From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Timur Tabi <timur@kernel.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
willy@infradead.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, roman.fietze@magna.com,
keescook@chromium.org, john.ogness@linutronix.de,
akinobu.mita@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] lib/vsprintf: make-printk-non-secret printks all addresses as unhashed
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 21:48:35 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210204204835.GA7529@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210202201846.716915-1-timur@kernel.org>
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On Tue 2021-02-02 14:18:46, Timur Tabi wrote:
> If the make-printk-non-secret command-line parameter is set, then
> printk("%p") will print addresses as unhashed. This is useful for
> debugging purposes.
>
> A large warning message is displayed if this option is enabled,
> because unhashed addresses, while useful for debugging, exposes
> kernel addresses which can be a security risk.
Yes please. I needed to see pointers for debugging, and seeing hashed
pointers is nasty. Having to patch C code to be able to develop... is
bad.
> + pr_warn("** Kernel memory addresses are exposed, which may **\n");
> + pr_warn("** compromise security on your system. **\n");
This is lies, right? And way too verbose.
Pavel
--
http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-04 20:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-02 20:18 Timur Tabi
2021-02-02 21:52 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-02 22:19 ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-02 22:34 ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-02 22:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2021-02-03 18:53 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-04 20:48 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2021-02-04 20:54 ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-04 21:49 ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 21:59 ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-04 22:06 ` Steven Rostedt
2021-02-04 22:11 ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 22:17 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-04 22:20 ` Timur Tabi
2021-02-04 22:51 ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 22:57 ` Pavel Machek
2021-02-04 22:05 ` Steven Rostedt
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