From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EE223C43603 for ; Thu, 1 Apr 2021 22:11:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7FC04610FA for ; Thu, 1 Apr 2021 22:11:50 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 7FC04610FA Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id AD5A46B00F3; Thu, 1 Apr 2021 18:11:28 -0400 (EDT) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id A336B6B00ED; Thu, 1 Apr 2021 18:11:28 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id 700226B00F2; Thu, 1 Apr 2021 18:11:28 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from forelay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0234.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.234]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 54F1A6B00F0 for ; Thu, 1 Apr 2021 18:11:28 -0400 (EDT) Received: from smtpin11.hostedemail.com (10.5.19.251.rfc1918.com [10.5.19.251]) by forelay01.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 158D3183956D4 for ; Thu, 1 Apr 2021 22:11:28 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 77985195456.11.2E5E149 Received: from mga03.intel.com (mga03.intel.com [134.134.136.65]) by imf24.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B15FFA00038A for ; Thu, 1 Apr 2021 22:11:25 +0000 (UTC) IronPort-SDR: fhfO1/50ZKEYhEzpZ3w9NqKsNeT8motDXhe7KX794pem2dJ6gGPAh7/g6nXwlphwqnII8AKmrZ INzJ1KX3JwtQ== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9941"; a="192371353" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,296,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="192371353" Received: from fmsmga001.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.23]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 01 Apr 2021 15:11:23 -0700 IronPort-SDR: FdGj2VNkGhFplIzibFFOJ2eqJuTzZKQq14uuWLi5ew5WLl3unCpzS9fDlJDoksEU2JXCFo+Of0 nx8/TjUkyBvg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,296,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="517513907" Received: from yyu32-desk.sc.intel.com ([143.183.136.146]) by fmsmga001-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 01 Apr 2021 15:11:23 -0700 From: Yu-cheng Yu To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Vedvyas Shanbhogue , Dave Martin , Weijiang Yang , Pengfei Xu , Haitao Huang Cc: Yu-cheng Yu , "Kirill A . Shutemov" Subject: [PATCH v24 14/30] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2021 15:10:48 -0700 Message-Id: <20210401221104.31584-15-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20210401221104.31584-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> References: <20210401221104.31584-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: B15FFA00038A X-Stat-Signature: d3nzwti96nme7ie76wfsq9yoy4ftoc44 X-Rspamd-Server: rspam02 Received-SPF: none (intel.com>: No applicable sender policy available) receiver=imf24; identity=mailfrom; envelope-from=""; helo=mga03.intel.com; client-ip=134.134.136.65 X-HE-DKIM-Result: none/none X-HE-Tag: 1617315085-120518 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: Shadow stack accesses are those that are performed by the CPU where it expects to encounter a shadow stack mapping. These accesses are performe= d implicitly by CALL/RET at the site of the shadow stack pointer. These accesses are made explicitly by shadow stack management instructions like WRUSSQ. Shadow stacks accesses to shadow-stack mapping can see faults in normal, valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings. Shadow stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap and copy-on-write. Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack mapping. In handling a shadow stack page fault, verify it occurs within a shadow stack mapping. It is always an error otherwise. For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect copy-on-write. Because clearing _PAGE_DIRTY (vs. _PAGE_RW) is used to trigger the fault, shadow stack rea= d fault and shadow stack write fault are not differentiated and both are handled as a write access. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov --- v24: - Change VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK. arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_p= f.h index 10b1de500ab1..afa524325e55 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ * bit 3 =3D=3D 1: use of reserved bit detected * bit 4 =3D=3D 1: fault was an instruction fetch * bit 5 =3D=3D 1: protection keys block access + * bit 6 =3D=3D 1: shadow stack access fault * bit 15 =3D=3D 1: SGX MMU page-fault */ enum x86_pf_error_code { @@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code { X86_PF_RSVD =3D 1 << 3, X86_PF_INSTR =3D 1 << 4, X86_PF_PK =3D 1 << 5, + X86_PF_SHSTK =3D 1 << 6, X86_PF_SGX =3D 1 << 15, }; =20 diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index a73347e2cdfc..394e504305b7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -1100,6 +1100,17 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_a= rea_struct *vma) (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign)) return 1; =20 + /* + * Verify a shadow stack access is within a shadow stack VMA. + * It is always an error otherwise. Normal data access to a + * shadow stack area is checked in the case followed. + */ + if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) { + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) + return 1; + return 0; + } + if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) { /* write, present and write, not present: */ if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))) @@ -1293,6 +1304,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, =20 perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address); =20 + /* + * Clearing _PAGE_DIRTY is used to detect shadow stack access. + * This method cannot distinguish shadow stack read vs. write. + * For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect + * copy-on-write. + */ + if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) + flags |=3D FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) flags |=3D FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) --=20 2.21.0