From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Taras Madan <tarasmadan@google.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Bharata B Rao <bharata@amd.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCHv14 11/17] x86/mm/iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 15:37:30 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230111123736.20025-12-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230111123736.20025-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
IOMMU and SVA-capable devices know nothing about LAM and only expect
canonical addresses. An attempt to pass down tagged pointer will lead
to address translation failure.
By default do not allow to enable both LAM and use SVA in the same
process.
The new ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA arch_prctl() overrides the limitation.
By using the arch_prctl() userspace takes responsibility to never pass
tagged address to the device.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 6 ++++++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 7 +++++++
drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c | 4 ++++
include/linux/mmu_context.h | 7 +++++++
6 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
index e80762e998ce..0da5c227f490 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
#define MM_CONTEXT_HAS_VSYSCALL 1
/* Do not allow changing LAM mode */
#define MM_CONTEXT_LOCK_LAM 2
+/* Allow LAM and SVA coexisting */
+#define MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA 3
/*
* x86 has arch-specific MMU state beyond what lives in mm_struct.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 4b77c96da07f..6ffc42dfd59d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -114,6 +114,12 @@ static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
mm->context.untag_mask = -1UL;
}
+#define arch_pgtable_dma_compat arch_pgtable_dma_compat
+static inline bool arch_pgtable_dma_compat(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ return !mm_lam_cr3_mask(mm) ||
+ test_bit(MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA, &mm->context.flags);
+}
#else
static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
index a31e27b95b19..eb290d89cb32 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
@@ -23,5 +23,6 @@
#define ARCH_GET_UNTAG_MASK 0x4001
#define ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR 0x4002
#define ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS 0x4003
+#define ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA 0x4004
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index 1b41c60ebf6e..0831d2be190f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -759,6 +759,10 @@ static int prctl_enable_tagged_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_bits)
if (current->mm != mm)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (mm_valid_pasid(mm) &&
+ !test_bit(MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA, &mm->context.flags))
+ return -EINTR;
+
if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
return -EINTR;
@@ -882,6 +886,9 @@ long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)
(unsigned long __user *)arg2);
case ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR:
return prctl_enable_tagged_addr(task->mm, arg2);
+ case ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA:
+ set_bit(MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA, &task->mm->context.flags);
+ return 0;
case ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS:
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LAM))
return put_user(0, (unsigned long __user *)arg2);
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c
index 4ee2929f0d7a..dd76a1a09cf7 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
/*
* Helpers for IOMMU drivers implementing SVA
*/
+#include <linux/mmu_context.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/iommu.h>
@@ -32,6 +33,9 @@ int iommu_sva_alloc_pasid(struct mm_struct *mm, ioasid_t min, ioasid_t max)
min == 0 || max < min)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (!arch_pgtable_dma_compat(mm))
+ return -EBUSY;
+
mutex_lock(&iommu_sva_lock);
/* Is a PASID already associated with this mm? */
if (mm_valid_pasid(mm)) {
diff --git a/include/linux/mmu_context.h b/include/linux/mmu_context.h
index 14b9c1fa05c4..f2b7a3f04099 100644
--- a/include/linux/mmu_context.h
+++ b/include/linux/mmu_context.h
@@ -35,4 +35,11 @@ static inline unsigned long mm_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
}
#endif
+#ifndef arch_pgtable_dma_compat
+static inline bool arch_pgtable_dma_compat(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+#endif
+
#endif
--
2.38.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-11 13:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-11 12:37 [PATCHv14 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 01/17] x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user() Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-18 15:49 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-18 15:59 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-01-18 16:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-18 17:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 02/17] x86: Allow atomic MM_CONTEXT flags setting Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 03/17] x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 04/17] x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 13:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-01-11 14:14 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 14:37 ` [PATCHv14.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 05/17] mm: Introduce untagged_addr_remote() Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 06/17] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 07/17] x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 08/17] x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead until the first LAM user Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-17 13:05 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-17 13:57 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-17 15:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-17 17:18 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-01-17 17:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-01-17 18:26 ` Nick Desaulniers
2023-01-17 18:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-01-17 19:17 ` Nick Desaulniers
2023-01-17 20:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-01-17 20:43 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-01-17 18:14 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-17 18:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-01-19 23:06 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 09/17] mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 10/17] iommu/sva: Replace pasid_valid() helper with mm_valid_pasid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 12/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add malloc and tag-bits test cases for linear-address masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 13/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add mmap and SYSCALL " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 14/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add io_uring " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 15/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add inherit " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 16/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA " Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-11 12:37 ` [PATCHv14 17/17] selftests/x86/lam: Add test cases for LAM vs thread creation Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-18 16:49 ` [PATCHv14 00/17] Linear Address Masking enabling Peter Zijlstra
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