willy@infradead.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox