From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
Kevin Locke <kevin@kevinlocke.name>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] exec: Check __FMODE_EXEC instead of in_execve for LSMs
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 13:32:02 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202401241310.0A158998@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wiUwRG7LuR=z5sbkFVGQh+7qVB6_1NM0Ny9SVNL1Un4Sw@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 12:47:34PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Wed, 24 Jan 2024 at 12:15, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> >
> > Hmpf, and frustratingly Ubuntu (and Debian) still builds with
> > CONFIG_USELIB, even though it was reported[2] to them almost 4 years ago.
For completeness, Fedora hasn't had CONFIG_USELIB for a while now.
> Well, we could just remove the __FMODE_EXEC from uselib.
>
> It's kind of wrong anyway.
Yeah.
> So I think just removing __FMODE_EXEC would just do the
> RightThing(tm), and changes nothing for any sane situation.
Agreed about these:
- fs/fcntl.c is just doing a bitfield sanity check.
- nfs_open_permission_mask(), as you say, is only checking for
unreadable case.
- fsnotify would also see uselib() as a read, but afaict,
that's what it would see for an mmap(), so this should
be functionally safe.
This one, though, I need some more time to examine:
- AppArmor, TOMOYO, and LandLock will see uselib() as an
open-for-read, so that might still be a problem? As you
say, it's more of a mmap() call, but that would mean
adding something a call like security_mmap_file() into
uselib()...
The issue isn't an insane "support uselib() under AppArmor" case, but
rather "Can uselib() be used to bypass exec/mmap checks?"
This totally untested patch might give appropriate coverage:
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index d179abb78a1c..0c9265312c8d 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -143,6 +143,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library)
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out;
+ error = security_mmap_file(file, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_FIXED | MAP_SHARED);
+ if (error)
+ goto exit;
+
/*
* may_open() has already checked for this, so it should be
* impossible to trip now. But we need to be extra cautious
> Of course, as you say, not having CONFIG_USELIB enabled at all is the
> _truly_ sane thing, but the only thing that used the FMODE_EXEC bit
> were landlock and some special-case nfs stuff.
Do we want to attempt deprecation again? This was suggested last time:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200518130251.zih2s32q2rxhxg6f@wittgenstein/
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-24 21:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-24 19:22 Kees Cook
2024-01-24 19:39 ` Kevin Locke
2024-01-24 19:51 ` Kees Cook
2024-01-24 19:58 ` Jann Horn
2024-01-24 20:15 ` Kees Cook
2024-01-24 20:47 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-01-24 20:51 ` Jann Horn
2024-01-24 21:32 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-01-24 21:35 ` Kees Cook
2024-01-24 21:40 ` Jann Horn
2024-01-24 21:50 ` Kees Cook
2024-01-25 14:34 ` Tetsuo Handa
2024-01-25 14:59 ` Jann Horn
2024-01-25 16:38 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-01-27 4:53 ` John Johansen
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