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From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, brauner@kernel.org, hughd@google.com,
	jlayton@redhat.com, Tavian Barnes <tavianator@tavianator.com>,
	Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] libfs: getdents() should return 0 after reaching EOD
Date: Sat, 18 Nov 2023 16:28:38 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231118162838.GE1957730@ZenIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <170007970281.4975.12356401645395490640.stgit@bazille.1015granger.net>

On Wed, Nov 15, 2023 at 03:22:52PM -0500, Chuck Lever wrote:

>  static int offset_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
>  {
> +	struct dentry *cursor = file->private_data;
>  	struct dentry *dir = file->f_path.dentry;
>  
>  	lockdep_assert_held(&d_inode(dir)->i_rwsem);
> @@ -479,11 +481,19 @@ static int offset_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
>  	if (!dir_emit_dots(file, ctx))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	offset_iterate_dir(d_inode(dir), ctx);
> +	if (ctx->pos == 2)
> +		cursor->d_flags &= ~DCACHE_EOD;
> +	else if (cursor->d_flags & DCACHE_EOD)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	if (offset_iterate_dir(d_inode(dir), ctx))
> +		cursor->d_flags |= DCACHE_EOD;

This is simply grotesque - "it's better to keep ->private_data constant,
so we will allocate a dentry, just to store the one bit of data we need to
keep track of; oh, and let's grab a bit out of ->d_flags, while we are at it;
we will ignore the usual locking rules for ->d_flags modifications, 'cause
it's all serialized on ->f_pos_lock".

No.  If nothing else, this is harder to follow than the original.  It's
far easier to verify that these struct file instances only use ->private_data
as a flag and these accesses are serialized on ->f_pos_lock as claimed
than go through the accesses to ->d_flags, prove that the one above is
the only one that can happen to such dentries (while they are live, that
is - once they are in __dentry_kill(), there will be modifications of ->d_flags)
and that it can't happen to any other instances.

NAKed-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>


  reply	other threads:[~2023-11-18 16:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-15 20:22 Chuck Lever
2023-11-18 16:28 ` Al Viro [this message]
2023-11-18 16:40   ` Chuck Lever III

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