From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Taras Madan <tarasmadan@google.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Bharata B Rao <bharata@amd.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCHv16 03/17] x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking
Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2023 14:25:58 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230312112612.31869-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230312112612.31869-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Enumerate Linear Address Masking and provide defines for CR3 and CR4
flags.
The new CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING option enables the feature support in
kernel.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 6 ++++++
4 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index a825bf031f49..aa9f73f5d670 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2290,6 +2290,17 @@ config RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING
If unsure, leave at the default value.
+config ADDRESS_MASKING
+ bool "Linear Address Masking support"
+ depends on X86_64
+ help
+ Linear Address Masking (LAM) modifies the checking that is applied
+ to 64-bit linear addresses, allowing software to use of the
+ untranslated address bits for metadata.
+
+ The capability can be used for efficient address sanitizers (ASAN)
+ implementation and for optimizations in JITs.
+
config HOTPLUG_CPU
def_bool y
depends on SMP
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 73c9672c123b..353b054812de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -321,6 +321,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_LKGS (12*32+18) /* "" Load "kernel" (userspace) GS */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMX_FP16 (12*32+21) /* "" AMX fp16 Support */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_IFMA (12*32+23) /* "" Support for VPMADD52[H,L]UQ */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LAM (12*32+26) /* Linear Address Masking */
/* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (EBX), word 13 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
index a7f3d9100adb..d8cccadc83a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
* On systems with SME, one bit (in a variable position!) is stolen to indicate
* that the top-level paging structure is encrypted.
*
+ * On systemms with LAM, bits 61 and 62 are used to indicate LAM mode.
+ *
* All of the remaining bits indicate the physical address of the top-level
* paging structure.
*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
index c47cc7f2feeb..d898432947ff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -82,6 +82,10 @@
#define X86_CR3_PCID_BITS 12
#define X86_CR3_PCID_MASK (_AC((1UL << X86_CR3_PCID_BITS) - 1, UL))
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT 61 /* Activate LAM for userspace, 62:57 bits masked */
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U57 _BITULL(X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT)
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U48_BIT 62 /* Activate LAM for userspace, 62:48 bits masked */
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U48 _BITULL(X86_CR3_LAM_U48_BIT)
#define X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT 63 /* Preserve old PCID */
#define X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH _BITULL(X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT)
@@ -132,6 +136,8 @@
#define X86_CR4_PKE _BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT)
#define X86_CR4_CET_BIT 23 /* enable Control-flow Enforcement Technology */
#define X86_CR4_CET _BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT)
+#define X86_CR4_LAM_SUP_BIT 28 /* LAM for supervisor pointers */
+#define X86_CR4_LAM_SUP _BITUL(X86_CR4_LAM_SUP_BIT)
/*
* x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8
--
2.39.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-03-12 11:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-03-12 11:25 [PATCHv16 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-12 11:25 ` [PATCHv16 01/17] x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user() Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-12 11:25 ` [PATCHv16 02/17] x86: Allow atomic MM_CONTEXT flags setting Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-12 11:25 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2023-03-12 11:25 ` [PATCHv16 04/17] x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-12 11:26 ` [PATCHv16 05/17] mm: Introduce untagged_addr_remote() Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-14 23:35 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-03-12 11:26 ` [PATCHv16 06/17] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-12 11:26 ` [PATCHv16 07/17] x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead for systems without LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-12 11:26 ` [PATCHv16 08/17] x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-12 11:26 ` [PATCHv16 09/17] mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-12 11:26 ` [PATCHv16 10/17] iommu/sva: Replace pasid_valid() helper with mm_valid_pasid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-12 11:26 ` [PATCHv16 11/17] x86/mm/iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-04-03 6:18 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2023-04-03 9:44 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-04-03 9:56 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2023-04-03 10:17 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-04-03 10:22 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2023-04-03 10:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-12 11:26 ` [PATCHv16 12/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add malloc and tag-bits test cases for linear-address masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-12 11:26 ` [PATCHv16 13/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add mmap and SYSCALL " Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-08-09 16:04 ` Florian Weimer
2023-03-12 11:26 ` [PATCHv16 14/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add io_uring " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-12 11:26 ` [PATCHv16 15/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add inherit " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-12 11:26 ` [PATCHv16 16/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-12 11:26 ` [PATCHv16 17/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add test cases for LAM vs thread creation Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-03-17 17:18 ` [PATCHv16 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Alexander Potapenko
2023-03-17 17:21 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-03-17 17:28 ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-22 12:48 ` Alexander Potapenko
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