From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
To: glider@google.com
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 41/45] entry: kmsan: introduce kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs()
Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 16:23:06 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220701142310.2188015-42-glider@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220701142310.2188015-1-glider@google.com>
struct pt_regs passed into IRQ entry code is set up by uninstrumented
asm functions, therefore KMSAN may not notice the registers are
initialized.
kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs() unpoisons the contents of struct pt_regs,
preventing potential false positives. Unlike kmsan_unpoison_memory(),
it can be called under kmsan_in_runtime(), which is often the case in
IRQ entry code.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
---
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ibfd7018ac847fd8e5491681f508ba5d14e4669cf
---
include/linux/kmsan.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
kernel/entry/common.c | 5 +++++
mm/kmsan/hooks.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/kmsan.h b/include/linux/kmsan.h
index e8b5c306c4aa1..c4412622b9a78 100644
--- a/include/linux/kmsan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kmsan.h
@@ -246,6 +246,17 @@ void kmsan_handle_dma_sg(struct scatterlist *sg, int nents,
*/
void kmsan_handle_urb(const struct urb *urb, bool is_out);
+/**
+ * kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs() - Handle pt_regs in low-level entry code.
+ * @regs: struct pt_regs pointer received from assembly code.
+ *
+ * KMSAN unpoisons the contents of the passed pt_regs, preventing potential
+ * false positive reports. Unlike kmsan_unpoison_memory(),
+ * kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs() can be called from the regions where
+ * kmsan_in_runtime() returns true, which is the case in early entry code.
+ */
+void kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs(const struct pt_regs *regs);
+
#else
static inline void kmsan_init_shadow(void)
@@ -342,6 +353,10 @@ static inline void kmsan_handle_urb(const struct urb *urb, bool is_out)
{
}
+static inline void kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs(const struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+}
+
#endif
#endif /* _LINUX_KMSAN_H */
diff --git a/kernel/entry/common.c b/kernel/entry/common.c
index 032f164abe7ce..055d3bdb0442c 100644
--- a/kernel/entry/common.c
+++ b/kernel/entry/common.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/resume_user_mode.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/kmsan.h>
#include <linux/livepatch.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/tick.h>
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ static __always_inline void __enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
user_exit_irqoff();
instrumentation_begin();
+ kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs(regs);
trace_hardirqs_off_finish();
instrumentation_end();
}
@@ -352,6 +354,7 @@ noinstr irqentry_state_t irqentry_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
lockdep_hardirqs_off(CALLER_ADDR0);
rcu_irq_enter();
instrumentation_begin();
+ kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs(regs);
trace_hardirqs_off_finish();
instrumentation_end();
@@ -367,6 +370,7 @@ noinstr irqentry_state_t irqentry_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
*/
lockdep_hardirqs_off(CALLER_ADDR0);
instrumentation_begin();
+ kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs(regs);
rcu_irq_enter_check_tick();
trace_hardirqs_off_finish();
instrumentation_end();
@@ -452,6 +456,7 @@ irqentry_state_t noinstr irqentry_nmi_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
rcu_nmi_enter();
instrumentation_begin();
+ kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs(regs);
trace_hardirqs_off_finish();
ftrace_nmi_enter();
instrumentation_end();
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
index 9aecbf2825837..c7528bcbb2f91 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
@@ -358,6 +358,33 @@ void kmsan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmsan_unpoison_memory);
+/*
+ * Version of kmsan_unpoison_memory() that can be called from within the KMSAN
+ * runtime.
+ *
+ * Non-instrumented IRQ entry functions receive struct pt_regs from assembly
+ * code. Those regs need to be unpoisoned, otherwise using them will result in
+ * false positives.
+ * Using kmsan_unpoison_memory() is not an option in entry code, because the
+ * return value of in_task() is inconsistent - as a result, certain calls to
+ * kmsan_unpoison_memory() are ignored. kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs() ensures that
+ * the registers are unpoisoned even if kmsan_in_runtime() is true in the early
+ * entry code.
+ */
+void kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs(const struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ unsigned long ua_flags;
+
+ if (!kmsan_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ ua_flags = user_access_save();
+ kmsan_internal_unpoison_memory((void *)regs, sizeof(*regs),
+ KMSAN_POISON_NOCHECK);
+ user_access_restore(ua_flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs);
+
void kmsan_check_memory(const void *addr, size_t size)
{
if (!kmsan_enabled)
--
2.37.0.rc0.161.g10f37bed90-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-01 14:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 145+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-01 14:22 [PATCH v4 00/45] Add KernelMemorySanitizer infrastructure Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 01/45] x86: add missing include to sparsemem.h Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 02/45] stackdepot: reserve 5 extra bits in depot_stack_handle_t Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 14:17 ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 03/45] instrumented.h: allow instrumenting both sides of copy_from_user() Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 14:17 ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 04/45] x86: asm: instrument usercopy in get_user() and __put_user_size() Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-02 3:47 ` kernel test robot
2022-07-15 14:03 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-02 10:45 ` kernel test robot
2022-07-15 16:44 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-02 13:09 ` kernel test robot
2022-07-07 10:13 ` Marco Elver
2022-08-07 17:33 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 05/45] asm-generic: instrument usercopy in cacheflush.h Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 14:17 ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 06/45] kmsan: add ReST documentation Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-07 12:34 ` Marco Elver
2022-07-15 7:42 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-15 8:52 ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 07/45] kmsan: introduce __no_sanitize_memory and __no_kmsan_checks Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 14:17 ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 08/45] kmsan: mark noinstr as __no_sanitize_memory Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 14:17 ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 09/45] x86: kmsan: pgtable: reduce vmalloc space Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-11 16:12 ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 10/45] libnvdimm/pfn_dev: increase MAX_STRUCT_PAGE_SIZE Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-11 16:26 ` Marco Elver
2022-08-03 9:41 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-08-03 9:44 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-05 22:08 ` Dan Williams
2023-01-09 9:51 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-09 22:06 ` Dan Williams
2023-01-10 5:56 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-10 6:55 ` Dan Williams
2023-01-10 8:48 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-10 8:52 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-10 8:53 ` Eric Dumazet
2023-01-10 8:55 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-01-10 15:35 ` Steven Rostedt
2023-01-10 9:14 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-30 8:34 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-01-30 18:57 ` Dan Williams
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 11/45] kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-02 0:18 ` Hillf Danton
2022-08-03 17:25 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-11 16:49 ` Marco Elver
2022-08-03 18:14 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-13 10:04 ` Marco Elver
2022-08-03 17:45 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 12/45] kmsan: disable instrumentation of unsupported common kernel code Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 11:54 ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 13/45] MAINTAINERS: add entry for KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 12:06 ` Marco Elver
2022-08-02 16:39 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 14/45] mm: kmsan: maintain KMSAN metadata for page operations Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 12:20 ` Marco Elver
2022-08-03 10:30 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 15/45] mm: kmsan: call KMSAN hooks from SLUB code Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 13:13 ` Marco Elver
2022-08-02 16:31 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 16/45] kmsan: handle task creation and exiting Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 13:17 ` Marco Elver
2022-08-02 15:47 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 17/45] init: kmsan: call KMSAN initialization routines Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 14:05 ` Marco Elver
2022-08-02 20:07 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-08-03 9:08 ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 18/45] instrumented.h: add KMSAN support Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 13:51 ` Marco Elver
2022-08-03 11:17 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 19/45] kmsan: unpoison @tlb in arch_tlb_gather_mmu() Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-13 9:28 ` Marco Elver
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 20/45] kmsan: add iomap support Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 21/45] Input: libps2: mark data received in __ps2_command() as initialized Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 22/45] dma: kmsan: unpoison DMA mappings Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 23/45] virtio: kmsan: check/unpoison scatterlist in vring_map_one_sg() Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 24/45] kmsan: handle memory sent to/from USB Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 25/45] kmsan: add tests for KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 14:16 ` Marco Elver
2022-08-02 17:29 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 26/45] kmsan: disable strscpy() optimization under KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 27/45] crypto: kmsan: disable accelerated configs " Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 28/45] kmsan: disable physical page merging in biovec Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 29/45] block: kmsan: skip bio block merging logic for KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-13 10:22 ` Marco Elver
2022-08-02 17:47 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 30/45] kcov: kmsan: unpoison area->list in kcov_remote_area_put() Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 31/45] security: kmsan: fix interoperability with auto-initialization Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 32/45] objtool: kmsan: list KMSAN API functions as uaccess-safe Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 33/45] x86: kmsan: disable instrumentation of unsupported code Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-12 13:43 ` Marco Elver
2022-08-03 10:52 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:22 ` [PATCH v4 34/45] x86: kmsan: skip shadow checks in __switch_to() Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 35/45] x86: kmsan: handle open-coded assembly in lib/iomem.c Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 36/45] x86: kmsan: use __msan_ string functions where possible Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 37/45] x86: kmsan: sync metadata pages on page fault Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 38/45] x86: kasan: kmsan: support CONFIG_GENERIC_CSUM on x86, enable it for KASAN/KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 39/45] x86: fs: kmsan: disable CONFIG_DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 40/45] x86: kmsan: don't instrument stack walking functions Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` Alexander Potapenko [this message]
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 42/45] bpf: kmsan: initialize BPF registers with zeroes Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 43/45] namei: initialize parameters passed to step_into() Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-02 17:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-03 3:59 ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 2:52 ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 8:20 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-04 13:44 ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 13:55 ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 15:49 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-04 16:03 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-04 16:33 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-04 18:23 ` Segher Boessenkool
2022-07-04 16:00 ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 16:47 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-04 17:36 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-04 19:02 ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 19:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-04 19:55 ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 20:24 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-04 20:46 ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 20:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-04 21:04 ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:13 ` [PATCH 1/7] __follow_mount_rcu(): verify that mount_lock remains unchanged Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:14 ` [PATCH 2/7] follow_dotdot{,_rcu}(): change calling conventions Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:14 ` [PATCH 3/7] namei: stash the sampled ->d_seq into nameidata Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:15 ` [PATCH 4/7] step_into(): lose inode argument Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:15 ` [PATCH 5/7] follow_dotdot{,_rcu}(): don't bother with inode Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:16 ` [PATCH 6/7] lookup_fast(): " Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:17 ` [PATCH 7/7] step_into(): move fetching ->d_inode past handle_mounts() Al Viro
2022-07-04 23:19 ` [PATCH 1/7] __follow_mount_rcu(): verify that mount_lock remains unchanged Al Viro
2022-07-05 0:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-07-05 3:48 ` Al Viro
2022-07-04 20:47 ` [PATCH v4 43/45] namei: initialize parameters passed to step_into() Linus Torvalds
2022-08-08 16:37 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 44/45] mm: fs: initialize fsdata passed to write_begin/write_end interface Alexander Potapenko
2022-07-04 20:07 ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-07-04 20:30 ` Al Viro
2022-08-25 15:39 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-08-25 16:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-08-25 21:57 ` Segher Boessenkool
2022-08-26 19:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2022-08-31 13:32 ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-08-25 22:13 ` Segher Boessenkool
2022-07-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v4 45/45] x86: kmsan: enable KMSAN builds for x86 Alexander Potapenko
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