From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-pg1-f200.google.com (mail-pg1-f200.google.com [209.85.215.200]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3A51C6B0006 for ; Fri, 20 Jul 2018 08:23:21 -0400 (EDT) Received: by mail-pg1-f200.google.com with SMTP id q12-v6so5886589pgp.6 for ; Fri, 20 Jul 2018 05:23:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-sor-f41.google.com (mail-sor-f41.google.com. [209.85.220.41]) by mx.google.com with SMTPS id y16-v6sor510896pge.171.2018.07.20.05.23.19 for (Google Transport Security); Fri, 20 Jul 2018 05:23:20 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 20 Jul 2018 15:23:15 +0300 From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Subject: Re: [PATCHv5 03/19] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs Message-ID: <20180720122315.5lue3trrmvewvxg2@kshutemo-mobl1> References: <20180717112029.42378-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> <20180717112029.42378-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> <20180719073240.autom4g4cdm3jgd6@kshutemo-mobl1> <3045c925-f5a8-ae68-8f77-4cddaf040f9f@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <3045c925-f5a8-ae68-8f77-4cddaf040f9f@intel.com> Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org List-ID: To: Dave Hansen Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Ingo Molnar , x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , "H. Peter Anvin" , Tom Lendacky , Kai Huang , Jacob Pan , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org On Thu, Jul 19, 2018 at 07:02:34AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > On 07/19/2018 12:32 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > > On Wed, Jul 18, 2018 at 10:38:27AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote: > >> On 07/17/2018 04:20 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > >>> Pages encrypted with different encryption keys are not allowed to be > >>> merged by KSM. Otherwise it would cross security boundary. > >> Let's say I'm using plain AES (not AES-XTS). I use the same key in two > >> keyid slots. I map a page with the first keyid and another with the > >> other keyid. > >> > >> Won't they have the same cipertext? Why shouldn't we KSM them? > > We compare plain text, not ciphertext. And for good reason. > > What's the reason? Probably good to talk about it for those playing > along at home. I'll update commit message. > > Comparing ciphertext would only make KSM successful for AES-ECB that > > doesn't dependent on physical address of the page. > > > > MKTME only supports AES-XTS (no plans to support AES-ECB). It effectively > > disables KSM if we go with comparing ciphertext. > > But what's the security boundary that is violated? You are talking > about some practical concerns (KSM scanning inefficiency) which is a far > cry from being any kind of security issue. As with zero page, my initial reasoning was that mixing pages from different secrutiy domains is bad idea. -- Kirill A. Shutemov