From: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
To: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>,
Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/5] x86/mm: check exec permissions on fault
Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 20:10:40 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220309041043.302261-3-namit@vmware.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220309041043.302261-1-namit@vmware.com>
From: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
access_error() currently does not check for execution permission
violation. As a result, spurious page-faults due to execution permission
violation cause SIGSEGV.
It appears not to be an issue so far, but the next patches avoid TLB
flushes on permission promotion, which can lead to this scenario. nodejs
for instance crashes when TLB flush is avoided on permission promotion.
Add a check to prevent access_error() from returning mistakenly that
spurious page-faults due to instruction fetch are a reason for an access
error.
It is assumed that error code bits of "instruction fetch" and "write" in
the hardware error code are mutual exclusive, and the change assumes so.
However, to be on the safe side, especially if hypervisors misbehave,
assert this is the case and warn otherwise.
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
---
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index d0074c6ed31a..ad0ef0a6087a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -1107,10 +1107,28 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
(error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign))
return 1;
- if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) {
+ if (error_code & (X86_PF_WRITE | X86_PF_INSTR)) {
+ /*
+ * CPUs are not expected to set the two error code bits
+ * together, but to ensure that hypervisors do not misbehave,
+ * run an additional sanity check.
+ */
+ if ((error_code & (X86_PF_WRITE|X86_PF_INSTR)) ==
+ (X86_PF_WRITE|X86_PF_INSTR)) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
/* write, present and write, not present: */
- if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)))
+ if ((error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) &&
+ unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* exec, present and exec, not present: */
+ if ((error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) &&
+ unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)))
return 1;
+
return 0;
}
--
2.25.1
next parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-09 4:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20220309041043.302261-1-namit@vmware.com>
2022-03-09 4:10 ` Nadav Amit [this message]
2022-03-09 4:10 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] mm/mprotect: use mmu_gather Nadav Amit
2022-03-09 4:10 ` [PATCH v3 5/5] mm: avoid unnecessary flush on change_huge_pmd() Nadav Amit
2022-03-09 21:40 ` [PATCH v3 0/5] mm/mprotect: avoid unnecessary TLB flushes Andrew Morton
2022-03-11 18:40 ` Nadav Amit
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20220309041043.302261-3-namit@vmware.com \
--to=nadav.amit@gmail.com \
--cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=namit@vmware.com \
--cc=npiggin@gmail.com \
--cc=peterx@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=yuzhao@google.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox