From: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 11/20] mmu: maybe_mkwrite updated to manufacture shadow stack PTEs
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 06:37:54 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230213143754.GC3943238@debug.ba.rivosinc.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2d6eefb8-c7c5-7d32-9a75-ae716f828cd9@redhat.com>
On Mon, Feb 13, 2023 at 01:05:16PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>On 13.02.23 05:53, Deepak Gupta wrote:
>>maybe_mkwrite creates PTEs with WRITE encodings for underlying arch if
>>VM_WRITE is turned on in vma->vm_flags. Shadow stack memory is a write-
>>able memory except it can only be written by certain specific
>>instructions. This patch allows maybe_mkwrite to create shadow stack PTEs
>>if vma is shadow stack VMA. Each arch can define which combination of VMA
>>flags means a shadow stack.
>>
>>Additionally pte_mkshdwstk must be provided by arch specific PTE
>>construction headers to create shadow stack PTEs. (in arch specific
>>pgtable.h).
>>
>>This patch provides dummy/stub pte_mkshdwstk if CONFIG_USER_SHADOW_STACK
>>is not selected.
>>
>>Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
>>---
>> include/linux/mm.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
>> include/linux/pgtable.h | 4 ++++
>> 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>>diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
>>index 8f857163ac89..a7705bc49bfe 100644
>>--- a/include/linux/mm.h
>>+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
>>@@ -1093,6 +1093,21 @@ static inline unsigned long thp_size(struct page *page)
>> void free_compound_page(struct page *page);
>> #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
>>+
>>+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_SHADOW_STACK
>>+bool arch_is_shadow_stack_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
>>+#endif
>>+
>>+static inline bool
>>+is_shadow_stack_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>>+{
>>+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_SHADOW_STACK
>>+ return arch_is_shadow_stack_vma(vma);
>>+#else
>>+ return false;
>>+#endif
>>+}
>>+
>> /*
>> * Do pte_mkwrite, but only if the vma says VM_WRITE. We do this when
>> * servicing faults for write access. In the normal case, do always want
>>@@ -1101,8 +1116,12 @@ void free_compound_page(struct page *page);
>> */
>> static inline pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>> {
>>- if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
>>- pte = pte_mkwrite(pte);
>>+ if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) {
>>+ if (unlikely(is_shadow_stack_vma(vma)))
>>+ pte = pte_mkshdwstk(pte);
>>+ else
>>+ pte = pte_mkwrite(pte);
>>+ }
>> return pte;
>
>Exactly what we are trying to avoid in the x86 approach right now.
>Please see the x86 series on details, we shouldn't try reinventing the
>wheel but finding a core-mm approach that fits multiple architectures.
>
>https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119212317.8324-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com
Thanks David for comment here. I looked at x86 approach. This patch
actually written in a way which is not re-inventing wheel and is following
a core-mm approach that fits multiple architectures.
Change above checks `is_shadow_stack_vma` and if it returns true then only
it manufactures shadow stack pte else it'll make a regular writeable mapping.
Now if we look at `is_shadow_stack_vma` implementation, it returns false if
`CONFIG_USER_SHADOW_STACK` is not defined. If `CONFIG_USER_SHADOW_STACK is
defined then it calls `arch_is_shadow_stack_vma` which should be implemented
by arch specific code. This allows each architecture to define their own vma
flag encodings for shadow stack (riscv chooses presence of only `VM_WRITE`
which is analogous to choosen PTE encodings on riscv W=1,R=0,X=0)
Additionally pte_mkshdwstk will be nop if not implemented by architecture.
Let me know if this make sense. If I am missing something here, let me know.
>
>--
>Thanks,
>
>David / dhildenb
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-13 14:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20230213045351.3945824-1-debug@rivosinc.com>
2023-02-13 4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 05/20] mmap : Introducing new protection "PROT_SHADOWSTACK" for mmap Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13 4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 07/20] elf: ELF header parsing in GNU property for cfi state Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13 4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 08/20] riscv: ELF header parsing in GNU property for riscv zisslpcfi Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13 4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 11/20] mmu: maybe_mkwrite updated to manufacture shadow stack PTEs Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13 12:05 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-13 14:37 ` Deepak Gupta [this message]
2023-02-13 14:56 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-13 20:01 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-14 12:10 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-14 18:27 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
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