From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
To: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Jon Grimm <jon.grimm@amd.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Kaplan, David" <David.Kaplan@amd.com>,
Varad Gautam <varad.gautam@suse.com>,
Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: Runtime Memory Validation in Intel-TDX and AMD-SNP
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 2021 17:35:25 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210721003525.GC535804@tassilo.jf.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAAYXXYwbt4_FcM1=3PRgiacfdFoztwt53CAukBaW61EyGeecnQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Jul 20, 2021 at 04:55:22PM -0700, Erdem Aktas wrote:
> Thank you so much for your answer and sorry for keeping the discussion long.
>
> On Tue, Jul 20, 2021 at 3:01 PM Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> > You mean when the TDVF is changed? In this case the unaccepted memory
> > will be a different memory type, so not lazy accept enabled kernels wouldn't
> > use it.
>
> Thanks Andi for the clarification. I also saw the Kirill's answer. It
> makes sense.
>
> > But for the kexec crash case it would be just attacks against the crash
> > dump, which I assume are not a real security concern.
>
> If the crash kernel is compromised, it can be used to dump the
> customer memory content to a shared location which is a real security
> concern, is it not?
This wouldn't be about compromising the crash kernel, but just about
inserting random zeroed pages into the crash dump. I assume the crash
parsing tools can handle corrupted data, it certainly happens often
enough with real dumps.
The crash kernel itself would need to be properly pre validated/accepted of
course, but that will likely happen when it loads. And the memory
it uses could be re-accepted as long as it only happens before it
is actually used (at least on Intel, there might be still the issue
Joern pointed out on AMD, but I guess there it could be avoided
by just pre accepting everything and setting up a suitable memory
map)
BTW with our current plan of disabling the #VE i don't think
it can happen anyways.
> > The crash kexec
> > mostly runs in its own memory, which doesn't need this, or is small
> > enough that it can be fully pre-accepted. And for the previous memory
> > view probably these issues are acceptable.
>
> I think this is where I am getting confused. I agree that we can copy
> the crashkernel to its own memory (all accepted) and run it. My
> confusion is: crash kernel will dump the memory which might have some
> shared pages between. we have 3 options:
> 1- We can either accept all the pages again, that includes the shared
> pages and lose the content of it. If we do not care about the content
> in shared pages, then this is okay.
On TDX this would lead to clearing the pages, which is definitely
not what you want for a crash dump.
> 2- Have a mechanism to transfer the private/shared page mapping and
> map all the pages accordingly before dumping.
FWIW we have very little shared mappings, and I suspect their
content is probably not super important for debugging (no
kernel data structures there). So even if you lost shared
mappings for crash dumps it likely wouldn't be a problem.
But actually it should just work.
-Andi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-07-21 0:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-07-19 12:58 Joerg Roedel
2021-07-19 13:07 ` Matthew Wilcox
2021-07-19 15:02 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-19 20:39 ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-20 8:55 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20 9:34 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-07-20 11:50 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20 0:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-07-20 1:51 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-20 2:00 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-20 3:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-07-20 19:54 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-20 22:01 ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-20 23:55 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-21 0:35 ` Andi Kleen [this message]
2021-07-21 8:51 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20 5:17 ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-20 9:11 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20 17:32 ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-20 23:09 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-21 0:38 ` Andi Kleen
2021-07-22 17:31 ` Marc Orr
2021-07-26 18:55 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20 8:44 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-20 14:14 ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-20 17:30 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-21 9:20 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-07-21 10:02 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-21 10:22 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-07-21 10:53 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-21 9:25 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-21 10:25 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-21 10:48 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-22 15:46 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-07-26 19:02 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-27 9:34 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-08-02 10:19 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-02 18:47 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-07-22 15:57 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-07-22 19:51 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-23 15:23 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-07-23 16:29 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-25 9:16 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-07-25 18:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-26 10:00 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-07-26 11:53 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-26 19:13 ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-26 23:02 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-26 23:54 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-07-27 1:35 ` Erdem Aktas
2021-07-23 11:04 ` Varad Gautam
2021-07-23 14:34 ` Kaplan, David
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