From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
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<ashish.kalra@amd.com>, <nikunj.dadhania@amd.com>,
<pankaj.gupta@amd.com>, <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/25] x86/sev: Adjust directmap to avoid inadvertant RMP faults
Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 17:54:20 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240126235420.mu644waj2eyoxqx6@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240126184340.GEZbP9XA13X91-eybA@fat_crate.local>
On Fri, Jan 26, 2024 at 07:43:40PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 26, 2024 at 11:04:15AM -0600, Michael Roth wrote:
> > vaddr comes from pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), i.e. __va(paddr), so it will
> > necessarily be a direct-mapped address above __PAGE_OFFSET.
>
> Ah, true.
>
> > For upper-end, a pfn_valid(pfn) check might suffice, since only a valid
> > PFN would have a possibly-valid mapping wthin the directmap range.
>
> Looking at it, yap, that could be a sensible thing to check.
>
> > These are PFNs that are owned/allocated-to the caller. Due to the nature
> > of the directmap it's possible non-owners would write to a mapping that
> > overlaps, but vmalloc()/etc. would not create mappings for any pages that
> > were not specifically part of an allocation that belongs to the caller,
> > so I don't see where there's any chance for an overlap there. And the caller
> > of these functions would not be adjusting directmap for PFNs that might be
> > mapped into other kernel address ranges like kernel-text/etc unless the
> > caller was specifically making SNP-aware adjustments to those ranges, in
> > which case it would be responsible for making those other adjustments,
> > or implementing the necessary helpers/etc.
>
> Why does any of that matter?
>
> If you can make this helper as generic as possible now, why don't you?
In this case, it would make it more difficult to handle things
efficiently and implement proper bounds-checking/etc. For instance, if
the caller *knows* they are doing something different like splitting a
kernel-text mapping, then we could implement proper bounds-checking
based on expected ranges, and implement any special handling associated
with that use-case, and capture that in a nice/understandable
adjust_kernel_text_mapping() helper. Or maybe if these are adjustments
for non-static/non-linear mappings, it makes more sense to be given an
HVA rather than PFN, etc., since we might not have any sort of reverse-map
structure/function than can be used to do the PFN->HVA lookups efficiently.
It's just a lot to guess at. And just the directmap splitting itself has
been the source of so much discussion, investigation, re-work, benchmarking,
etc., that it hints that implementing similar handling for other use-cases
really needs to have a clear and necessary purpose and set of requirements
hat can be evaluated/tested before enabling them and reasonably expecting
them to work as expected.
>
> > I'm not aware of such cases in the current code, and I don't think it makes
> > sense to attempt to try to handle them here generically until such a case
> > arises, since it will likely involve more specific requirements than what
> > we can anticipate from a theoretical/generic standpoint.
>
> Then that's a different story. If it will likely involve more specific
> handling, then that function should deal with pfns for which it can DTRT
> and for others warn loudly so that the code gets fixed in time.
>
> IOW, then it should check for the upper pfn of the direct map here and
> we have two, depending on the page sizes used...
Is something like this close to what you're thinking? I've re-tested with
SNP guests and it seems to work as expected.
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index 846e9e53dff0..c09497487c08 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -421,7 +421,12 @@ static int adjust_direct_map(u64 pfn, int rmp_level)
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rmp_level > PG_LEVEL_2M))
return -EINVAL;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rmp_level == PG_LEVEL_2M && !IS_ALIGNED(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD)))
+ if (!pfn_valid(pfn))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (rmp_level == PG_LEVEL_2M &&
+ (!IS_ALIGNED(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD) ||
+ !pfn_valid(pfn + PTRS_PER_PMD - 1)))
return -EINVAL;
Note that I removed the WARN_ON_ONCE(), which I think was a bit overzealous
for this check. The one above it for rmp_level > PG_LEVEL_2M I think is more
warranted, since it returns error for a use-case that might in theory become
valid on future hardware, but would result in unecessary 1GB->2MB directmap
splitting if we were to try to implement handling for that before it's
actually needed (which may well be never).
-Mike
>
> Thx.
>
> --
> Regards/Gruss,
> Boris.
>
> https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-26 23:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-26 4:11 [PATCH v2 00/25] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 01/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 02/25] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 03/25] iommu/amd: Don't rely on external callers to enable IOMMU SNP support Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 04/25] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 05/25] x86/mtrr: Don't print errors if MtrrFixDramModEn is set when SNP enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 06/25] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 07/25] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 08/25] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 09/25] x86/fault: Dump RMP table information when RMP page faults occur Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 10/25] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2024-01-29 18:00 ` Liam Merwick
2024-01-29 19:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 19:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 11/25] x86/sev: Adjust directmap to avoid inadvertant RMP faults Michael Roth
2024-01-26 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 17:04 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-26 18:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 23:54 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2024-01-27 11:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27 15:45 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-27 16:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 11:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 15:26 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 12/25] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 13/25] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-01-29 17:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 14/25] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 15/25] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2024-01-29 14:26 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-29 14:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 16/25] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-29 15:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 17/25] crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data " Michael Roth
2024-01-29 15:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 18/25] crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands " Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 19/25] iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 20/25] crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 21/25] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2024-01-26 11:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 22/25] x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 23/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 24/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 25/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2024-01-29 19:18 ` Liam Merwick
2024-01-29 20:10 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Borislav Petkov
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