From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] alloc_tag: Tighten file permissions on /proc/allocinfo
Date: Thu, 25 Apr 2024 14:38:42 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240425143842.fe54147e4073c7d5e8b48d7b@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJuCfpGiRFAOp-aqpVk6GRpG=4LEF3XyuV_LijzwDYRHKqHWWg@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, 25 Apr 2024 14:21:39 -0700 Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> wrote:
> > > > The side effect of locking down more and more reporting interfaces is
> > > > that programs that consume those interfaces now have to run as root.
> > >
> > > sudo cat /proc/allocinfo | analyse-that-fie
> >
> > Even that is still an annoyance, but I'm thinking more about a future
> > daemon to collect this every n seconds - that really shouldn't need to
> > be root.
>
> Yeah, that would preclude some nice usecases. Could we maybe use
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks instead? That way we can still use it from a
> non-root process?
I'm inclined to keep Kees's 0400. Yes it's a hassle but security is
always a hassle. Let's not make Linux less secure, especially for
people who aren't even using /proc/allocinfo.
If someone really wants 0666 then they can chmod the thing from
initscripts, can't they?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-25 21:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-25 20:08 Kees Cook
2024-04-25 20:45 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-25 20:51 ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-04-25 21:04 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-25 21:21 ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2024-04-25 21:25 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-25 21:38 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2024-04-25 21:45 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-26 8:32 ` Pavel Machek
2024-04-26 8:46 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-25 22:42 ` Kees Cook
2024-04-25 23:02 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-25 23:47 ` Andrew Morton
2024-04-26 0:27 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-26 0:43 ` Kees Cook
2024-04-26 0:58 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-26 3:25 ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-04-26 3:35 ` Kent Overstreet
2024-04-26 8:34 ` Pavel Machek
2024-04-26 0:39 ` Kees Cook
2024-04-25 20:57 ` Kees Cook
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