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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	"Masami Hiramatsu" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Wanpeng Li" <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Frederic Weisbecker" <frederic@kernel.org>,
	"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Uladzislau Rezki" <urezki@gmail.com>,
	"Christoph Hellwig" <hch@infradead.org>,
	"Lorenzo Stoakes" <lstoakes@gmail.com>,
	"Josh Poimboeuf" <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Sami Tolvanen" <samitolvanen@google.com>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>,
	"Nicholas Piggin" <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	"Juerg Haefliger" <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com>,
	"Nicolas Saenz Julienne" <nsaenz@kernel.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	"Nadav Amit" <namit@vmware.com>,
	"Dan Carpenter" <error27@gmail.com>,
	"Chuang Wang" <nashuiliang@gmail.com>,
	"Yang Jihong" <yangjihong1@huawei.com>,
	"Petr Mladek" <pmladek@suse.com>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
	"Julian Pidancet" <julian.pidancet@oracle.com>,
	"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Dionna Glaze" <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
	"Thomas Weißschuh" <linux@weissschuh.net>,
	"Juri Lelli" <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
	"Daniel Bristot de Oliveira" <bristot@redhat.com>,
	"Marcelo Tosatti" <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
	"Yair Podemsky" <ypodemsk@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 08/14] BROKEN: context_tracking: Make context_tracking_key __ro_after_init
Date: Wed, 5 Jul 2023 22:41:42 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230705204142.GB2813335@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230705181256.3539027-9-vschneid@redhat.com>

On Wed, Jul 05, 2023 at 07:12:50PM +0100, Valentin Schneider wrote:

> BROKEN: the struct static_key lives in a read-only mapping after
> mark_rodata_ro(), which falls apart when the KVM module is loaded after
> init and a write to the struct happens due to e.g. guest_state_exit_irqoff()
> relying on the static key:

Right.. so whoever added the whole ro_after_init jump_label support did
a very poor job of it.

That said; I think it is fixable. Since the key cannot be changed, we
don't actually need to track the entries list and can thus avoid the key
update.

Something like the completely untested below...

---
Subject: jump_label: Seal __ro_after_init keys

When a static_key is marked ro_after_init, its state will never change
(after init), therefore jump_label_update() will never need to iterate
the entries, and thus module load won't actually need to track this --
avoiding the static_key::next write.

Therefore, mark these keys such that jump_label_add_module() might
recognise them and avoid the modification.

Use the special state: 'static_key_linked(key) && !static_key_mod(key)'
to denote such keys.

*UNTESTED*

NOT-Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 include/asm-generic/sections.h |  5 +++++
 include/linux/jump_label.h     |  1 +
 init/main.c                    |  1 +
 kernel/jump_label.c            | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/asm-generic/sections.h b/include/asm-generic/sections.h
index db13bb620f52..c768de6f19a9 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/sections.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/sections.h
@@ -180,6 +180,11 @@ static inline bool is_kernel_rodata(unsigned long addr)
 	       addr < (unsigned long)__end_rodata;
 }
 
+static inline bool is_kernel_ro_after_init(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	return addr >= (unsigned long)__start_ro_after_init &&
+	       addr < (unsigned long)__end_ro_after_init;
+}
 /**
  * is_kernel_inittext - checks if the pointer address is located in the
  *                      .init.text section
diff --git a/include/linux/jump_label.h b/include/linux/jump_label.h
index f0a949b7c973..88ef9e776af8 100644
--- a/include/linux/jump_label.h
+++ b/include/linux/jump_label.h
@@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ extern struct jump_entry __start___jump_table[];
 extern struct jump_entry __stop___jump_table[];
 
 extern void jump_label_init(void);
+extern void jump_label_ro(void);
 extern void jump_label_lock(void);
 extern void jump_label_unlock(void);
 extern void arch_jump_label_transform(struct jump_entry *entry,
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index ad920fac325c..cb5304ca18f4 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -1403,6 +1403,7 @@ static void mark_readonly(void)
 		 * insecure pages which are W+X.
 		 */
 		rcu_barrier();
+		jump_label_ro();
 		mark_rodata_ro();
 		rodata_test();
 	} else
diff --git a/kernel/jump_label.c b/kernel/jump_label.c
index d9c822bbffb8..40fb72d79d7a 100644
--- a/kernel/jump_label.c
+++ b/kernel/jump_label.c
@@ -530,6 +530,46 @@ void __init jump_label_init(void)
 	cpus_read_unlock();
 }
 
+static inline bool static_key_sealed(struct static_key *key)
+{
+	return (key->type & JUMP_TYPE_LINKED) && !(key->type & ~JUMP_TYPE_MASK);
+}
+
+static inline void static_key_seal(struct static_key *key)
+{
+	unsigned long type = key->type & JUMP_TYPE_TRUE;
+	key->type = JUMP_TYPE_LINKED | type;
+}
+
+void jump_label_ro(void)
+{
+	struct jump_entry *iter_start = __start___jump_table;
+	struct jump_entry *iter_stop = __stop___jump_table;
+	struct static_key *key = NULL;
+	struct jump_entry *iter;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!static_key_initialized))
+		return;
+
+	cpus_read_lock();
+	jump_label_lock();
+
+	for (iter = iter_start; iter < iter_stop; iter++) {
+		struct static_key *iterk = jump_entry_key(iter);
+
+		if (!is_kernel_ro_after_init(iterk))
+			continue;
+
+		if (static_key_sealed(iterk))
+			continue;
+
+		static_key_seal(iterk);
+	}
+
+	jump_label_unlock();
+	cpus_read_unlock();
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
 
 enum jump_label_type jump_label_init_type(struct jump_entry *entry)
@@ -650,6 +690,9 @@ static int jump_label_add_module(struct module *mod)
 			static_key_set_entries(key, iter);
 			continue;
 		}
+		if (static_key_sealed(key))
+			goto do_poke;
+
 		jlm = kzalloc(sizeof(struct static_key_mod), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!jlm)
 			return -ENOMEM;
@@ -675,6 +718,7 @@ static int jump_label_add_module(struct module *mod)
 		static_key_set_linked(key);
 
 		/* Only update if we've changed from our initial state */
+do_poke:
 		if (jump_label_type(iter) != jump_label_init_type(iter))
 			__jump_label_update(key, iter, iter_stop, true);
 	}


  reply	other threads:[~2023-07-05 20:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-07-05 18:12 [RFC PATCH 00/14] context_tracking,x86: Defer some IPIs until a user->kernel transition Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH 01/14] tracing/filters: Dynamically allocate filter_pred.regex Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH 02/14] tracing/filters: Enable filtering a cpumask field by another cpumask Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 18:54   ` Steven Rostedt
2023-07-05 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH 03/14] tracing/filters: Enable filtering a scalar field by a cpumask Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 19:00   ` Steven Rostedt
2023-07-05 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH 04/14] tracing/filters: Enable filtering the CPU common " Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH 05/14] tracing/filters: Document cpumask filtering Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH 06/14] objtool: Flesh out warning related to pv_ops[] calls Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH 07/14] objtool: Warn about non __ro_after_init static key usage in .noinstr Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH 08/14] BROKEN: context_tracking: Make context_tracking_key __ro_after_init Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 20:41   ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2023-07-05 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH 09/14] x86/kvm: Make kvm_async_pf_enabled __ro_after_init Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH 10/14] x86/sev-es: Make sev_es_enable_key __ro_after_init Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH 11/14] context-tracking: Introduce work deferral infrastructure Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 22:23   ` Frederic Weisbecker
2023-07-05 22:41     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-06  9:53       ` Frederic Weisbecker
2023-07-06 10:01     ` Frederic Weisbecker
2023-07-06 11:30     ` Valentin Schneider
2023-07-06 11:40       ` Frederic Weisbecker
2023-07-06 16:39         ` Paul E. McKenney
2023-07-06 18:05           ` Valentin Schneider
2023-07-06 11:55     ` Frederic Weisbecker
2023-07-05 22:39   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-06 11:31     ` Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH 12/14] context_tracking,x86: Defer kernel text patching IPIs Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH 13/14] context_tracking,x86: Add infrastructure to defer kernel TLBI Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 18:12 ` [RFC PATCH 14/14] x86/mm, mm/vmalloc: Defer flush_tlb_kernel_range() targeting NOHZ_FULL CPUs Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 18:48 ` [RFC PATCH 00/14] context_tracking,x86: Defer some IPIs until a user->kernel transition Nadav Amit
2023-07-06 11:29   ` Valentin Schneider
2023-07-05 19:03 ` Steven Rostedt
2023-07-06 11:30   ` Valentin Schneider

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