From: Tianchen Ding <dtcccc@linux.alibaba.com>
To: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH 2/2] kfence: Alloc kfence_pool after system startup
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 11:15:05 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220303031505.28495-3-dtcccc@linux.alibaba.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220303031505.28495-1-dtcccc@linux.alibaba.com>
KFENCE aims at production environments, but it does not allow enabling
after system startup because kfence_pool only alloc pages from memblock.
Consider the following production scene:
At first, for performance considerations, production machines do not
enable KFENCE.
However, after running for a while, the kernel is suspected to have
memory errors. (e.g., a sibling machine crashed.)
So other production machines need to enable KFENCE, but it's hard for
them to reboot.
Allow enabling KFENCE by alloc pages after system startup, even if
KFENCE is not enabled during booting.
Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding <dtcccc@linux.alibaba.com>
---
This patch is similar to what the KFENCE(early version) do on ARM64.
Instead of alloc_pages(), we'd prefer alloc_contig_pages() to get exact
number of pages.
I'm not sure about the impact of breaking __ro_after_init. I've tested
with hackbench, and it seems no performance regression.
Or any problem about security?
---
mm/kfence/core.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 76 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
index 19eb123c0bba..ae69b2a113a4 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/core.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static unsigned long kfence_skip_covered_thresh __read_mostly = 75;
module_param_named(skip_covered_thresh, kfence_skip_covered_thresh, ulong, 0644);
/* The pool of pages used for guard pages and objects. */
-char *__kfence_pool __ro_after_init;
+char *__kfence_pool __read_mostly;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kfence_pool); /* Export for test modules. */
/*
@@ -534,17 +534,18 @@ static void rcu_guarded_free(struct rcu_head *h)
kfence_guarded_free((void *)meta->addr, meta, false);
}
-static bool __init kfence_init_pool(void)
+/*
+ * The main part of init kfence pool.
+ * Return 0 if succeed. Otherwise return the address where error occurs.
+ */
+static unsigned long __kfence_init_pool(void)
{
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)__kfence_pool;
struct page *pages;
int i;
- if (!__kfence_pool)
- return false;
-
if (!arch_kfence_init_pool())
- goto err;
+ return addr;
pages = virt_to_page(addr);
@@ -562,7 +563,7 @@ static bool __init kfence_init_pool(void)
/* Verify we do not have a compound head page. */
if (WARN_ON(compound_head(&pages[i]) != &pages[i]))
- goto err;
+ return addr;
__SetPageSlab(&pages[i]);
}
@@ -575,7 +576,7 @@ static bool __init kfence_init_pool(void)
*/
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr)))
- goto err;
+ return addr;
addr += PAGE_SIZE;
}
@@ -592,7 +593,7 @@ static bool __init kfence_init_pool(void)
/* Protect the right redzone. */
if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr + PAGE_SIZE)))
- goto err;
+ return addr;
addr += 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
}
@@ -605,9 +606,21 @@ static bool __init kfence_init_pool(void)
*/
kmemleak_free(__kfence_pool);
- return true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool __init kfence_init_pool(void)
+{
+ unsigned long addr;
+
+ if (!__kfence_pool)
+ return false;
+
+ addr = __kfence_init_pool();
+
+ if (!addr)
+ return true;
-err:
/*
* Only release unprotected pages, and do not try to go back and change
* page attributes due to risk of failing to do so as well. If changing
@@ -620,6 +633,22 @@ static bool __init kfence_init_pool(void)
return false;
}
+static bool kfence_init_pool_late(void)
+{
+ unsigned long addr, free_pages;
+
+ addr = __kfence_init_pool();
+
+ if (!addr)
+ return true;
+
+ /* Same as above. */
+ free_pages = (KFENCE_POOL_SIZE - (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool)) / PAGE_SIZE;
+ free_contig_range(page_to_pfn(virt_to_page(addr)), free_pages);
+ __kfence_pool = NULL;
+ return false;
+}
+
/* === DebugFS Interface ==================================================== */
static int stats_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
@@ -768,31 +797,58 @@ void __init kfence_alloc_pool(void)
pr_err("failed to allocate pool\n");
}
+static inline void __kfence_init(void)
+{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS))
+ static_branch_enable(&kfence_allocation_key);
+ WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, true);
+ queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer, 0);
+ pr_info("initialized - using %lu bytes for %d objects at 0x%p-0x%p\n", KFENCE_POOL_SIZE,
+ CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS, (void *)__kfence_pool,
+ (void *)(__kfence_pool + KFENCE_POOL_SIZE));
+}
+
void __init kfence_init(void)
{
+ stack_hash_seed = (u32)random_get_entropy();
+
/* Setting kfence_sample_interval to 0 on boot disables KFENCE. */
if (!kfence_sample_interval)
return;
- stack_hash_seed = (u32)random_get_entropy();
if (!kfence_init_pool()) {
pr_err("%s failed\n", __func__);
return;
}
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS))
- static_branch_enable(&kfence_allocation_key);
- WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, true);
- queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer, 0);
- pr_info("initialized - using %lu bytes for %d objects at 0x%p-0x%p\n", KFENCE_POOL_SIZE,
- CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS, (void *)__kfence_pool,
- (void *)(__kfence_pool + KFENCE_POOL_SIZE));
+ __kfence_init();
+}
+
+static int kfence_init_late(void)
+{
+ struct page *pages;
+ const unsigned long nr_pages = KFENCE_POOL_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ pages = alloc_contig_pages(nr_pages, GFP_KERNEL, first_online_node, NULL);
+
+ if (!pages)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ __kfence_pool = page_to_virt(pages);
+
+ if (!kfence_init_pool_late()) {
+ pr_err("%s failed\n", __func__);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
+ __kfence_init();
+ return 0;
}
static int kfence_enable_late(void)
{
if (!__kfence_pool)
- return -EINVAL;
+ return kfence_init_late();
WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, true);
queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer, 0);
--
2.27.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-03 3:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-03 3:15 [RFC PATCH 0/2] " Tianchen Ding
2022-03-03 3:15 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] kfence: Allow re-enabling KFENCE " Tianchen Ding
2022-03-04 18:13 ` Marco Elver
2022-03-05 5:26 ` Tianchen Ding
2022-03-05 6:06 ` Tianchen Ding
2022-03-05 9:36 ` Marco Elver
2022-03-03 3:15 ` Tianchen Ding [this message]
2022-03-04 18:14 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] kfence: Alloc kfence_pool " Marco Elver
2022-03-03 9:05 ` [RFC PATCH 0/2] " Alexander Potapenko
2022-03-03 9:30 ` Marco Elver
2022-03-04 2:24 ` Tianchen Ding
2022-03-04 18:14 ` Marco Elver
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