From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
seanjc@google.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com,
luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com,
pgonda@google.com, peterz@infradead.org,
srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com, rientjes@google.com,
tobin@ibm.com, vbabka@suse.cz, kirill@shutemov.name,
ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, alpergun@google.com,
jarkko@kernel.org, ashish.kalra@amd.com, nikunj.dadhania@amd.com,
pankaj.gupta@amd.com, liam.merwick@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/25] x86/sev: Adjust directmap to avoid inadvertant RMP faults
Date: Sat, 27 Jan 2024 12:42:07 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240127114207.GBZbTsDyC3hFq8pQ3D@fat_crate.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240126235420.mu644waj2eyoxqx6@amd.com>
On Fri, Jan 26, 2024 at 05:54:20PM -0600, Michael Roth wrote:
> Is something like this close to what you're thinking? I've re-tested with
> SNP guests and it seems to work as expected.
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
> index 846e9e53dff0..c09497487c08 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
> @@ -421,7 +421,12 @@ static int adjust_direct_map(u64 pfn, int rmp_level)
> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rmp_level > PG_LEVEL_2M))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rmp_level == PG_LEVEL_2M && !IS_ALIGNED(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD)))
> + if (!pfn_valid(pfn))
_text at VA 0xffffffff81000000 is also a valid pfn so no, this is not
enough.
Either this function should not have "direct map" in the name as it
converts *any* valid pfn not just the direct map ones or it should check
whether the pfn belongs to the direct map range.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-27 11:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-26 4:11 [PATCH v2 00/25] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 01/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 02/25] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 03/25] iommu/amd: Don't rely on external callers to enable IOMMU SNP support Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 04/25] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 05/25] x86/mtrr: Don't print errors if MtrrFixDramModEn is set when SNP enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 06/25] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 07/25] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 08/25] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 09/25] x86/fault: Dump RMP table information when RMP page faults occur Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 10/25] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2024-01-29 18:00 ` Liam Merwick
2024-01-29 19:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 19:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 11/25] x86/sev: Adjust directmap to avoid inadvertant RMP faults Michael Roth
2024-01-26 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 17:04 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-26 18:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 23:54 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-27 11:42 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2024-01-27 15:45 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-27 16:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 11:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 15:26 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 12/25] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 13/25] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-01-29 17:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 14/25] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 15/25] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2024-01-29 14:26 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-29 14:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 16/25] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-29 15:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 17/25] crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data " Michael Roth
2024-01-29 15:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 18/25] crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands " Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 19/25] iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 20/25] crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 21/25] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2024-01-26 11:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 22/25] x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 23/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 24/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 25/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2024-01-29 19:18 ` Liam Merwick
2024-01-29 20:10 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Borislav Petkov
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