* Re: get_user_pages() and EXEC_ONLY mapping. [not found] <87bkc1oe8c.fsf@linux.ibm.com> @ 2023-11-10 14:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe [not found] ` <9a51f827-6bf4-412b-9feb-37cc41ad3e90@linux.ibm.com> 2023-11-10 17:17 ` Catalin Marinas 1 sibling, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2023-11-10 14:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Aneesh Kumar K.V Cc: Catalin Marinas, David Hildenbrand, akpm, Christophe Leroy, linux-mm, linuxppc-dev On Fri, Nov 10, 2023 at 08:19:23PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote: > > Hello, > > Some architectures can now support EXEC_ONLY mappings and I am wondering > what get_user_pages() on those addresses should return. -EPERM > Earlier PROT_EXEC implied PROT_READ and pte_access_permitted() > returned true for that. But arm64 does have this explicit comment > that says > > /* > * p??_access_permitted() is true for valid user mappings (PTE_USER > * bit set, subject to the write permission check). For execute-only > * mappings, like PROT_EXEC with EPAN (both PTE_USER and PTE_UXN bits > * not set) must return false. PROT_NONE mappings do not have the > * PTE_VALID bit set. > */ > > Is that correct? We should be able to get struct page for PROT_EXEC > mappings? If the memory is unreadable then providing a back door through O_DIRECT and everthing else to read it sounds wrong to me. If there is some case where a get_user_pages caller is exec-only compatible then a new FOLL_EXEC flag to permit it would make sense. Jason ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
[parent not found: <9a51f827-6bf4-412b-9feb-37cc41ad3e90@linux.ibm.com>]
* Re: get_user_pages() and EXEC_ONLY mapping. [not found] ` <9a51f827-6bf4-412b-9feb-37cc41ad3e90@linux.ibm.com> @ 2023-11-10 15:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe 0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread From: Jason Gunthorpe @ 2023-11-10 15:06 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Aneesh Kumar K V Cc: Catalin Marinas, David Hildenbrand, akpm, Christophe Leroy, linux-mm, linuxppc-dev On Fri, Nov 10, 2023 at 08:27:19PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K V wrote: > On 11/10/23 8:23 PM, Jason Gunthorpe wrote: > > On Fri, Nov 10, 2023 at 08:19:23PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote: > >> > >> Hello, > >> > >> Some architectures can now support EXEC_ONLY mappings and I am wondering > >> what get_user_pages() on those addresses should return. > > > > -EPERM > > > >> Earlier PROT_EXEC implied PROT_READ and pte_access_permitted() > >> returned true for that. But arm64 does have this explicit comment > >> that says > >> > >> /* > >> * p??_access_permitted() is true for valid user mappings (PTE_USER > >> * bit set, subject to the write permission check). For execute-only > >> * mappings, like PROT_EXEC with EPAN (both PTE_USER and PTE_UXN bits > >> * not set) must return false. PROT_NONE mappings do not have the > >> * PTE_VALID bit set. > >> */ > >> > >> Is that correct? We should be able to get struct page for PROT_EXEC > >> mappings? > > > > If the memory is unreadable then providing a back door through > > O_DIRECT and everthing else to read it sounds wrong to me. > > > > If there is some case where a get_user_pages caller is exec-only > > compatible then a new FOLL_EXEC flag to permit it would make sense. > > > > I was expecting pin_user_pages() to return -EPERM and get_user_pages() > return struct page. This was based on Documentation/core-api/pin_user_pages.rst Not unconditionally but you could argue that FOLL_GET should succeed. It depends how much do you care about absolute security of unreadable memory vs compatability. > "Another way of thinking about these flags is as a progression of restrictions: > FOLL_GET is for struct page manipulation, without affecting the data that the > struct page refers to. FOLL_PIN is a *replacement* for FOLL_GET, and is for > short term pins on pages whose data *will* get accessed. " This was sort of aspirational - have we got rid of all the FOLL_GET users that are touching the data? Looks like no from a quick check.. Jason ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: get_user_pages() and EXEC_ONLY mapping. [not found] <87bkc1oe8c.fsf@linux.ibm.com> 2023-11-10 14:53 ` get_user_pages() and EXEC_ONLY mapping Jason Gunthorpe @ 2023-11-10 17:17 ` Catalin Marinas 1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread From: Catalin Marinas @ 2023-11-10 17:17 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Aneesh Kumar K.V Cc: Jason Gunthorpe, David Hildenbrand, akpm, Christophe Leroy, linux-mm, linuxppc-dev On Fri, Nov 10, 2023 at 08:19:23PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote: > Some architectures can now support EXEC_ONLY mappings and I am wondering > what get_user_pages() on those addresses should return. Earlier > PROT_EXEC implied PROT_READ and pte_access_permitted() returned true for > that. But arm64 does have this explicit comment that says > > /* > * p??_access_permitted() is true for valid user mappings (PTE_USER > * bit set, subject to the write permission check). For execute-only > * mappings, like PROT_EXEC with EPAN (both PTE_USER and PTE_UXN bits > * not set) must return false. PROT_NONE mappings do not have the > * PTE_VALID bit set. > */ > > Is that correct? We should be able to get struct page for PROT_EXEC > mappings? I don't remember why we ended up with this briefly looking at the code, pte_access_permitted() is only used on the fast GUP path. On the slow path, there is a check_vma_flags() call which returns -EFAULT if the vma is not readable. So the pte_access_permitted() on the fast path matches the semantics of the slow path. If one wants the page structure, FOLL_FORCE ignores the read check (on the slow path), though I think it still fails if VM_MAYREAD is not set. Unless you have a real use-case where this is not sufficient, I'd leave the behaviour as is on arm64 (and maybe update other architectures that support exec-only to do the same). -- Catalin ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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