From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
seanjc@google.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com,
luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com,
pgonda@google.com, peterz@infradead.org,
srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com, rientjes@google.com,
dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com, vbabka@suse.cz,
kirill@shutemov.name, ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
alpergun@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, ashish.kalra@amd.com,
nikunj.dadhania@amd.com, pankaj.gupta@amd.com,
liam.merwick@oracle.com, zhi.a.wang@intel.com,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@profian.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 14/50] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 10:59:37 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231127095937.GLZWRoiaqGlJMX54Xb@fat_crate.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231016132819.1002933-15-michael.roth@amd.com>
On Mon, Oct 16, 2023 at 08:27:43AM -0500, Michael Roth wrote:
> +/*
> + * SEV_DATA_RANGE_LIST:
> + * Array containing range of pages that firmware transitions to HV-fixed
> + * page state.
> + */
> +struct sev_data_range_list *snp_range_list;
> +static int __sev_snp_init_locked(int *error);
Put the function above the caller instead of doing a forward
declaration.
> static inline bool sev_version_greater_or_equal(u8 maj, u8 min)
> {
> struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
> @@ -466,9 +479,9 @@ static inline int __sev_do_init_locked(int *psp_ret)
> return __sev_init_locked(psp_ret);
> }
>
> -static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error)
> +static int ___sev_platform_init_locked(int *error, bool probe)
> {
> - int rc = 0, psp_ret = SEV_RET_NO_FW_CALL;
> + int rc, psp_ret = SEV_RET_NO_FW_CALL;
> struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
> struct sev_device *sev;
>
> @@ -480,6 +493,34 @@ static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error)
> if (sev->state == SEV_STATE_INIT)
> return 0;
>
> + /*
> + * Legacy guests cannot be running while SNP_INIT(_EX) is executing,
> + * so perform SEV-SNP initialization at probe time.
> + */
> + rc = __sev_snp_init_locked(error);
> + if (rc && rc != -ENODEV) {
> + /*
> + * Don't abort the probe if SNP INIT failed,
> + * continue to initialize the legacy SEV firmware.
> + */
> + dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP: failed to INIT rc %d, error %#x\n", rc, *error);
> + }
> +
> + /* Delay SEV/SEV-ES support initialization */
> + if (probe && !psp_init_on_probe)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!sev_es_tmr) {
> + /* Obtain the TMR memory area for SEV-ES use */
> + sev_es_tmr = sev_fw_alloc(SEV_ES_TMR_SIZE);
> + if (sev_es_tmr)
> + /* Must flush the cache before giving it to the firmware */
> + clflush_cache_range(sev_es_tmr, SEV_ES_TMR_SIZE);
> + else
> + dev_warn(sev->dev,
> + "SEV: TMR allocation failed, SEV-ES support unavailable\n");
> + }
> +
> if (sev_init_ex_buffer) {
> rc = sev_read_init_ex_file();
> if (rc)
> @@ -522,6 +563,11 @@ static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error)
> +{
> + return ___sev_platform_init_locked(error, false);
> +}
Uff, this is silly. And it makes the code hard to follow and that meat
of the platform init functionality in the ___-prefixed function a mess.
And the problem is that that "probe" functionality is replicated from
the one place where it is actually needed - sev_pci_init() which calls
that new sev_platform_init_on_probe() function - to everything that
calls __sev_platform_init_locked() for which you've added a wrapper.
What you should do, instead, is split the code around
__sev_snp_init_locked() in a separate function which does only that and
is called something like __sev_platform_init_snp_locked() or so which
does that unconditional work. And then you define:
_sev_platform_init_locked(int *error, bool probe)
note the *one* '_' - i.e., first layer:
_sev_platform_init_locked(int *error, bool probe):
{
__sev_platform_init_snp_locked(error);
if (!probe)
return 0;
if (psp_init_on_probe)
__sev_platform_init_locked(error);
...
}
and you do the probing in that function only so that it doesn't get lost
in the bunch of things __sev_platform_init_locked() does.
And then you call _sev_platform_init_locked() everywhere and no need for
a second sev_platform_init_on_probe().
> +
> int sev_platform_init(int *error)
> {
> int rc;
> @@ -534,6 +580,17 @@ int sev_platform_init(int *error)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_platform_init);
>
> +static int sev_platform_init_on_probe(int *error)
> +{
> + int rc;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
> + rc = ___sev_platform_init_locked(error, true);
> + mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> static int __sev_platform_shutdown_locked(int *error)
> {
> struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
> @@ -838,6 +895,191 @@ static int sev_update_firmware(struct device *dev)
> return ret;
> }
>
> +static void snp_set_hsave_pa(void *arg)
> +{
> + wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, 0);
> +}
> +
> +static int snp_filter_reserved_mem_regions(struct resource *rs, void *arg)
> +{
> + struct sev_data_range_list *range_list = arg;
> + struct sev_data_range *range = &range_list->ranges[range_list->num_elements];
> + size_t size;
> +
> + if ((range_list->num_elements * sizeof(struct sev_data_range) +
> + sizeof(struct sev_data_range_list)) > PAGE_SIZE)
> + return -E2BIG;
Why? A comment would be helpful like with the rest this patch adds.
> + switch (rs->desc) {
> + case E820_TYPE_RESERVED:
> + case E820_TYPE_PMEM:
> + case E820_TYPE_ACPI:
> + range->base = rs->start & PAGE_MASK;
> + size = (rs->end + 1) - rs->start;
> + range->page_count = size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + range_list->num_elements++;
> + break;
> + default:
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int __sev_snp_init_locked(int *error)
> +{
> + struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
> + struct sev_data_snp_init_ex data;
> + struct sev_device *sev;
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + if (!psp || !psp->sev_data)
> + return -ENODEV;
Only caller checks this already.
> + sev = psp->sev_data;
> +
> + if (sev->snp_initialized)
Do we really need this silly boolean or is there a way to query the
platform whether SNP has been initialized?
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!sev_version_greater_or_equal(SNP_MIN_API_MAJOR, SNP_MIN_API_MINOR)) {
> + dev_dbg(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP support requires firmware version >= %d:%d\n",
> + SNP_MIN_API_MAJOR, SNP_MIN_API_MINOR);
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * The SNP_INIT requires the MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA must be set to 0h
> + * across all cores.
> + */
> + on_each_cpu(snp_set_hsave_pa, NULL, 1);
> +
> + /*
> + * Starting in SNP firmware v1.52, the SNP_INIT_EX command takes a list of
> + * system physical address ranges to convert into the HV-fixed page states
> + * during the RMP initialization. For instance, the memory that UEFI
> + * reserves should be included in the range list. This allows system
> + * components that occasionally write to memory (e.g. logging to UEFI
> + * reserved regions) to not fail due to RMP initialization and SNP enablement.
> + */
> + if (sev_version_greater_or_equal(SNP_MIN_API_MAJOR, 52)) {
Is there a generic way to probe SNP_INIT_EX presence in the firmware or
are FW version numbers the only way?
> + /*
> + * Firmware checks that the pages containing the ranges enumerated
> + * in the RANGES structure are either in the Default page state or in the
"default"
> + * firmware page state.
> + */
> + snp_range_list = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!snp_range_list) {
> + dev_err(sev->dev,
> + "SEV: SNP_INIT_EX range list memory allocation failed\n");
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Retrieve all reserved memory regions setup by UEFI from the e820 memory map
> + * to be setup as HV-fixed pages.
> + */
> +
^ Superfluous newline.
> + rc = walk_iomem_res_desc(IORES_DESC_NONE, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0, ~0,
> + snp_range_list, snp_filter_reserved_mem_regions);
> + if (rc) {
> + dev_err(sev->dev,
> + "SEV: SNP_INIT_EX walk_iomem_res_desc failed rc = %d\n", rc);
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
> + data.init_rmp = 1;
> + data.list_paddr_en = 1;
> + data.list_paddr = __psp_pa(snp_range_list);
> +
> + /*
> + * Before invoking SNP_INIT_EX with INIT_RMP=1, make sure that
> + * all dirty cache lines containing the RMP are flushed.
> + *
> + * NOTE: that includes writes via RMPUPDATE instructions, which
> + * are also cacheable writes.
> + */
> + wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
> +
> + rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT_EX, &data, error);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + } else {
> + /*
> + * SNP_INIT is equivalent to SNP_INIT_EX with INIT_RMP=1, so
> + * just as with that case, make sure all dirty cache lines
> + * containing the RMP are flushed.
> + */
> + wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
> +
> + rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT, NULL, error);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + }
So instead of duplicating the code here at the end of the if-else
branching, you can do:
void *arg = &data;
if () {
...
cmd = SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT_EX;
} else {
cmd = SEV_CMD_SNP_INIT;
arg = NULL;
}
wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(cmd, arg, error);
if (rc)
return rc;
> + /* Prepare for first SNP guest launch after INIT */
> + wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
Why is that WBINVD needed?
> + rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_DF_FLUSH, NULL, error);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + sev->snp_initialized = true;
> + dev_dbg(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP firmware initialized\n");
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static int __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(int *error)
> +{
> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
> + struct sev_data_snp_shutdown_ex data;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!sev->snp_initialized)
> + return 0;
> +
> + memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
> + data.length = sizeof(data);
> + data.iommu_snp_shutdown = 1;
> +
> + wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
> +
> +retry:
> + ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX, &data, error);
> + /* SHUTDOWN may require DF_FLUSH */
> + if (*error == SEV_RET_DFFLUSH_REQUIRED) {
> + ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_DF_FLUSH, NULL, NULL);
> + if (ret) {
> + dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP DF_FLUSH failed\n");
> + return ret;
When you return here, sev->snp_initialized is still true but, in
reality, it probably is in some half-broken state after issuing those
commands you it is not really initialized anymore.
> + }
> + goto retry;
This needs an upper limit from which to break out and not potentially
endless-loop.
> + }
> + if (ret) {
> + dev_err(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP firmware shutdown failed\n");
> + return ret;
> + }
> +
> + sev->snp_initialized = false;
> + dev_dbg(sev->dev, "SEV-SNP firmware shutdown\n");
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_snp_shutdown(int *error)
> +{
> + int rc;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
> + rc = __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(error);
Why is this "locked" version even there if it is called only here?
IOW, put all the logic in here - no need for
__sev_snp_shutdown_locked().
> + mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
...
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-27 10:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 158+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-16 13:27 [PATCH v10 00/50] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 01/50] KVM: SVM: INTERCEPT_RDTSCP is never intercepted anyway Michael Roth
2023-10-16 15:12 ` Greg KH
2023-10-16 15:14 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-10-16 15:21 ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 02/50] KVM: SVM: Fix TSC_AUX virtualization setup Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 03/50] KVM: SEV: Do not intercept accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS for SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
2023-12-13 12:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 17:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-12-13 17:40 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 04/50] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-12-13 12:51 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 13:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 13:31 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 13:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 13:40 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 13:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 14:18 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 15:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 17:35 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 18:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 05/50] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-10-25 17:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-27 21:50 ` Dave Hansen
2023-12-13 12:52 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 06/50] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2023-10-25 18:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-07 16:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 18:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-07 19:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-08 8:21 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-11-08 15:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-07 19:00 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-11-07 19:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 20:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 21:21 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-11-07 21:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 22:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 22:33 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-11-08 6:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-08 9:11 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-11-08 19:53 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-08 17:09 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-12-08 23:21 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-20 7:07 ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 07/50] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-11-14 14:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19 3:31 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-09 22:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 08/50] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2023-11-15 16:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19 6:08 ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 09/50] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-10-16 14:14 ` Dave Hansen
2023-10-16 14:55 ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 10/50] x86/fault: Report RMP page faults for kernel addresses Michael Roth
2023-11-21 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 11/50] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2023-11-21 16:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19 16:20 ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 12/50] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2023-11-24 14:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 13/50] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-11-24 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 14/50] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-11-27 9:59 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2023-11-30 2:13 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-06 17:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-06 20:35 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-09 16:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-11 21:11 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-12 6:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 15/50] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-12-06 20:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 16/50] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2023-12-06 20:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-08 20:54 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-07 16:20 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-08 22:10 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-11 13:08 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-12 23:26 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 17/50] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-08 13:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19 23:46 ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 18/50] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Michael Roth
2023-12-09 15:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-29 21:38 ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 19/50] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2023-12-12 16:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 20/50] KVM: SEV: Select CONFIG_KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2023-12-13 12:54 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-29 21:41 ` Michael Roth
2023-12-18 10:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-29 21:40 ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 21/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2023-12-12 17:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 22/50] KVM: SEV: Add GHCB handling for Hypervisor Feature Support requests Michael Roth
2023-12-18 10:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 23/50] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2023-12-11 13:24 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-12 0:00 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-13 13:31 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 18:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-18 14:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 24/50] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2023-12-18 17:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 25/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 26/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 27/50] KVM: Add HVA range operator Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 28/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 29/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 30/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 31/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 32/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 33/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 34/50] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 35/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 36/50] KVM: SEV: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 37/50] KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 38/50] KVM: SEV: Add support for GHCB-based termination requests Michael Roth
2023-10-19 12:20 ` Liam Merwick
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 39/50] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 40/50] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 41/50] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 42/50] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 43/50] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 44/50] iommu/amd: Add IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN support Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 45/50] iommu/amd: Report all cases inhibiting SNP enablement Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 46/50] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 23:11 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 47/50] x86/sev: Add KVM commands for per-instance certs Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 48/50] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2023-10-16 23:18 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-17 16:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-18 2:28 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-18 13:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-18 20:27 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-18 20:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-18 21:27 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-18 21:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-19 2:48 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-19 14:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-19 23:55 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-20 0:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-20 0:43 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-20 15:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-20 18:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-10 22:07 ` Michael Roth
2023-11-10 22:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-16 5:31 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-05 0:30 ` Dan Williams
2023-12-05 0:48 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-05 20:06 ` Dan Williams
2023-12-05 22:04 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-05 23:11 ` Dan Williams
2023-12-06 0:43 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 49/50] crypto: ccp: Add debug support for decrypting pages Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 50/50] crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump Michael Roth
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