From: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
To: pmladek@suse.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, senozhatsky@chromium.org,
andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com,
haakon.bugge@oracle.com, john.haxby@oracle.com,
jane.chu@oracle.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 1/1] vsprintf: protect kernel from panic due to non-canonical pointer dereference
Date: Wed, 19 Oct 2022 13:41:59 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221019194159.2923873-1-jane.chu@oracle.com> (raw)
Having stepped on a local kernel bug where reading sysfs has led to
out-of-bound pointer dereference by vsprintf() which led to GPF panic.
And the reason for GPF is that the OOB pointer was turned to a
non-canonical address such as 0x7665645f63616465.
vsprintf() already has this line of defense
if ((unsigned long)ptr < PAGE_SIZE || IS_ERR_VALUE(ptr))
return "(efault)";
Since a non-canonical pointer can be detected by kern_addr_valid()
on architectures that present VM holes as well as meaningful
implementation of kern_addr_valid() that detects the non-canonical
addresses, this patch adds a check on non-canonical string pointer by
kern_addr_valid() and "(efault)" to alert user that something
is wrong instead of unecessarily panic the server.
On the other hand, if the non-canonical string pointer is dereferenced
else where in the kernel, by virtue of being non-canonical, a crash
is expected to be immediate.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
---
lib/vsprintf.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index c414a8d9f1ea..b38c12ef1e45 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -698,6 +698,9 @@ static const char *check_pointer_msg(const void *ptr)
if ((unsigned long)ptr < PAGE_SIZE || IS_ERR_VALUE(ptr))
return "(efault)";
+ if (!kern_addr_valid((unsigned long)ptr))
+ return "(efault)";
+
return NULL;
}
--
2.18.4
next reply other threads:[~2022-10-19 19:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-19 19:41 Jane Chu [this message]
2022-10-19 20:33 ` Andy Shevchenko
2022-10-20 14:52 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2022-10-20 16:03 ` Andy Shevchenko
2022-10-25 8:40 ` Petr Mladek
2022-10-25 9:13 ` Andy Shevchenko
2022-10-19 21:00 ` Rasmus Villemoes
2022-10-20 9:28 ` Petr Mladek
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2022-10-19 19:34 [PATCH v3 0/1] vsprintf: check non-canonical pointer by kern_addr_valid() Jane Chu
2022-10-19 19:34 ` [PATCH v3 1/1] vsprintf: protect kernel from panic due to non-canonical pointer dereference Jane Chu
2022-10-20 11:41 ` kernel test robot
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