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From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V . Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
	kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org,
	jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 27/37] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk
Date: Fri,  4 Nov 2022 15:35:54 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221104223604.29615-28-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221104223604.29615-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

Shadow stack's are normally written to via CALL/RET or specific CET
instuctions like RSTORSSP/SAVEPREVSSP. However during some Linux
operations the kernel will need to write to directly using the ring-0 only
WRUSS instruction.

A shadow stack restore token marks a restore point of the shadow stack, and
the address in a token must point directly above the token, which is within
the same shadow stack. This is distinctively different from other pointers
on the shadow stack, since those pointers point to executable code area.

Introduce token setup and verify routines. Also introduce WRUSS, which is
a kernel-mode instruction but writes directly to user shadow stack.

In future patches that enable shadow stack to work with signals, the kernel
will need something to denote the point in the stack where sigreturn may be
called. This will prevent attackers calling sigreturn at arbitrary places
in the stack, in order to help prevent SROP attacks.

To do this, something that can only be written by the kernel needs to be
placed on the shadow stack. This can be accomplished by setting bit 63 in
the frame written to the shadow stack. Userspace return addresses can't
have this bit set as it is in the kernel range. It is also can't be a
valid restore token.

Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

---

v3:
 - Drop shstk_check_rstor_token()
 - Fail put_shstk_data() if bit 63 is set in the data (Kees)
 - Add comment in create_rstor_token() (Kees)
 - Pull in create_rstor_token() changes from future patch (Kees)

v2:
 - Add data helpers for writing to shadow stack.

v1:
 - Use xsave helpers.

Yu-cheng v30:
 - Update commit log, remove description about signals.
 - Update various comments.
 - Remove variable 'ssp' init and adjust return value accordingly.
 - Check get_user_shstk_addr() return value.
 - Replace 'ia32' with 'proc32'.

 arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 13 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c              | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 86 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
index 35f709f619fb..6d51a87aea7f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
@@ -223,6 +223,19 @@ static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p)
 		: [pax] "a" (p));
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+static inline int write_user_shstk_64(u64 __user *addr, u64 val)
+{
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussq %[val], (%[addr])\n"
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail])
+			  :: [addr] "r" (addr), [val] "r" (val)
+			  :: fail);
+	return 0;
+fail:
+	return -EFAULT;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */
+
 #define nop() asm volatile ("nop")
 
 static inline void serialize(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index a7a982924b9a..755b4af40413 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
 #include <asm/fpu/api.h>
 #include <asm/prctl.h>
 
+#define SS_FRAME_SIZE 8
+
 static bool features_enabled(unsigned long features)
 {
 	return current->thread.features & features;
@@ -40,6 +42,35 @@ static void features_clr(unsigned long features)
 	current->thread.features &= ~features;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Create a restore token on the shadow stack.  A token is always 8-byte
+ * and aligned to 8.
+ */
+static int create_rstor_token(unsigned long ssp, unsigned long *token_addr)
+{
+	unsigned long addr;
+
+	/* Token must be aligned */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 8))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	addr = ssp - SS_FRAME_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * SSP is aligned, so reserved bits and mode bit are a zero, just mark
+	 * the token 64-bit.
+	 */
+	ssp |= BIT(0);
+
+	if (write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)addr, (u64)ssp))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (token_addr)
+		*token_addr = addr;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size)
 {
 	int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
@@ -160,6 +191,48 @@ int shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long clone_flags,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static unsigned long get_user_shstk_addr(void)
+{
+	unsigned long long ssp;
+
+	fpregs_lock_and_load();
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+
+	fpregs_unlock();
+
+	return ssp;
+}
+
+static int put_shstk_data(u64 __user *addr, u64 data)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(data & BIT(63)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Mark the high bit so that the sigframe can't be processed as a
+	 * return address.
+	 */
+	if (write_user_shstk_64(addr, data | BIT(63)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int get_shstk_data(unsigned long *data, unsigned long __user *addr)
+{
+	unsigned long ldata;
+
+	if (unlikely(get_user(ldata, addr)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (!(ldata & BIT(63)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*data = ldata & ~BIT(63);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	struct thread_shstk *shstk = &tsk->thread.shstk;
-- 
2.17.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-11-04 22:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 104+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-04 22:35 [PATCH v3 00/37] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 01/37] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 02/37] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 03/37] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-07 17:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 04/37] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-07 18:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-07 18:19     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-07 18:37       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-07 19:19         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-07 19:30           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-11-07 19:33             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 05/37] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 06/37] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 07/37] x86/cet: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 08/37] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 09/37] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 10/37] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 11/37] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 12/37] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 13/37] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 11:20   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 17:18     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 14/37] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 15/37] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 11:47   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 20:03     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-15 21:07       ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 23:13         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-16 10:09           ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 16/37] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 17/37] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 18/37] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 12:04   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 20:40     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-15 20:56       ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 21:49         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 19/37] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 20/37] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 12:05   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 20:41     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 21/37] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 22/37] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 23/37] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 24/37] x86: Introduce userspace API for CET enabling Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 12:26   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 13:03     ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 20:55       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-15 14:25   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 20:55     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 25/37] x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 12:32   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 21:46     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 26/37] x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` Rick Edgecombe [this message]
2022-11-15 14:18   ` [PATCH v3 27/37] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 23:42     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-16 10:18       ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-16 22:38         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-17 14:17           ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-18 17:05             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-15 14:22   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 20:56     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 28/37] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 29/37] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 30/37] x86/shstk: Support wrss for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 31/37] x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:35 ` [PATCH v3 32/37] x86/cet/shstk: Wire in CET interface Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:36 ` [PATCH v3 33/37] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:36 ` [PATCH v3 34/37] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:36 ` [PATCH v3 35/37] x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 14:43   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 22:23     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-17 12:25       ` Schimpe, Christina
2022-11-17 14:14         ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-18 17:20           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-18 17:25             ` Schimpe, Christina
2022-11-17 19:57         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-18 16:21           ` Schimpe, Christina
2022-11-18 17:18             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-21  7:40           ` Mike Rapoport
2022-11-21 15:52             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-22  9:36               ` Mike Rapoport
2022-11-04 22:36 ` [PATCH v3 36/37] x86/cet/shstk: Add ARCH_CET_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-15 14:47   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 20:01     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-15 20:57       ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-15 21:00         ` Dave Hansen
2022-11-15 21:21           ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-04 22:36 ` [RFC 37/37] fs/binfmt_elf: Block old shstk elf bit Rick Edgecombe
2022-11-04 22:56   ` H.J. Lu
2022-11-06  9:33     ` Florian Weimer
2022-11-07 16:49       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-07 16:55         ` Florian Weimer
2022-11-07 17:37           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-07 19:10             ` H.J. Lu
2022-11-07 21:10               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-07 21:21                 ` H.J. Lu
2022-11-07 21:34                   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-07 21:47                     ` H.J. Lu
2022-11-07 22:46                       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-07 23:45                         ` H.J. Lu
2022-11-08  9:14                 ` Florian Weimer
2022-11-07 16:49     ` Edgecombe, Rick P

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