From: Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@google.com>
To: cl@linux.com, penberg@kernel.org, rientjes@google.com,
iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
vbabka@suse.cz, roman.gushchin@linux.dev, 42.hyeyoo@gmail.com,
keescook@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, corbet@lwn.net, luto@kernel.org,
peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jannh@google.com, matteorizzo@google.com, evn@google.com,
poprdi@google.com, jordyzomer@google.com
Subject: [RFC PATCH 13/14] mm/slub: sanity-check freepointers
Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2023 10:59:32 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230915105933.495735-14-matteorizzo@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230915105933.495735-1-matteorizzo@google.com>
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Sanity-check that:
- non-NULL freepointers point into the slab
- freepointers look plausibly aligned
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@google.com>
---
lib/slub_kunit.c | 4 ++++
mm/slab.h | 8 +++++++
mm/slub.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 69 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/slub_kunit.c b/lib/slub_kunit.c
index d4a3730b08fa..acf8600bd1fd 100644
--- a/lib/slub_kunit.c
+++ b/lib/slub_kunit.c
@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ static void test_clobber_zone(struct kunit *test)
#ifndef CONFIG_KASAN
static void test_next_pointer(struct kunit *test)
{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_VIRTUAL))
+ kunit_skip(test,
+ "incompatible with freepointer corruption detection in CONFIG_SLAB_VIRTUAL");
+
struct kmem_cache *s = test_kmem_cache_create("TestSlub_next_ptr_free",
64, SLAB_POISON);
u8 *p = kmem_cache_alloc(s, GFP_KERNEL);
diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index 460c802924bd..8d10a011bdf0 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -79,6 +79,14 @@ struct slab {
struct list_head flush_list_elem;
+ /*
+ * Not in kmem_cache because it depends on whether the allocation is
+ * normal order or fallback order.
+ * an alternative might be to over-allocate virtual memory for
+ * fallback-order pages.
+ */
+ unsigned long align_mask;
+
/* Replaces the page lock */
spinlock_t slab_lock;
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 0f7f5bf0b174..57474c8a6569 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -392,6 +392,44 @@ static inline freeptr_t freelist_ptr_encode(const struct kmem_cache *s,
return (freeptr_t){.v = encoded};
}
+/*
+ * Does some validation of freelist pointers. Without SLAB_VIRTUAL this is
+ * currently a no-op.
+ */
+static inline bool freelist_pointer_corrupted(struct slab *slab, freeptr_t ptr,
+ void *decoded)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_VIRTUAL
+ /*
+ * If the freepointer decodes to 0, use 0 as the slab_base so that
+ * the check below always passes (0 & slab->align_mask == 0).
+ */
+ unsigned long slab_base = decoded ? (unsigned long)slab_to_virt(slab)
+ : 0;
+
+ /*
+ * This verifies that the SLUB freepointer does not point outside the
+ * slab. Since at that point we can basically do it for free, it also
+ * checks that the pointer alignment looks vaguely sane.
+ * However, we probably don't want the cost of a proper division here,
+ * so instead we just do a cheap check whether the bottom bits that are
+ * clear in the size are also clear in the pointer.
+ * So for kmalloc-32, it does a perfect alignment check, but for
+ * kmalloc-192, it just checks that the pointer is a multiple of 32.
+ * This should probably be reconsidered - is this a good tradeoff, or
+ * should that part be thrown out, or do we want a proper accurate
+ * alignment check (and can we make it work with acceptable performance
+ * cost compared to the security improvement - probably not)?
+ */
+ return CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(
+ ((unsigned long)decoded & slab->align_mask) != slab_base,
+ "bad freeptr (encoded %lx, ptr %p, base %lx, mask %lx",
+ ptr.v, decoded, slab_base, slab->align_mask);
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
static inline void *freelist_ptr_decode(const struct kmem_cache *s,
freeptr_t ptr, unsigned long ptr_addr,
struct slab *slab)
@@ -403,6 +441,10 @@ static inline void *freelist_ptr_decode(const struct kmem_cache *s,
#else
decoded = (void *)ptr.v;
#endif
+
+ if (unlikely(freelist_pointer_corrupted(slab, ptr, decoded)))
+ return NULL;
+
return decoded;
}
@@ -2122,6 +2164,21 @@ static struct slab *get_free_slab(struct kmem_cache *s,
if (slab == NULL)
return NULL;
+ /*
+ * Bits that must be equal to start-of-slab address for all
+ * objects inside the slab.
+ * For compatibility with pointer tagging (like in HWASAN), this would
+ * need to clear the pointer tag bits from the mask.
+ */
+ slab->align_mask = ~((PAGE_SIZE << oo_order(oo)) - 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Object alignment bits (must be zero, which is equal to the bits in
+ * the start-of-slab address)
+ */
+ if (s->red_left_pad == 0)
+ slab->align_mask |= (1 << (ffs(s->size) - 1)) - 1;
+
return slab;
}
--
2.42.0.459.ge4e396fd5e-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-09-15 11:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-09-15 10:59 [RFC PATCH 00/14] Prevent cross-cache attacks in the SLUB allocator Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH 01/14] mm/slub: don't try to dereference invalid freepointers Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 20:50 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-30 11:04 ` Hyeonggon Yoo
2023-09-15 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH 02/14] mm/slub: add is_slab_addr/is_slab_page helpers Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 20:55 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-15 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH 03/14] mm/slub: move kmem_cache_order_objects to slab.h Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 20:56 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-15 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH 04/14] mm: use virt_to_slab instead of folio_slab Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 20:59 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-15 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH 05/14] mm/slub: create folio_set/clear_slab helpers Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 21:02 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-15 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH 06/14] mm/slub: pass additional args to alloc_slab_page Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 21:03 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-15 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH 07/14] mm/slub: pass slab pointer to the freeptr decode helper Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 21:06 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-15 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH 08/14] security: introduce CONFIG_SLAB_VIRTUAL Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 21:07 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-15 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH 09/14] mm/slub: add the slab freelists to kmem_cache Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 21:08 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-15 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH 10/14] x86: Create virtual memory region for SLUB Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 21:13 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-15 21:49 ` Dave Hansen
2023-09-18 8:54 ` Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH 11/14] mm/slub: allocate slabs from virtual memory Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 21:22 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-15 21:57 ` Dave Hansen
2023-10-11 9:17 ` Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH 12/14] mm/slub: introduce the deallocated_pages sysfs attribute Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 21:23 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-15 10:59 ` Matteo Rizzo [this message]
2023-09-15 21:26 ` [RFC PATCH 13/14] mm/slub: sanity-check freepointers Kees Cook
2023-09-15 10:59 ` [RFC PATCH 14/14] security: add documentation for SLAB_VIRTUAL Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-15 21:34 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-20 9:04 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-09-15 15:19 ` [RFC PATCH 00/14] Prevent cross-cache attacks in the SLUB allocator Dave Hansen
2023-09-15 16:30 ` Lameter, Christopher
2023-09-18 12:08 ` Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-18 17:39 ` Ingo Molnar
2023-09-18 18:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-09-19 15:48 ` Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-19 16:02 ` Dave Hansen
2023-09-19 17:56 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-19 18:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-09-19 13:42 ` Matteo Rizzo
2023-09-19 15:56 ` Dave Hansen
2023-09-20 7:44 ` Ingo Molnar
2023-09-20 8:49 ` Vlastimil Babka
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