From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <seanjc@google.com>,
<isaku.yamahata@intel.com>, <ackerleytng@google.com>,
<vbabka@suse.cz>, <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
<nikunj.dadhania@amd.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>,
<pankaj.gupta@amd.com>, "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFC gmem v1 7/8] KVM: x86: Define RMP page fault error bits for #NPF
Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2023 06:50:27 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231016115028.996656-8-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231016115028.996656-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
When SEV-SNP is enabled globally, the hardware places restrictions on all
memory accesses based on the RMP entry, whether the hypervisor or a VM,
performs the accesses. When hardware encounters an RMP access violation
during a guest access, it will cause a #VMEXIT(NPF) with a number of
additional bits set to indicate the reasons for the #NPF. Define those
here.
See APM2 section 16.36.10 for more details.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
[mdr: add some additional details to commit message]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index cdc235277a6f..fa401cb1a552 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -253,9 +253,13 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;
#define PFERR_FETCH_BIT 4
#define PFERR_PK_BIT 5
#define PFERR_SGX_BIT 15
+#define PFERR_GUEST_RMP_BIT 31
#define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT 32
#define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT 33
#define PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS_BIT 48
+#define PFERR_GUEST_ENC_BIT 34
+#define PFERR_GUEST_SIZEM_BIT 35
+#define PFERR_GUEST_VMPL_BIT 36
#define PFERR_PRESENT_MASK BIT(PFERR_PRESENT_BIT)
#define PFERR_WRITE_MASK BIT(PFERR_WRITE_BIT)
@@ -267,6 +271,10 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;
#define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK BIT_ULL(PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT)
#define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK BIT_ULL(PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT)
#define PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS BIT_ULL(PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS_BIT)
+#define PFERR_GUEST_RMP_MASK BIT_ULL(PFERR_GUEST_RMP_BIT)
+#define PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK BIT_ULL(PFERR_GUEST_ENC_BIT)
+#define PFERR_GUEST_SIZEM_MASK BIT_ULL(PFERR_GUEST_SIZEM_BIT)
+#define PFERR_GUEST_VMPL_MASK BIT_ULL(PFERR_GUEST_VMPL_BIT)
#define PFERR_NESTED_GUEST_PAGE (PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK | \
PFERR_WRITE_MASK | \
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-16 11:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-16 11:50 [PATCH RFC gmem v1 0/8] KVM: gmem hooks/changes needed for x86 (other archs?) Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 1/8] mm: Introduce AS_INACCESSIBLE for encrypted/confidential memory Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 2/8] KVM: Use AS_INACCESSIBLE when creating guest_memfd inode Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 3/8] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for initializing memory Michael Roth
2024-02-08 10:57 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-02-08 17:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 4/8] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for invalidating memory Michael Roth
2024-02-09 10:11 ` Steven Price
2024-02-09 14:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-09 15:02 ` Steven Price
2024-02-09 15:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-11 17:24 ` Michael Roth
2024-03-12 20:26 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-13 17:11 ` Steven Price
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 5/8] KVM: x86/mmu: Pass around full 64-bit error code for KVM page faults Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 6/8] KVM: x86: Add KVM_X86_SNP_VM vm_type Michael Roth
2023-10-16 11:50 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2023-10-16 11:50 ` [PATCH RFC gmem v1 8/8] KVM: x86: Determine shared/private faults based on vm_type Michael Roth
2024-01-31 1:13 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-08 0:24 ` Michael Roth
2024-02-08 17:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-08 17:30 ` Paolo Bonzini
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