From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 82939C433EF for ; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 13:30:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id 1B7346B007D; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 08:30:25 -0500 (EST) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id 167176B0081; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 08:30:25 -0500 (EST) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id 07D796B0083; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 08:30:25 -0500 (EST) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from forelay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0026.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.26]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EE99B6B007D for ; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 08:30:24 -0500 (EST) Received: from smtpin07.hostedemail.com (10.5.19.251.rfc1918.com [10.5.19.251]) by forelay04.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AE8E690068 for ; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 13:30:24 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 79065264768.07.E4A4AF6 Received: from mga12.intel.com (mga12.intel.com [192.55.52.136]) by imf17.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A65824005F for ; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 13:30:23 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1643031023; x=1674567023; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:reply-to:references: mime-version:in-reply-to; bh=s3MS9jlacq/GjKUc1J7BgRzARDrYpUsH/uofSxi2lpg=; b=A5qX5G/dZwxGCvVbqfUC0G0ct4GjZ/O4/E7Mvkja84ZKX9ZGpSrULKTP KJWG2LYM89pRb9FhO3pccr4DR7UWeden0iQQpw1smdYmyYUBL0yJPcFJS CtLQiX6yiKc9zX7G52049/7qr/+19b3BKc14rfTyNhsaJrXRojfQ3HcxY v4JUWoRACIu/e3ABid0wL1VCXhKCXCI/MHGx6D82DpqXffCs0jKBH0NM6 Eyj8ap1VhPfTVwHJ7Jnay34esCj6l/zKSmwKkk5R5eHE68f26DSTRnogy OHIbRI8u7BLJ1gTOu9aXHUllYeeyd+l9vIc6UIqZe1xR6ySexTN2Wg/yB Q==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6200,9189,10236"; a="226023388" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.88,311,1635231600"; d="scan'208";a="226023388" Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Jan 2022 05:30:19 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.88,311,1635231600"; d="scan'208";a="532077916" Received: from chaop.bj.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.240.192.101]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 24 Jan 2022 05:30:05 -0800 Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 21:29:36 +0800 From: Chao Peng To: Steven Price Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Paolo Bonzini , Jonathan Corbet , Sean Christopherson , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Wanpeng Li , Jim Mattson , Joerg Roedel , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" , Hugh Dickins , Jeff Layton , "J . Bruce Fields" , Andrew Morton , Yu Zhang , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , luto@kernel.org, jun.nakajima@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com, david@redhat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 02/12] mm/memfd: Introduce MFD_INACCESSIBLE flag Message-ID: <20220124132936.GA55051@chaop.bj.intel.com> Reply-To: Chao Peng References: <20220118132121.31388-1-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> <20220118132121.31388-3-chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> <8f1eba03-e5e9-e9fc-084d-0ef683093d65@arm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <8f1eba03-e5e9-e9fc-084d-0ef683093d65@arm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.9.4 (2018-02-28) X-Stat-Signature: deerh5s5ebyezxaj8m6s865s3kz8df35 Authentication-Results: imf17.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=intel.com header.s=Intel header.b="A5qX5G/d"; dmarc=pass (policy=none) header.from=intel.com; spf=none (imf17.hostedemail.com: domain of chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com has no SPF policy when checking 192.55.52.136) smtp.mailfrom=chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com X-Rspamd-Server: rspam02 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: A65824005F X-HE-Tag: 1643031023-853809 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 03:50:55PM +0000, Steven Price wrote: > On 18/01/2022 13:21, Chao Peng wrote: > > Introduce a new memfd_create() flag indicating the content of the > > created memfd is inaccessible from userspace. It does this by force > > setting F_SEAL_INACCESSIBLE seal when the file is created. It also set > > F_SEAL_SEAL to prevent future sealing, which means, it can not coexist > > with MFD_ALLOW_SEALING. > > > > The pages backed by such memfd will be used as guest private memory in > > confidential computing environments such as Intel TDX/AMD SEV. Since > > page migration/swapping is not yet supported for such usages so these > > pages are currently marked as UNMOVABLE and UNEVICTABLE which makes > > them behave like long-term pinned pages. > > > > Signed-off-by: Chao Peng > > --- > > include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 1 + > > mm/memfd.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- > > 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h > > index 7a8a26751c23..48750474b904 100644 > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h > > @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ > > #define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U > > #define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U > > #define MFD_HUGETLB 0x0004U > > +#define MFD_INACCESSIBLE 0x0008U > > > > /* > > * Huge page size encoding when MFD_HUGETLB is specified, and a huge page > > diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c > > index 9f80f162791a..26998d96dc11 100644 > > --- a/mm/memfd.c > > +++ b/mm/memfd.c > > @@ -245,16 +245,19 @@ long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) > > #define MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof(MFD_NAME_PREFIX) - 1) > > #define MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN (NAME_MAX - MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN) > > > > -#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB) > > +#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB | \ > > + MFD_INACCESSIBLE) > > > > SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, > > const char __user *, uname, > > unsigned int, flags) > > { > > + struct address_space *mapping; > > unsigned int *file_seals; > > struct file *file; > > int fd, error; > > char *name; > > + gfp_t gfp; > > long len; > > > > if (!(flags & MFD_HUGETLB)) { > > @@ -267,6 +270,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, > > return -EINVAL; > > } > > > > + /* Disallow sealing when MFD_INACCESSIBLE is set. */ > > + if (flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE && flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + > > /* length includes terminating zero */ > > len = strnlen_user(uname, MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN + 1); > > if (len <= 0) > > @@ -315,6 +322,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, > > *file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL; > > } > > > > + if (flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE) { > > + mapping = file_inode(file)->i_mapping; > > + gfp = mapping_gfp_mask(mapping); > > + gfp &= ~__GFP_MOVABLE; > > + mapping_set_gfp_mask(mapping, gfp); > > + mapping_set_unevictable(mapping); > > + > > + file_seals = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file); > > + *file_seals &= F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_INACCESSIBLE; > > This looks backwards - the flags should be set on *file_seals, but here > you are unsetting all other flags. Thanks Steve. '|=' actually should be used here. Chao > > Steve > > > + } > > + > > fd_install(fd, file); > > kfree(name); > > return fd; > >