From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8E587C43331 for ; Fri, 3 Apr 2020 13:37:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4476E20721 for ; Fri, 3 Apr 2020 13:37:58 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (2048-bit key) header.d=armlinux.org.uk header.i=@armlinux.org.uk header.b="JSw+lUNa" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 4476E20721 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=armlinux.org.uk Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id E380A8E0008; Fri, 3 Apr 2020 09:37:57 -0400 (EDT) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id DE8E78E0007; Fri, 3 Apr 2020 09:37:57 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id CD8AC8E0008; Fri, 3 Apr 2020 09:37:57 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from forelay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0250.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.250]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B069A8E0007 for ; Fri, 3 Apr 2020 09:37:57 -0400 (EDT) Received: from smtpin19.hostedemail.com (10.5.19.251.rfc1918.com [10.5.19.251]) by forelay01.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E31A180AD81D for ; Fri, 3 Apr 2020 13:37:57 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 76666646994.19.lip27_b2d72abaad3d X-HE-Tag: lip27_b2d72abaad3d X-Filterd-Recvd-Size: 7783 Received: from pandora.armlinux.org.uk (pandora.armlinux.org.uk [78.32.30.218]) by imf08.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP for ; Fri, 3 Apr 2020 13:37:56 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=armlinux.org.uk; s=pandora-2019; h=Sender:In-Reply-To:Content-Type: MIME-Version:References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Id: List-Help:List-Unsubscribe:List-Subscribe:List-Post:List-Owner:List-Archive; bh=6qRe0n0i/brQrN4i1lC0j4Ww/Thvi8ApntxMb75aYXw=; b=JSw+lUNa0DxywVe7R1CwsfF6W duHA2+TE7R9d3Mj5F003DngVbNKxSVj07IsPCJdXcbDKfi4XCbV4ygEyQ2r2xLVcJuRgwSX6jGZEJ BWcGCNe02Cw9VmMdvYYMF4C34vxXgWcgw7Bx5E1id8eF7VZpzt7tlf3usJx4e0EkXqCg5VYwrh3BV 1gMqh70gTjdoMbbsN4ZUl5v7c1LUD4OfmKjo9YmE5xnoZLDAJ58VKWHjvenyjPU25Ft//Dno1kd6q Wr3yAFl58sfrBLMgsgA1VKz/ieI0PWh+2PQVGTBtYblzZLcF+QtFZHCOMZ89yU6AYVMJjTAc1L9zq 56cCCltuQ==; Received: from shell.armlinux.org.uk ([2001:4d48:ad52:3201:5054:ff:fe00:4ec]:33460) by pandora.armlinux.org.uk with esmtpsa (TLSv1.2:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jKMVh-00010t-Gw; Fri, 03 Apr 2020 14:37:25 +0100 Received: from linux by shell.armlinux.org.uk with local (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1jKMVb-0002hX-Tl; Fri, 03 Apr 2020 14:37:19 +0100 Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2020 14:37:19 +0100 From: Russell King - ARM Linux admin To: Catalin Marinas Cc: Al Viro , Kees Cook , Christophe Leroy , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Michael Ellerman , airlied@linux.ie, daniel@ffwll.ch, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Christian Borntraeger Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND 1/4] uaccess: Add user_read_access_begin/end and user_write_access_begin/end Message-ID: <20200403133719.GC25745@shell.armlinux.org.uk> References: <27106d62fdbd4ffb47796236050e418131cb837f.1585811416.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> <20200402162942.GG23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <67e21b65-0e2d-7ca5-7518-cec1b7abc46c@c-s.fr> <20200402175032.GH23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <202004021132.813F8E88@keescook> <20200403005831.GI23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20200403112609.GB26633@mbp> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200403112609.GB26633@mbp> User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On Fri, Apr 03, 2020 at 12:26:10PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote: > On Fri, Apr 03, 2020 at 01:58:31AM +0100, Al Viro wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 02, 2020 at 11:35:57AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > > Yup, I think it's a weakness of the ARM implementation and I'd like to > > > not extend it further. AFAIK we should never nest, but I would not be > > > surprised at all if we did. > > > > > > If we were looking at a design goal for all architectures, I'd like > > > to be doing what the public PaX patchset did for their memory access > > > switching, which is to alarm if calling into "enable" found the access > > > already enabled, etc. Such a condition would show an unexpected nesting > > > (like we've seen with similar constructs with set_fs() not getting reset > > > during an exception handler, etc etc). > > > > FWIW, maybe I'm misreading the ARM uaccess logics, but... it smells like > > KERNEL_DS is somewhat more dangerous there than on e.g. x86. > > > > Look: with CONFIG_CPU_DOMAINS, set_fs(KERNEL_DS) tells MMU to ignore > > per-page permission bits in DOMAIN_KERNEL (i.e. for kernel address > > ranges), allowing them even if they would normally be denied. We need > > that for actual uaccess loads/stores, since those use insns that pretend > > to be done in user mode and we want them to access the kernel pages. > > But that affects the normal loads/stores as well; unless I'm misreading > > that code, it will ignore (supervisor) r/o on a page. And that's not > > just for the code inside the uaccess blocks; *everything* done under > > KERNEL_DS is subject to that. > > That's correct. Luckily this only affects ARMv5 and earlier. From ARMv6 > onwards, CONFIG_CPU_USE_DOMAINS is no longer selected and the uaccess > instructions are just plain ldr/str. > > Russell should know the details on whether there was much choice. Since > the kernel was living in the linear map with full rwx permissions, the > KERNEL_DS overriding was probably not a concern and the ldrt/strt for > uaccess deemed more secure. We also have weird permission setting > pre-ARMv6 (or rather v6k) where RO user pages are writable from the > kernel with standard str instructions (breaking CoW). I don't recall > whether it was a choice made by the kernel or something the architecture > enforced. The vectors page has to be kernel writable (and user RO) to > store the TLS value in the absence of a TLS register but maybe we could > do this via the linear alias together with the appropriate cache > maintenance. > > From ARMv6, the domain overriding had the side-effect of ignoring the XN > bit and causing random instruction fetches from ioremap() areas. So we > had to remove the domain switching. We also gained a dedicated TLS > register. Indeed. On pre-ARMv6, we have the following choices for protection attributes: Page tables Control Reg Privileged User AP S,R permission permission 00 0,0 No access No access 00 1,0 Read-only No access 00 0,1 Read-only Read-only 00 1,1 Unpredictable Unpredictable 01 X,X Read/Write No access 10 X,X Read/Write Read-only 11 X,X Read/Write Read/Write We use S,R=1,0 under Linux because this allows us to read-protect kernel pages without making them visible to userspace. If we changed to S,R=0,1, then we could have our read-only permissions for both kernel and userspace, drop domain switching, and use the plain LDR/STR instructions, but we then lose the ability to write-protect module executable code and other parts of kernel space without making them visible to userspace. So, it essentially boils down to making a choice - which set of security features we think are the most important. > I think uaccess_enable() could indeed switch the kernel domain if > KERNEL_DS is set and move this out of set_fs(). It would reduce the > window the kernel domain permissions are overridden. Anyway, > uaccess_enable() appeared much later on arm when Russell introduced PAN > (SMAP) like support by switching the user domain. Yes, that would be a possibility. Another possibility would be to eliminate as much usage of KERNEL_DS as possible - I've just found one instance in sys_oabi-compat.c that can be eliminated (epoll_ctl) but there's several there that can't with the current code structure, and re-coding the contents of some fs/* functions to work around that is a very bad idea. If there's some scope for rejigging some of the fs/* code, it may be possible to elimate some other cases in there. I notice that the fs/* code seems like some of the last remaining users of KERNEL_DS, although I suspect that some aren't possible to eliminate. :( -- RMK's Patch system: https://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/ FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line in suburbia: sync at 10.2Mbps down 587kbps up