From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Subject: [GIT PULL] Remove in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 2021 17:46:17 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210904154617.4189-1-david@redhat.com> (raw)
Hi Linus,
as discussed ...
The following changes since commit 7d2a07b769330c34b4deabeed939325c77a7ec2f:
Linux 5.14 (2021-08-29 15:04:50 -0700)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://github.com/davidhildenbrand/linux.git tags/denywrite-for-5.15
for you to fetch changes up to 592ca09be8333bd226f50100328a905bfc377133:
fs: update documentation of get_write_access() and friends (2021-09-03 18:42:02 +0200)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Remove in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE
Remove all in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE from the kernel and remove
VM_DENYWRITE.
There are some (minor) user-visible changes:
1. We no longer deny write access to shared libaries loaded via legacy
uselib(); this behavior matches modern user space e.g., via dlopen().
2. We no longer deny write access to the elf interpreter after exec
completed, treating it just like shared libraries (which it often is).
3. We always deny write access to the file linked via /proc/pid/exe:
sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE) will fail if write access to the file
cannot be denied, and write access to the file will remain denied
until the link is effectivel gone (exec, termination,
sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE)) -- just as if exec'ing the file.
Cross-compiled for a bunch of architectures (alpha, microblaze, i386,
s390x, ...) and verified via ltp that especially the relevant tests
(i.e., creat07 and execve04) continue working as expected.
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
----------------------------------------------------------------
David Hildenbrand (7):
binfmt: don't use MAP_DENYWRITE when loading shared libraries via uselib()
kernel/fork: factor out replacing the current MM exe_file
kernel/fork: always deny write access to current MM exe_file
binfmt: remove in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE
mm: remove VM_DENYWRITE
mm: ignore MAP_DENYWRITE in ksys_mmap_pgoff()
fs: update documentation of get_write_access() and friends
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c | 8 ++--
fs/binfmt_aout.c | 7 ++--
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 6 +--
fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c | 2 +-
fs/exec.c | 4 +-
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 1 -
include/linux/fs.h | 19 +++++----
include/linux/mm.h | 4 +-
include/linux/mman.h | 4 +-
include/trace/events/mmflags.h | 1 -
kernel/events/core.c | 2 -
kernel/fork.c | 95 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
kernel/sys.c | 33 +--------------
lib/test_printf.c | 5 +--
mm/mmap.c | 29 ++-----------
mm/nommu.c | 2 -
16 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 103 deletions(-)
next reply other threads:[~2021-09-04 15:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-09-04 15:46 David Hildenbrand [this message]
2021-09-04 19:00 ` pr-tracker-bot
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