From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kevin Locke <kevin@kevinlocke.name>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [6.8-rc1 Regression] Unable to exec apparmor_parser from virt-aa-helper
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 09:21:14 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202401240916.044E6A6A7A@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wiZj-C-ZjiJdhyCDGK07WXfeROj1ACaSy7OrxtpqQVe-g@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 09:10:58AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Wed, 24 Jan 2024 at 08:54, Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > Hmm. That whole thing is disgusting. I think it should have checked
> > FMODE_EXEC, and I have no idea why it doesn't.
>
> Maybe because FMODE_EXEC gets set for uselib() calls too? I dunno. I
> think it would be even better if we had the 'intent' flags from
> 'struct open_flags' available, but they aren't there in the
> file_open() security chain.
I think there were other problems that I might have already fixed when I
reorganized things in commit 0fd338b2d2cd ("exec: move path_noexec() check
earlier") to more correctly map to LSM checks.
> Anyway, moving current->in_execve earlier looks fairly trivial, but I
> worry about the randomness. I'd be *so*( much happier if this crazy
> flag went away, and it got changed to look at the open intent instead.
>
> Attached patch is ENTIRELY UNTESTED. And disgusting.
I opted to tie "current->in_execve" lifetime to bprm lifetime just to
have a clean boundary (i.e. strictly in alloc/free_bprm()).
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-24 17:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-24 16:19 Kevin Locke
2024-01-24 16:35 ` Kees Cook
2024-01-24 16:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-01-24 16:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-01-24 17:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-01-24 17:21 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-01-24 17:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-01-24 18:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-01-24 18:29 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-01-24 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2024-01-24 19:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-01-25 14:16 ` Tetsuo Handa
2024-01-25 17:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-01-27 7:04 ` Tetsuo Handa
2024-01-27 11:00 ` Tetsuo Handa
2024-01-27 11:23 ` Tetsuo Handa
2024-01-24 18:57 ` Kees Cook
2024-01-27 5:17 ` John Johansen
2024-01-24 17:15 ` Kees Cook
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