From: Eugeniu Rosca <erosca@de.adit-jv.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Eugeniu Rosca <erosca@de.adit-jv.com>,
Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
<stable@vger.kernel.org>, Eugeniu Rosca <roscaeugeniu@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: slub: fix conversion of freelist_corrupted()
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2020 11:06:18 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200812090618.GA11872@lxhi-065.adit-jv.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200811134909.536004dcfc4c78204313dcd2@linux-foundation.org>
Dear Andrew,
On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 01:49:09PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Tue, 11 Aug 2020 14:46:56 +0200 Eugeniu Rosca <erosca@de.adit-jv.com> wrote:
>
> > Commit 52f23478081ae0 ("mm/slub.c: fix corrupted freechain in
> > deactivate_slab()") suffered an update when picked up from LKML [1].
> >
> > Specifically, relocating 'freelist = NULL' into 'freelist_corrupted()'
> > created a no-op statement. Fix it by sticking to the behavior intended
> > in the original patch [1]. Prefer the lowest-line-count solution.
> >
> > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200331031450.12182-1-dongli.zhang@oracle.com/
> >
> > ...
> >
> > --- a/mm/slub.c
> > +++ b/mm/slub.c
> > @@ -677,7 +677,6 @@ static bool freelist_corrupted(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
> > if ((s->flags & SLAB_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS) &&
> > !check_valid_pointer(s, page, nextfree)) {
> > object_err(s, page, freelist, "Freechain corrupt");
> > - freelist = NULL;
> > slab_fix(s, "Isolate corrupted freechain");
> > return true;
> > }
> > @@ -2184,8 +2183,10 @@ static void deactivate_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
> > * 'freelist' is already corrupted. So isolate all objects
> > * starting at 'freelist'.
> > */
> > - if (freelist_corrupted(s, page, freelist, nextfree))
> > + if (freelist_corrupted(s, page, freelist, nextfree)) {
> > + freelist = NULL;
> > break;
> > + }
> >
> > do {
> > prior = page->freelist;
>
> Looks right.
>
> What are the runtime effects of this change? In other words, what are
> the end user visible effects of the present defect?
Thank you for the prompt feedback.
The issue popped up as a result of static analysis and code review.
Therefore, I lack any specific runtime behavior example being fixed.
Nevertheless, I think this does not diminish the concern expressed in
the description of the patch.
--
Best regards,
Eugeniu Rosca
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-12 9:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-11 12:46 Eugeniu Rosca
2020-08-11 20:49 ` Andrew Morton
2020-08-12 9:06 ` Eugeniu Rosca [this message]
2020-08-14 6:57 ` Dongli Zhang
2020-08-14 7:46 ` Eugeniu Rosca
2020-08-14 19:43 ` Dongli Zhang
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