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[198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id q16-20020a170902eb9000b00194d14d8e54sm1790804plg.96.2023.01.19.16.59.54 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 19 Jan 2023 16:59:54 -0800 (PST) Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 16:59:53 -0800 From: Kees Cook To: Rick Edgecombe Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H . J . Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , Weijiang Yang , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , John Allen , kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org, jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com, christina.schimpe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 16/39] x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors Message-ID: <202301191659.1B1439CF7@keescook> References: <20230119212317.8324-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> <20230119212317.8324-17-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20230119212317.8324-17-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 9794A1C0003 X-Rspamd-Server: rspam09 X-Rspam-User: X-Stat-Signature: tf76rnesyycsxb8sftrk4xgofpgre8s5 X-HE-Tag: 1674176865-885476 X-HE-Meta: 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 8qbyvNd9 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 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On Thu, Jan 19, 2023 at 01:22:54PM -0800, Rick Edgecombe wrote: > From: Yu-cheng Yu > > The CPU performs "shadow stack accesses" when it expects to encounter > shadow stack mappings. These accesses can be implicit (via CALL/RET > instructions) or explicit (instructions like WRSS). > > Shadow stack accesses to shadow-stack mappings can result in faults in > normal, valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings. > Shadow stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap > and copy-on-write. The kernel needs to use faults to implement those > features. > > The architecture has concepts of both shadow stack reads and shadow stack > writes. Any shadow stack access to non-shadow stack memory will generate > a fault with the shadow stack error code bit set. > > This means that, unlike normal write protection, the fault handler needs > to create a type of memory that can be written to (with instructions that > generate shadow stack writes), even to fulfill a read access. So in the > case of COW memory, the COW needs to take place even with a shadow stack > read. Otherwise the page will be left (shadow stack) writable in > userspace. So to trigger the appropriate behavior, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE > for shadow stack accesses, even if the access was a shadow stack read. > > For the purpose of making this clearer, consider the following example. > If a process has a shadow stack, and forks, the shadow stack PTEs will > become read-only due to COW. If the CPU in one process performs a shadow > stack read access to the shadow stack, for example executing a RET and > causing the CPU to read the shadow stack copy of the return address, then > in order for the fault to be resolved the PTE will need to be set with > shadow stack permissions. But then the memory would be changeable from > userspace (from CALL, RET, WRSS, etc). So this scenario needs to trigger > COW, otherwise the shared page would be changeable from both processes. > > Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow > stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack > mapping. Also, generate the errors for invalid shadow stack accesses. > > Tested-by: Pengfei Xu > Tested-by: John Allen > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu Reviewed-by: Kees Cook -- Kees Cook