From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>,
concord@gentoo.org, Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>,
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>,
Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>,
Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] Revert "slub: force on no_hash_pointers when slub_debug is enabled"
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2023 11:47:17 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230208194712.never.999-kees@kernel.org> (raw)
This reverts commit 792702911f581f7793962fbeb99d5c3a1b28f4c3.
Linking no_hash_pointers() to slub_debug has had a chilling effect
on using slub_debug features for security hardening, since system
builders are forced to choose between redzoning and heap address location
exposures. Instead, just require that the "no_hash_pointers" boot param
needs to be used to expose pointers during slub_debug reports.
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Cc: concord@gentoo.org
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202109200726.2EFEDC5@keescook/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
include/linux/kernel.h | 2 --
lib/vsprintf.c | 2 +-
mm/slub.c | 4 ----
3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index fe6efb24d151..e3d9d3879495 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -229,8 +229,6 @@ int sscanf(const char *, const char *, ...);
extern __scanf(2, 0)
int vsscanf(const char *, const char *, va_list);
-extern int no_hash_pointers_enable(char *str);
-
extern int get_option(char **str, int *pint);
extern char *get_options(const char *str, int nints, int *ints);
extern unsigned long long memparse(const char *ptr, char **retptr);
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index be71a03c936a..410b4a80a58a 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -2222,7 +2222,7 @@ char *fwnode_string(char *buf, char *end, struct fwnode_handle *fwnode,
return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
}
-int __init no_hash_pointers_enable(char *str)
+static int __init no_hash_pointers_enable(char *str)
{
if (no_hash_pointers)
return 0;
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 13459c69095a..63f7337dd433 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -5005,10 +5005,6 @@ void __init kmem_cache_init(void)
if (debug_guardpage_minorder())
slub_max_order = 0;
- /* Print slub debugging pointers without hashing */
- if (__slub_debug_enabled())
- no_hash_pointers_enable(NULL);
-
kmem_cache_node = &boot_kmem_cache_node;
kmem_cache = &boot_kmem_cache;
--
2.34.1
next reply other threads:[~2023-02-08 19:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-08 19:47 Kees Cook [this message]
2023-02-08 23:58 ` Hyeonggon Yoo
2023-02-09 0:35 ` Kees Cook
2023-02-10 8:44 ` Vlastimil Babka
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