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From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
	<linux-mm@kvack.org>, <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	<mingo@redhat.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
	<ardb@kernel.org>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <seanjc@google.com>,
	<vkuznets@redhat.com>, <jmattson@google.com>, <luto@kernel.org>,
	<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <slp@redhat.com>,
	<pgonda@google.com>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
	<srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>, <rientjes@google.com>,
	<tobin@ibm.com>, <vbabka@suse.cz>, <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	<ak@linux.intel.com>, <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
	<alpergun@google.com>, <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	<ashish.kalra@amd.com>, <nikunj.dadhania@amd.com>,
	<pankaj.gupta@amd.com>, <liam.merwick@oracle.com>,
	<zhi.a.wang@intel.com>, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 11/26] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 19:49:35 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240126014935.m6yhr2jv2r4kfenc@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZabjKpCqx9np0SEI@kernel.org>

On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 10:12:26PM +0200, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 10:50:25AM -0600, Michael Roth wrote:
> > On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 10:19:09AM -0600, Michael Roth wrote:
> > > 
> > > The downside of course is potential impact for non-SNP workloads
> > > resulting from splitting the directmap. Mike Rapoport's numbers make
> > > me feel a little better about it, but I don't think they apply directly
> > > to the notion of splitting the entire directmap. It's Even he LWN article
> > > summarizes:
> 
> When I ran the tests, I had the entire direct map forced to 4k or 2M pages.
> There is indeed some impact and some tests suffer more than others but
> there were also runs that benefit from smaller page size in the direct map,
> at least if I remember correctly the results Intel folks posted a while
> ago.

I see, thanks for clarifying. Certainly helps to have this data if someone
ends up wanting to investigate pre-splitting directmap to optimize SNP
use-cases in the future. Still feel more comfortable introducing this as an
optional tuneable though; can't help but worry about that *1* workload that
somehow suffers perf regression and has us frantically re-working SNP
implementation if we were to start off with making 4k directmap a requirement.

>  
> > >   "The conclusion from all of this, Rapoport continued, was that
> > >   direct-map fragmentation just does not matter — for data access, at
> > >   least. Using huge-page mappings does still appear to make a difference
> > >   for memory containing the kernel code, so allocator changes should
> > >   focus on code allocations — improving the layout of allocations for
> > >   loadable modules, for example, or allowing vmalloc() to allocate huge
> > >   pages for code. But, for kernel-data allocations, direct-map
> > >   fragmentation simply appears to not be worth worrying about."
> > > 
> > > So at the very least, if we went down this path, we would be worth
> > > investigating the following areas in addition to general perf testing:
> > > 
> > >   1) Only splitting directmap regions corresponding to kernel-allocatable
> > >      *data* (hopefully that's even feasible...)
> 
> Forcing the direct map to 4k pages does not affect the kernel text
> mappings, they are created separately and they are not the part of the
> kernel mapping of the physical memory.
> Well, except the modules, but they are mapped with 4k pages anyway.

Thanks!

-Mike

> 
> > -Mike
> 
> -- 
> Sincerely yours,
> Mike.


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-01-26  3:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 101+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-12-30 16:19 [PATCH v1 00/26] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 01/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-12-31 11:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-31 16:44     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 02/26] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 03/26] iommu/amd: Don't rely on external callers to enable IOMMU SNP support Michael Roth
2024-01-04 10:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-04 10:58   ` Joerg Roedel
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 04/26] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2024-01-04 11:05   ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-05 16:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-05 16:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-08 16:49         ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-08 17:04           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-09 11:56             ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-09 12:29               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-09 12:44                 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-14 16:56                   ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2024-01-04 11:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-04 14:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-05 19:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-05 21:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 05/26] x86/mtrr: Don't print errors if MtrrFixDramModEn is set when SNP enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 06/26] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 07/26] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2024-01-10  9:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 20:18     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-01-10 22:14       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 11:13   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 15:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-10 15:27       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 15:51         ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-10 15:55           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-10 15:10   ` Tom Lendacky
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 08/26] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 09/26] x86/fault: Dump RMP table information when RMP page faults occur Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 10/26] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2024-01-12 14:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 11/26] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2024-01-12 19:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-12 20:00   ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-12 20:07     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-12 20:27       ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-15  9:06         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-15  9:14           ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-15  9:16           ` Mike Rapoport
2024-01-15  9:20             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-12 20:28       ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-12 20:37         ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-15  9:23           ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-16 16:19           ` Michael Roth
2024-01-16 16:50             ` Michael Roth
     [not found]               ` <ZabjKpCqx9np0SEI@kernel.org>
2024-01-26  1:49                 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2024-01-16 18:22             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-16 20:22             ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-26  1:35               ` Michael Roth
2024-01-15  9:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-16 16:21       ` Dave Hansen
2024-01-17  9:34         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-15  9:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 12/26] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-15  9:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  1:56     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 13/26] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-01-15 11:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-15 19:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  2:48     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 14/26] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-17  9:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 15/26] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2024-01-08 10:45   ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-09 22:19     ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-01-10  8:59       ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 16/26] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 17/26] crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data " Michael Roth
2024-01-18 14:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 18/26] crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands " Michael Roth
2024-01-19 17:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-19 17:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-01-19 17:48       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 13:29     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 19/26] iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 20/26] crypto: ccp: Add debug support for decrypting pages Michael Roth
2024-01-10 14:59   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-11  0:50     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 21/26] crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump Michael Roth
2024-01-21 11:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  3:03     ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-01-26 13:38     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 22/26] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2024-01-21 11:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  3:44     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 23/26] x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 24/26] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2024-01-21 12:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26  3:32     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 25/26] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command Michael Roth
2024-01-21 12:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v1 26/26] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2024-01-21 12:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 13:30     ` Michael Roth

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