From: "Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
To: Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, keescook@chromium.org,
jannh@google.com, sroettger@google.com, willy@infradead.org,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
usama.anjum@collabora.com, rdunlap@infradead.org,
jeffxu@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org, groeck@chromium.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, pedro.falcato@gmail.com,
dave.hansen@intel.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 0/4] Introduce mseal()
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 12:33:20 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240123173320.2xl3wygzbxnrei2c@revolver> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <86181.1705962897@cvs.openbsd.org>
* Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org> [240122 17:35]:
> Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> > On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 7:49 AM Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > Regarding these pieces
> > >
> > > > The PROT_SEAL bit in prot field of mmap(). When present, it marks
> > > > the map sealed since creation.
> > >
> > > OpenBSD won't be doing this. I had PROT_IMMUTABLE as a draft. In my
> > > research I found basically zero circumstances when you userland does
> > > that. The most common circumstance is you create a RW mapping, fill it,
> > > and then change to a more restrictve mapping, and lock it.
> > >
> > > There are a few regions in the addressspace that can be locked while RW.
> > > For instance, the stack. But the kernel does that, not userland. I
> > > found regions where the kernel wants to do this to the address space,
> > > but there is no need to export useless functionality to userland.
> > >
> > I have a feeling that most apps that need to use mmap() in their code
> > are likely using RW mappings. Adding sealing to mmap() could stop
> > those mappings from being executable. Of course, those apps would
> > need to change their code. We can't do it for them.
>
> I don't have a feeling about it.
>
> I spent a year engineering a complete system which exercises the maximum
> amount of memory you can lock.
>
> I saw nothing like what you are describing. I had PROT_IMMUTABLE in my
> drafts, and saw it turning into a dangerous anti-pattern.
>
> > Also, I believe adding this to mmap() has no downsides, only
> > performance gain, as Pedro Falcato pointed out in [1].
> >
> > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAKbZUD2A+=bp_sd+Q0Yif7NJqMu8p__eb4yguq0agEcmLH8SDQ@mail.gmail.com/
>
> Are you joking? You don't have any code doing that today. More feelings?
The 'no downside" is to combining two calls together; mmap() & mseal(),
at least that is how I read the linked discussion.
The common case (since there are no users today) of just calling
mmap()/munmap() will have the downside.
There will be a performance impact once you have can_modify_mm() doing
more than just returning true. Certainly, the impact will be larger
in munmap where multiple VMAs may need to be checked (assuming that's
the plan?).
This will require a new and earlier walk of the vma tree while holding
the mmap_lock. Since you are checking (potentially multiple) VMAs for
something, I don't think there is a way around holding the lock.
I'm not saying the cost will be large, but it will be a positive
non-zero number.
Thanks,
Liam
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-23 17:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-22 15:28 jeffxu
2024-01-22 15:28 ` [PATCH v7 1/4] mseal: Wire up mseal syscall jeffxu
2024-01-22 15:28 ` [PATCH v7 2/4] mseal: add " jeffxu
2024-01-23 18:14 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-01-24 17:50 ` Jeff Xu
2024-01-24 20:06 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-01-24 20:37 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-01-24 20:51 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-01-24 22:49 ` Jeff Xu
2024-01-25 2:04 ` Jeff Xu
2024-01-22 15:28 ` [PATCH v7 3/4] selftest mm/mseal memory sealing jeffxu
2024-01-22 15:28 ` [PATCH v7 4/4] mseal:add documentation jeffxu
2024-01-22 15:49 ` [PATCH v7 0/4] Introduce mseal() Theo de Raadt
2024-01-22 22:10 ` Jeff Xu
2024-01-22 22:34 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-01-23 17:33 ` Liam R. Howlett [this message]
2024-01-23 18:58 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-01-24 18:56 ` Jeff Xu
2024-01-24 18:55 ` Jeff Xu
2024-01-24 19:17 ` Theo de Raadt
2024-01-29 22:36 ` Jonathan Corbet
2024-01-31 17:49 ` Jeff Xu
2024-01-31 20:51 ` Jonathan Corbet
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