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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	seanjc@google.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com,
	luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com,
	pgonda@google.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com, rientjes@google.com,
	tobin@ibm.com, vbabka@suse.cz, kirill@shutemov.name,
	ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, alpergun@google.com,
	jarkko@kernel.org, ashish.kalra@amd.com, nikunj.dadhania@amd.com,
	pankaj.gupta@amd.com, liam.merwick@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/25] x86/sev: Adjust directmap to avoid inadvertant RMP faults
Date: Sat, 27 Jan 2024 17:02:49 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240127160249.GDZbUpKW_cqRzdYn7Z@fat_crate.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240127154506.v3wdio25zs6i2lc3@amd.com>

On Sat, Jan 27, 2024 at 09:45:06AM -0600, Michael Roth wrote:
> directmap maps all physical memory accessible by kernel, including text
> pages, so those are valid PFNs as far as this function is concerned.

Why don't you have a look at

Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst

to sync up on the nomenclature first?

   ffff888000000000 | -119.5  TB | ffffc87fffffffff |   64 TB | direct mapping of all physical memory (page_offset_base)

   ...

   ffffffff80000000 |   -2    GB | ffffffff9fffffff |  512 MB | kernel text mapping, mapped to physical address 0

and so on.

> The expectation is that the caller is aware of what PFNs it is passing in,

There are no expectations. Have you written them down somewhere?

> This function only splits mappings in the 0xffff888000000000 directmap
> range.

This function takes any PFN it gets passed in as it is. I don't care
who its users are now or in the future and whether they pay attention
what they pass into - it needs to be properly defined.

Mike, please get on with the program. Use the right naming for the
function and basta.

IOW, this:

diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index 0a8f9334ec6e..652ee63e87fd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(psmash);
  * More specifics on how these checks are carried out can be found in APM
  * Volume 2, "RMP and VMPL Access Checks".
  */
-static int adjust_direct_map(u64 pfn, int rmp_level)
+static int split_pfn(u64 pfn, int rmp_level)
 {
 	unsigned long vaddr = (unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn);
 	unsigned int level;
@@ -405,7 +405,12 @@ static int adjust_direct_map(u64 pfn, int rmp_level)
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rmp_level > PG_LEVEL_2M))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rmp_level == PG_LEVEL_2M && !IS_ALIGNED(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD)))
+       if (!pfn_valid(pfn))
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (rmp_level == PG_LEVEL_2M &&
+           (!IS_ALIGNED(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD) ||
+            !pfn_valid(pfn + PTRS_PER_PMD - 1)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/*
@@ -456,7 +461,7 @@ static int rmpupdate(u64 pfn, struct rmp_state *state)
 
 	level = RMP_TO_PG_LEVEL(state->pagesize);
 
-	if (adjust_direct_map(pfn, level))
+	if (split_pfn(pfn, level))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	do {


-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette


  reply	other threads:[~2024-01-27 16:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-26  4:11 [PATCH v2 00/25] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 01/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 02/25] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 03/25] iommu/amd: Don't rely on external callers to enable IOMMU SNP support Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 04/25] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 05/25] x86/mtrr: Don't print errors if MtrrFixDramModEn is set when SNP enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 06/25] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 07/25] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 08/25] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 09/25] x86/fault: Dump RMP table information when RMP page faults occur Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 10/25] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2024-01-29 18:00   ` Liam Merwick
2024-01-29 19:28     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 19:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 11/25] x86/sev: Adjust directmap to avoid inadvertant RMP faults Michael Roth
2024-01-26 15:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 17:04     ` Michael Roth
2024-01-26 18:43       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 23:54         ` Michael Roth
2024-01-27 11:42           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27 15:45             ` Michael Roth
2024-01-27 16:02               ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2024-01-29 11:59                 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 15:26                   ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 12/25] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 13/25] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-01-29 17:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 14/25] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 15/25] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2024-01-29 14:26   ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-29 14:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 16/25] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-29 15:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 17/25] crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data " Michael Roth
2024-01-29 15:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 18/25] crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands " Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 19/25] iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 20/25] crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 21/25] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2024-01-26 11:00   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 22/25] x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 23/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 24/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 25/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2024-01-29 19:18   ` Liam Merwick
2024-01-29 20:10     ` Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Borislav Petkov

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