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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	seanjc@google.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com,
	luto@kernel.org, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com,
	pgonda@google.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com, rientjes@google.com,
	dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com, vbabka@suse.cz,
	kirill@shutemov.name, ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	marcorr@google.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
	alpergun@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, ashish.kalra@amd.com,
	nikunj.dadhania@amd.com, pankaj.gupta@amd.com,
	liam.merwick@oracle.com, zhi.a.wang@intel.com,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 06/50] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support
Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2023 17:31:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231107163142.GAZUpmbt/i3himIf+E@fat_crate.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231016132819.1002933-7-michael.roth@amd.com>

On Mon, Oct 16, 2023 at 08:27:35AM -0500, Michael Roth wrote:
> +static bool early_rmptable_check(void)
> +{
> +	u64 rmp_base, rmp_size;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * For early BSP initialization, max_pfn won't be set up yet, wait until
> +	 * it is set before performing the RMP table calculations.
> +	 */
> +	if (!max_pfn)
> +		return true;

This already says that this is called at the wrong point during init.

Right now we have

early_identify_cpu -> early_init_amd -> early_detect_mem_encrypt

which runs only on the BSP but then early_init_amd() is called in
init_amd() too so that it takes care of the APs too.

Which ends up doing a lot of unnecessary work on each AP in
early_detect_mem_encrypt() like calculating the RMP size on each AP
unnecessarily where this needs to happen exactly once.

Is there any reason why this function cannot be moved to init_amd()
where it'll do the normal, per-AP init?

And the stuff that needs to happen once, needs to be called once too.

> +
> +	return snp_get_rmptable_info(&rmp_base, &rmp_size);
> +}
> +
>  static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>  {
>  	u64 msr;
> @@ -659,6 +674,9 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>  		if (!(msr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK))
>  			goto clear_sev;
>  
> +		if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP) && !early_rmptable_check())
> +			goto clear_snp;
> +
>  		return;
>  
>  clear_all:
> @@ -666,6 +684,7 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>  clear_sev:
>  		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
>  		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
> +clear_snp:
>  		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
>  	}
>  }

...

> +bool snp_get_rmptable_info(u64 *start, u64 *len)
> +{
> +	u64 max_rmp_pfn, calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz, rmp_base, rmp_end;
> +
> +	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, rmp_base);
> +	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, rmp_end);
> +
> +	if (!(rmp_base & RMP_ADDR_MASK) || !(rmp_end & RMP_ADDR_MASK)) {
> +		pr_err("Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n");
> +		return false;
> +	}

If you're masking off bits 0-12 above...

> +
> +	if (rmp_base > rmp_end) {

... why aren't you using the masked out vars further on?

I know, the hw will say, yeah, those bits are 0 but still. IOW, do:

	rmp_base &= RMP_ADDR_MASK;
	rmp_end  &= RMP_ADDR_MASK;

after reading them.

> +		pr_err("RMP configuration not valid: base=%#llx, end=%#llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end);
> +		return false;
> +	}
> +
> +	rmp_sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Calculate the amount the memory that must be reserved by the BIOS to
> +	 * address the whole RAM, including the bookkeeping area. The RMP itself
> +	 * must also be covered.
> +	 */
> +	max_rmp_pfn = max_pfn;
> +	if (PHYS_PFN(rmp_end) > max_pfn)
> +		max_rmp_pfn = PHYS_PFN(rmp_end);
> +
> +	calc_rmp_sz = (max_rmp_pfn << 4) + RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ;
> +
> +	if (calc_rmp_sz > rmp_sz) {
> +		pr_err("Memory reserved for the RMP table does not cover full system RAM (expected 0x%llx got 0x%llx)\n",
> +		       calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz);
> +		return false;
> +	}
> +
> +	*start = rmp_base;
> +	*len = rmp_sz;
> +
> +	return true;
> +}
> +
> +static __init int __snp_rmptable_init(void)
> +{
> +	u64 rmp_base, rmp_size;
> +	void *rmp_start;
> +	u64 val;
> +
> +	if (!snp_get_rmptable_info(&rmp_base, &rmp_size))
> +		return 1;
> +
> +	pr_info("RMP table physical address [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n",

That's "RMP table physical range"

> +		rmp_base, rmp_base + rmp_size - 1);
> +
> +	rmp_start = memremap(rmp_base, rmp_size, MEMREMAP_WB);
> +	if (!rmp_start) {
> +		pr_err("Failed to map RMP table addr 0x%llx size 0x%llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_size);

No need to dump rmp_base and rmp_size again here - you're dumping them
above.

> +		return 1;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of
> +	 * kexec boot.
> +	 */
> +	rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
> +	if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
> +		goto skip_enable;
> +
> +	/* Initialize the RMP table to zero */

Again: useless comment.

> +	memset(rmp_start, 0, rmp_size);
> +
> +	/* Flush the caches to ensure that data is written before SNP is enabled. */
> +	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
> +
> +	/* MFDM must be enabled on all the CPUs prior to enabling SNP. */

First of all, use the APM bit name here pls: MtrrFixDramModEn.

And then, for the life of me, I can't find any mention in the APM why
this bit is needed. Neither in "15.36.2 Enabling SEV-SNP" nor in
"15.34.3 Enabling SEV".

Looking at the bit defintions of WrMem an RdMem - read and write
requests get directed to system memory instead of MMIO so I guess you
don't want to be able to write MMIO for certain physical ranges when SNP
is enabled but it'll be good to have this properly explained instead of
a "this must happen" information-less sentence.

> +	on_each_cpu(mfd_enable, NULL, 1);
> +
> +	/* Enable SNP on all CPUs. */

Useless comment.

> +	on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1);
> +
> +skip_enable:
> +	rmp_start += RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ;
> +	rmp_size -= RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ;
> +
> +	rmptable_start = (struct rmpentry *)rmp_start;
> +	rmptable_max_pfn = rmp_size / sizeof(struct rmpentry) - 1;
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
> +{
> +	int family, model;
> +
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	family = boot_cpu_data.x86;
> +	model  = boot_cpu_data.x86_model;

Looks useless - just use boot_cpu_data directly below.

As mentioned here already https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y9ubi0i4Z750gdMm@zn.tnic/

And I already mentioned that for v9:

https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230621094236.GZZJLGDAicp1guNPvD@fat_crate.local

Next time I'm NAKing this patch until you incorporate all review
comments or you give a technical reason why you disagree with them.

> +	/*
> +	 * RMP table entry format is not architectural and it can vary by processor and
> +	 * is defined by the per-processor PPR. Restrict SNP support on the known CPU
> +	 * model and family for which the RMP table entry format is currently defined for.
> +	 */
> +	if (family != 0x19 || model > 0xaf)
> +		goto nosnp;
> +
> +	if (amd_iommu_snp_enable())
> +		goto nosnp;
> +
> +	if (__snp_rmptable_init())
> +		goto nosnp;
> +
> +	cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "x86/rmptable_init:online", __snp_enable, NULL);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +
> +nosnp:
> +	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
> +	return -ENOSYS;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * This must be called after the PCI subsystem. This is because amd_iommu_snp_enable()
> + * is called to ensure the IOMMU supports the SEV-SNP feature, which can only be
> + * called after subsys_initcall().
> + *
> + * NOTE: IOMMU is enforced by SNP to ensure that hypervisor cannot program DMA
> + * directly into guest private memory. In case of SNP, the IOMMU ensures that
> + * the page(s) used for DMA are hypervisor owned.
> + */
> +fs_initcall(snp_rmptable_init);

This looks backwards. AFAICT, the IOMMU code should call arch code to
enable SNP at the right time, not the other way around - arch code
calling driver code.

Especially if the SNP table enablement depends on some exact IOMMU
init_state:

        if (init_state > IOMMU_ENABLED) {
		pr_err("SNP: Too late to enable SNP for IOMMU.\n");


-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-11-07 16:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 158+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-16 13:27 [PATCH v10 00/50] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 01/50] KVM: SVM: INTERCEPT_RDTSCP is never intercepted anyway Michael Roth
2023-10-16 15:12   ` Greg KH
2023-10-16 15:14     ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-10-16 15:21       ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 02/50] KVM: SVM: Fix TSC_AUX virtualization setup Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 03/50] KVM: SEV: Do not intercept accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS for SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
2023-12-13 12:50   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 17:30     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-12-13 17:40       ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 04/50] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-12-13 12:51   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 13:13     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 13:31       ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 13:36         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 13:40           ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 13:49             ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 14:18               ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 15:41                 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 17:35                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 18:53                     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 05/50] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-10-25 17:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-27 21:50   ` Dave Hansen
2023-12-13 12:52   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 06/50] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2023-10-25 18:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-07 16:31   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2023-11-07 18:32     ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-07 19:13       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-08  8:21       ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-11-08 15:19         ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-07 19:00     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-11-07 19:19       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 20:27         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 21:21           ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-11-07 21:27             ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 22:08               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 22:33                 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-11-08  6:14                   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-08  9:11                     ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-11-08 19:53                     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-08 17:09       ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-12-08 23:21         ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-20  7:07     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 07/50] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-11-14 14:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19  3:31     ` Michael Roth
2024-01-09 22:07       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 08/50] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2023-11-15 16:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19  6:08     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 09/50] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-10-16 14:14   ` Dave Hansen
2023-10-16 14:55     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 10/50] x86/fault: Report RMP page faults for kernel addresses Michael Roth
2023-11-21 15:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 11/50] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2023-11-21 16:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19 16:20     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 12/50] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2023-11-24 14:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 13/50] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-11-24 14:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 14/50] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-11-27  9:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-30  2:13     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-06 17:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-06 20:35         ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-09 16:20           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-11 21:11             ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-12  6:52               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 15/50] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-12-06 20:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 16/50] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2023-12-06 20:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-08 20:54     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-07 16:20   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-08 22:10     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-11 13:08       ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-12 23:26         ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 17/50] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-08 13:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19 23:46     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 18/50] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Michael Roth
2023-12-09 15:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-29 21:38     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 19/50] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2023-12-12 16:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 20/50] KVM: SEV: Select CONFIG_KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2023-12-13 12:54   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-29 21:41     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-18 10:13   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-29 21:40     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 21/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2023-12-12 17:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 22/50] KVM: SEV: Add GHCB handling for Hypervisor Feature Support requests Michael Roth
2023-12-18 10:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 23/50] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2023-12-11 13:24   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-12  0:00     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-13 13:31   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 18:45   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-18 14:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 24/50] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2023-12-18 17:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 25/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 26/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 27/50] KVM: Add HVA range operator Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 28/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 29/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 30/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 31/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 32/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 33/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 34/50] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 35/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 36/50] KVM: SEV: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 37/50] KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 38/50] KVM: SEV: Add support for GHCB-based termination requests Michael Roth
2023-10-19 12:20   ` Liam Merwick
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 39/50] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 40/50] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 41/50] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 42/50] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 43/50] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 44/50] iommu/amd: Add IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN support Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 45/50] iommu/amd: Report all cases inhibiting SNP enablement Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 46/50] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 23:11   ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 47/50] x86/sev: Add KVM commands for per-instance certs Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 48/50] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2023-10-16 23:18   ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-17 16:27     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-18  2:28       ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-18 13:48         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-18 20:27           ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-18 20:38             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-18 21:27               ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-18 21:43                 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-19  2:48           ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-19 14:57             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-19 23:55               ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-20  0:13                 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-20  0:43                   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-20 15:13                     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-20 18:37             ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-10 22:07           ` Michael Roth
2023-11-10 22:47             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-16  5:31               ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-05  0:30                 ` Dan Williams
2023-12-05  0:48                   ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-05 20:06                     ` Dan Williams
2023-12-05 22:04                       ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-05 23:11                         ` Dan Williams
2023-12-06  0:43                           ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 49/50] crypto: ccp: Add debug support for decrypting pages Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 50/50] crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump Michael Roth

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