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David Alan Gilbert" , , , , Brijesh Singh Subject: [PATCH v7 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2021 16:06:46 -0600 Message-ID: <20211110220731.2396491-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Originating-IP: [10.180.168.240] X-ClientProxiedBy: SATLEXMB03.amd.com (10.181.40.144) To SATLEXMB04.amd.com (10.181.40.145) X-EOPAttributedMessage: 0 X-MS-PublicTrafficType: Email X-MS-Office365-Filtering-Correlation-Id: 226494c5-4154-43c4-7a9a-08d9a4968b2b X-MS-TrafficTypeDiagnostic: DM5PR1201MB0106: X-Microsoft-Antispam-PRVS: X-MS-Oob-TLC-OOBClassifiers: OLM:8273; X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck: 1 X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-Relay: 0 X-Microsoft-Antispam: BCL:0; X-Microsoft-Antispam-Message-Info: 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 X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: CIP:165.204.84.17;CTRY:US;LANG:en;SCL:1;SRV:;IPV:CAL;SFV:NSPM;H:SATLEXMB04.amd.com;PTR:InfoDomainNonexistent;CAT:NONE;SFS:(4636009)(46966006)(36840700001)(86362001)(54906003)(30864003)(82310400003)(186003)(110136005)(8676002)(336012)(70586007)(4326008)(2906002)(70206006)(1076003)(36756003)(5660300002)(6666004)(508600001)(81166007)(26005)(2616005)(356005)(7416002)(7406005)(426003)(36860700001)(47076005)(7696005)(44832011)(83380400001)(966005)(16526019)(316002)(8936002)(36900700001)(2101003);DIR:OUT;SFP:1101; X-OriginatorOrg: amd.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 10 Nov 2021 22:07:53.5748 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 226494c5-4154-43c4-7a9a-08d9a4968b2b X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: 3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=3dd8961f-e488-4e60-8e11-a82d994e183d;Ip=[165.204.84.17];Helo=[SATLEXMB04.amd.com] X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: DM6NAM11FT050.eop-nam11.prod.protection.outlook.com X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Anonymous X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: DM5PR1201MB0106 X-Rspamd-Server: rspam01 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 0E5EEE0019A4 X-Stat-Signature: y3w17imoa6m7wfg4wogzhoi8uehxz9ka Authentication-Results: imf30.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=amd.com header.s=selector1 header.b=AJrG4zYN; spf=pass (imf30.hostedemail.com: domain of brijesh.singh@amd.com designates 40.107.93.86 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=brijesh.singh@amd.com; dmarc=pass (policy=quarantine) header.from=amd.com X-HE-Tag: 1636582061-322511 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: This part of Secure Encrypted Paging (SEV-SNP) series focuses on the chan= ges required in a guest OS for SEV-SNP support. SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory integri= ty protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory encryption environment. =20 This series provides the basic building blocks to support booting the SEV= -SNP VMs, it does not cover all the security enhancement introduced by the SEV= -SNP such as interrupt protection. Many of the integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). Adding a new page to SEV-SN= P VM requires a 2-step process. First, the hypervisor assigns a page to the guest using the new RMPUPDATE instruction. This transitions the page to guest-invalid. Second, the guest validates the page using the new PVALIDA= TE instruction. The SEV-SNP VMs can use the new "Page State Change Request N= AE" defined in the GHCB specification to ask hypervisor to add or remove page from the RMP table. Each page assigned to the SEV-SNP VM can either be validated or unvalidat= ed, as indicated by the Validated flag in the page's RMP entry. There are two approaches that can be taken for the page validation: Pre-validation and Lazy Validation. Under pre-validation, the pages are validated prior to first use. And und= er lazy validation, pages are validated when first accessed. An access to a unvalidated page results in a #VC exception, at which time the exception handler may validate the page. Lazy validation requires careful tracking = of the validated pages to avoid validating the same GPA more than once. The recently introduced "Unaccepted" memory type can be used to communicate t= he unvalidated memory ranges to the Guest OS. At this time we only sypport the pre-validation, the OVMF guest BIOS validates the entire RAM before the control is handed over to the guest k= ernel. The early_set_memory_{encrypt,decrypt} and set_memory_{encrypt,decrypt} a= re enlightened to perform the page validation or invalidation while setting = or clearing the encryption attribute from the page table. This series does not provide support for the Interrupt security yet which= will be added after the base support. The series is based on tip/master ea79c24a30aa (origin/master, origin/HEAD, master) Merge branch 'timers/= urgent' Additional resources --------------------- SEV-SNP whitepaper https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolat= ion-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf =20 APM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36) GHCB spec: https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf SEV-SNP firmware specification: https://developer.amd.com/sev/ v6: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211008180453.462291-1-brijesh.sing= h@amd.com/ v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210820151933.22401-1-brijesh.singh@amd= .com/ Changes since v6: * Add rmpadjust() helper to be used by AP creation and vmpl0 detect func= tion. * Clear the VM communication key if guest detects that hypervisor is mod= ifying the SNP_GUEST_REQ response header. * Move the per-cpu GHCB registration from first #VC to idt setup. * Consolidate initial SEV/SME setup into a common entry point that gets = called early enough to also be used for SEV-SNP CPUID table setup. * SNP CPUID: separate initial SEV-SNP feature detection out into standal= one snp_init() routines, then add CPUID table setup to it as a separate pa= tch. * SNP CPUID: fix boot issue with Seabios due to ACPI relying on certain = EFI config table lookup failures as fallthrough cases rather than error ca= ses. * SNP CPUID: drop the use of a separate init routines to handle pointer = fixups after switching to kernel virtual addresses, instead use a helper that= uses RIP-relative addressing to access CPUID table when either on identity = mapping or kernel virtual addresses. Changes since v5: * move the seqno allocation in the sevguest driver. * extend snp_issue_guest_request() to accept the exit_info to simplify t= he logic. * use smaller structure names based on feedback. * explicitly clear the memory after the SNP guest request is completed. * cpuid validation: use a local copy of cpuid table instead of keeping firmware table mapped throughout boot. * cpuid validation: coding style fix-ups and refactor cpuid-related help= ers as suggested. * cpuid validation: drop a number of BOOT_COMPRESSED-guarded defs/declar= ations by moving things like snp_cpuid_init*() out of sev-shared.c and keepin= g only the common bits there. * Break up EFI config table helpers and related acpi.c changes into sepa= rate patches. * re-enable stack protection for 32-bit kernels as well, not just 64-bit Changes since v4: * Address the cpuid specific review comment * Simplified the macro based on the review feedback * Move macro definition to the patch that needs it * Fix the issues reported by the checkpath * Address the AP creation specific review comment Changes since v3: * Add support to use the PSP filtered CPUID. * Add support for the extended guest request. * Move sevguest driver in driver/virt/coco. * Add documentation for sevguest ioctl. * Add support to check the vmpl0. * Pass the VM encryption key and id to be used for encrypting guest mess= ages through the platform drv data. * Multiple cleanup and fixes to address the review feedbacks. Changes since v2: * Add support for AP startup using SNP specific vmgexit. * Add snp_prep_memory() helper. * Drop sev_snp_active() helper. * Add sev_feature_enabled() helper to check which SEV feature is active. * Sync the SNP guest message request header with latest SNP FW spec. * Multiple cleanup and fixes to address the review feedbacks. Changes since v1: * Integerate the SNP support in sev.{ch}. * Add support to query the hypervisor feature and detect whether SNP is = supported. * Define Linux specific reason code for the SNP guest termination. * Extend the setup_header provide a way for hypervisor to pass secret an= d cpuid page. * Add support to create a platform device and driver to query the attest= ation report and the derive a key. * Multiple cleanup and fixes to address Boris's review fedback. Borislav Petkov (3): x86/sev: Get rid of excessive use of defines x86/head64: Carve out the guest encryption postprocessing into a helper x86/sev: Remove do_early_exception() forward declarations Brijesh Singh (22): x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP x86/sev: Shorten GHCB terminate macro names x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction x86/sev: Check the vmpl level x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes x86/kernel: Make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table x86/kernel: Validate rom memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Michael Roth (16): x86/compressed/64: detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot x86/sev: detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot x86/head: re-enable stack protection for 32/64-bit builds x86/sev: move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper KVM: x86: move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI system table lookup to helper x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI config table lookup to helper x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI vendor table lookup to helper KVM: SEV: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers x86/boot: add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams x86/compressed: add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup x86/compressed: use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests x86/compressed/64: add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob x86/sev: add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup x86/sev: use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Tom Lendacky (4): KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save area KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst | 117 +++ .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 28 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c | 129 +-- arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c | 178 ++++ arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 8 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 44 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S | 36 - arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 44 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 243 ++++- arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpuid.h | 26 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h | 137 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 96 +- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 171 +++- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 4 +- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 13 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 - arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 5 + arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 78 +- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 24 + arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c | 13 +- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 554 +++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 838 ++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 3 + arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 17 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 24 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 55 +- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 8 + arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 15 + drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig | 9 + drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c | 743 ++++++++++++++++ drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.h | 98 ++ include/linux/cc_platform.h | 8 + include/linux/efi.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/sev-guest.h | 81 ++ 44 files changed, 3524 insertions(+), 345 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cpuid.h create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.h create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/sev-guest.h --=20 2.25.1