From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Marius Hillenbrand <mhillenb@amazon.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.de>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: [RFC 00/10] Process-local memory allocations for hiding KVM secrets
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 11:25:50 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190612182550.GI20308@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190612170834.14855-1-mhillenb@amazon.de>
On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 07:08:24PM +0200, Marius Hillenbrand wrote:
> The Linux kernel has a global address space that is the same for any
> kernel code. This address space becomes a liability in a world with
> processor information leak vulnerabilities, such as L1TF. With the right
> cache load gadget, an attacker-controlled hyperthread pair can leak
> arbitrary data via L1TF. Disabling hyperthreading is one recommended
> mitigation, but it comes with a large performance hit for a wide range
> of workloads.
>
> An alternative mitigation is to not make certain data in the kernel
> globally visible, but only when the kernel executes in the context of
> the process where this data belongs to.
>
> This patch series proposes to introduce a region for what we call
> process-local memory into the kernel's virtual address space. Page
> tables and mappings in that region will be exclusive to one address
> space, instead of implicitly shared between all kernel address spaces.
> Any data placed in that region will be out of reach of cache load
> gadgets that execute in different address spaces. To implement
> process-local memory, we introduce a new interface kmalloc_proclocal() /
> kfree_proclocal() that allocates and maps pages exclusively into the
> current kernel address space. As a first use case, we move architectural
> state of guest CPUs in KVM out of reach of other kernel address spaces.
Can you briefly describe what types of attacks this is intended to
mitigate? E.g. guest-guest, userspace-guest, etc... I don't want to
make comments based on my potentially bad assumptions.
> The patch set is a prototype for x86-64 that we have developed on top of
> kernel 4.20.17 (with cherry-picked commit d253ca0c3865 "x86/mm/cpa: Add
> set_direct_map_*() functions"). I am aware that the integration with KVM
> will see some changes while rebasing to 5.x. Patches 7 and 8, in
Ha, "some" :-)
> particular, help make patch 9 more readable, but will be dropped in
> rebasing. We have tested the code on both Intel and AMDs, launching VMs
> in a loop. So far, we have not done in-depth performance evaluation.
> Impact on starting VMs was within measurement noise.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-12 18:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-12 17:08 Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 01/10] x86/mm/kaslr: refactor to use enum indices for regions Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 02/10] x86/speculation, mm: add process local virtual memory region Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 03/10] x86/mm, mm,kernel: add teardown for process-local memory to mm cleanup Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 04/10] mm: allocate virtual space for process-local memory Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 05/10] mm: allocate/release physical pages " Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 06/10] kvm/x86: add support for storing vCPU state in " Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 07/10] kvm, vmx: move CR2 context switch out of assembly path Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 08/10] kvm, vmx: move register clearing " Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 09/10] kvm, vmx: move gprs to process local memory Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 17:08 ` [RFC 10/10] kvm, x86: move guest FPU state into " Marius Hillenbrand
2019-06-12 18:25 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2019-06-13 7:20 ` [RFC 00/10] Process-local memory allocations for hiding KVM secrets Alexander Graf
2019-06-13 10:54 ` Liran Alon
2019-06-12 19:55 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-12 20:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-12 20:41 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-12 20:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-13 1:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-13 1:50 ` Nadav Amit
2019-06-13 16:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-13 7:52 ` Alexander Graf
2019-06-13 16:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-13 16:20 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-13 17:29 ` Nadav Amit
2019-06-13 17:49 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-13 20:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-14 14:21 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-16 22:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-16 22:28 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-17 7:38 ` Alexander Graf
2019-06-17 15:50 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 15:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 16:03 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 16:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 16:53 ` Nadav Amit
2019-06-17 18:07 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 18:45 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-06-17 18:49 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-17 18:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-17 18:50 ` Nadav Amit
2019-06-17 18:55 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-13 7:27 ` Alexander Graf
2019-06-13 14:19 ` Dave Hansen
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