From: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
To: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
lsf-pc@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, "Shutemov,
Kirill" <kirill.shutemov@intel.com>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [LSF/MM TOPIC] Impact on core mm from new hardware features
Date: Fri, 25 Jun 2021 15:34:50 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210625223449.GC2799309@iweiny-DESK2.sc.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87y2ayyy1h.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au>
On Fri, Jun 25, 2021 at 09:38:18PM +1000, Michael Ellerman wrote:
> Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> writes:
> > I'd like to have a session about new hardware features that may will
> > have an impact on core memory management. This session would have two
> > goals: one to ensure that the OS-agnostic MM crowd understands what the
> > architectures are going to be throwing their way. Second, that the
> > different arch-specific folks can look for commonalities which could
> > enable shared infrastructure.
I'm interested in this subject.
> >
> > There should be enough x86 folks around, but I'd love to hear from the
> > ARM and powerpc people as well.
>
> Cc += Aneesh and Nick
>
> I can't think of anything publicly announced for Power that will have a
> big impact on core mm, but Nick & Aneesh might have ideas.
>
> cheers
>
> > Here are a few mostly Intel-specific things I'd like to discuss.
> > However, all of these either have analogs on other architectures or are
> > implemented by other x86 vendors.
> >
> > * Shadow Stacks - requires new Copy-on-Read memory type. Creates
> > application mappings which are effectively PROT_NONE, but which are
> > implicitly accessible by the hardware.
> > * Linear Address Masking (LAM) - Similar to ARM's Top Byte Ignore
> > (TBI). Repurpose some virtual address bits to store metadata. Intel
> > implementation can sacrifice user address space. Offloads some of
> > the work the compiler does in ASAN implementations.
> > * Supervisor Protection Keys - Extends Memory Protection Keys (pkeys)
> > to kernel mappings.
I'd be more than happy to share what I've tried to do to make this support
generic.
Ira
> > * TDX - VMs that don't trust the hypervisor. Requires unmapping guest
> > memory from userspace and possibly the host kernel.
>
>
>
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-25 22:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-22 14:55 Dave Hansen
2021-06-22 15:00 ` Matthew Wilcox
2021-06-22 16:19 ` [Lsf-pc] " Dan Williams
2021-06-25 11:38 ` Michael Ellerman
2021-06-25 22:34 ` Ira Weiny [this message]
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