From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@gmail.com>
To: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v9 04/51] KVM: x86: Determine shared/private faults using a configurable mask
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2023 07:43:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230623144315.GC3436214@ls.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5ec0664fe81df54019ef5934f2dc6dfadf1d649c.camel@intel.com>
On Thu, Jun 22, 2023 at 11:52:56PM +0000,
"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com> wrote:
> On Thu, 2023-06-22 at 16:39 -0700, Isaku Yamahata wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 22, 2023 at 10:31:08PM +0000,
> > "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > > > If there are better ways to handle *how*
> > > > that's done I don't have any complaints there, but moving/adding bits
> > > > to GPA/error_flags after fault time just seems unecessary to me when
> > > > fault->is_private field can serve that purpose just as well.
> > >
> > > Perhaps you missed my point. My point is arch.mmu_private_fault_mask and
> > > arch.gfn_shared_mask seem redundant because the logic around them are exactly
> > > the same. I do believe we should have fault->is_private passing to the common
> > > MMU code.
> > >
> > > In fact, now I am wondering why we need to have "mmu_private_fault_mask" and
> > > "gfn_shared_mask" in _common_ KVM MMU code. We already have enough mechanism in
> > > KVM common code:
> > >
> > > 1) fault->is_private
> > > 2) kvm_mmu_page_role.private
> > > 3) an Xarray to tell whether a GFN is private or shared
> > >
> > > I am not convinced that we need to have "mmu_private_fault_mask" and
> > > "gfn_shared_mask" in common KVM MMU code. Instead, they can be in AMD and
> > > Intel's vendor code.
> > >
> > > Maybe it makes sense to have "gfn_shared_mask" in the KVM common code so that
> > > the fault handler can just strip away the "shared bit" at the very beginning (at
> > > least for TDX), but for the rest of the time I think we should already have
> > > enough infrastructure to handle private/shared mapping.
> > >
> > > Btw, one minor issue is, if I recall correctly, for TDX the shared bit must be
> > > applied to the GFN for shared mapping in normal EPT. I guess AMD doesn't need
> > > that for shared mapping. So "gfn_shared_mask" maybe useful in this case, but
> > > w/o it I believe we can also achieve in another way via vendor callback.
> >
> >
> > "2) kvm_mmu_page_role.private" above has different meaning.
> >
> > a). The fault is private or not.
> > b). page table the fault handler is walking is private or conventional.
> >
> > a.) is common for SNP, TDX and PROTECTED_VM. It makes sense in
> > kvm_mmu_do_page_fault() and __kvm_faultin_pfn(). After kvm_faultin_pfn(), the
> > fault handler can mostly forget it for SNP and PROTECTED_VM. (large page
> > adjustment needs it, though.) This is what we're discussing in this thread.
> >
> > b.) is specific to TDX. TDX KVM MMU introduces one more page table.
> >
> >
>
> I don't buy the last sentence. Even it's not necessarily for AMD from
> hardware's perspective, but the concept remains true for AMD too. So why cannot
> we use it for AMD?
We can use it for AMD. Let me rephrase it.
TDX only uses it now. SEV-SNP may or may not use it at their option.
--
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@gmail.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-23 14:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-12 4:25 [PATCH RFC v9 00/51] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 01/51] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for initializing private memory Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 02/51] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2023-06-12 10:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-19 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 03/51] KVM: x86: Use full 64-bit error code for kvm_mmu_do_page_fault Michael Roth
2023-06-14 14:24 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 04/51] KVM: x86: Determine shared/private faults using a configurable mask Michael Roth
2023-06-14 16:47 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-20 20:28 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-20 21:18 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-21 23:00 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-22 8:01 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-22 9:55 ` Huang, Kai
2023-06-22 15:32 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-22 22:31 ` Huang, Kai
2023-06-22 23:39 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-22 23:52 ` Huang, Kai
2023-06-23 14:43 ` Isaku Yamahata [this message]
2023-06-19 16:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-20 20:36 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 05/51] x86/coco: move CONFIG_HAS_CC_PLATFORM check down into coco/Makefile Michael Roth
2023-06-12 7:07 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2023-06-20 12:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-20 20:43 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-21 8:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-29 21:02 ` Michael Roth
2023-07-10 3:05 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2023-07-10 13:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 06/51] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 07/51] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2023-06-12 15:34 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-21 9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-21 14:31 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-21 15:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-21 9:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-21 14:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-06-21 19:15 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-08-09 13:03 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 08/51] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-06-12 15:39 ` Dave Hansen
2023-07-18 22:34 ` Kim Phillips
2023-07-18 23:17 ` Dave Hansen
2023-07-20 19:11 ` Kim Phillips
2023-07-20 22:24 ` Dave Hansen
2023-07-21 16:56 ` Kim Phillips
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 09/51] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:08 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-30 21:57 ` Michael Roth
2023-06-30 22:29 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 10/51] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:12 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 11/51] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:26 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 12/51] x86/fault: Report RMP page faults for kernel addresses Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:30 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 13/51] x86/fault: Handle RMP page faults for user addresses Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:40 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 14/51] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2023-06-12 17:00 ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 15/51] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 16/51] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 17/51] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 18/51] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 19/51] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2023-08-09 12:46 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 20/51] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 21/51] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 22/51] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 23/51] KVM: SEV: Select CONFIG_KVM_PROTECTED_VM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 24/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 25/51] KVM: SVM: Add GHCB handling for Hypervisor Feature Support requests Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 26/51] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 27/51] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 28/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 29/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 17:08 ` Peter Gonda
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 30/51] KVM: Add HVA range operator Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 31/51] KVM: Split out memory attribute xarray updates to helper function Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 32/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 33/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 34/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 35/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 36/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 37/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 38/51] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 39/51] KVM: x86: Define RMP page fault error bits for #NPF Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 40/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 41/51] KVM: SVM: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 42/51] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2023-08-15 16:00 ` Peter Gonda
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 43/51] KVM: SEV: Configure MMU to check for private fault flags Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 44/51] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 45/51] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 46/51] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 47/51] iommu/amd: Add IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN support Michael Roth
2023-09-07 10:31 ` Suthikulpanit, Suravee
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 48/51] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2023-06-13 6:24 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 49/51] x86/sev: Add KVM commands for per-instance certs Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 50/51] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2023-06-12 4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 51/51] crypto: ccp: Add debug support for decrypting pages Michael Roth
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