From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv5 05/19] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 11:27:24 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180719082724.4qvfdp6q4kuhxskn@kshutemo-mobl1> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <95ce19cb-332c-44f5-b3a1-6cfebd870127@intel.com>
On Wed, Jul 18, 2018 at 04:03:53PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> I asked about this before and it still isn't covered in the description:
> You were specifically asked (maybe in person at LSF/MM?) not to modify
> allocator to pass the keyid around. Please specifically mention how
> this design addresses that feedback in the patch description.
>
> You were told, "don't change the core allocator", so I think you just
> added new functions that wrap the core allocator and called them from
> the majority of sites that call into the core allocator. Personally, I
> think that misses the point of the original request.
>
> Do I have a better way? Nope, not really.
+Michal.
IIRC, Michal was not happy that I propagate the KeyID to very core
allcoator and we've talked about wrappers around existing APIs as a better
solution.
Michal, is it correct?
> > +/*
> > + * Encrypted page has to be cleared once keyid is set, not on allocation.
> > + */
> > +static inline bool encrypted_page_needs_zero(int keyid, gfp_t *gfp_mask)
> > +{
> > + if (!keyid)
> > + return false;
> > +
> > + if (*gfp_mask & __GFP_ZERO) {
> > + *gfp_mask &= ~__GFP_ZERO;
> > + return true;
> > + }
> > +
> > + return false;
> > +}
>
> Shouldn't this be zero_page_at_alloc()?
>
> Otherwise, it gets confusing about whether the page needs zeroing at
> *all*, vs at alloc vs. free.
I like your idea with deferred_page_zero() below. I'll go with it.
> > +static inline struct page *alloc_pages_node_keyid(int nid, int keyid,
> > + gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order)
> > +{
> > + if (nid == NUMA_NO_NODE)
> > + nid = numa_mem_id();
> > +
> > + return __alloc_pages_node_keyid(nid, keyid, gfp_mask, order);
> > +}
>
> We have an innumerable number of (__)?alloc_pages* functions. This adds
> two more. I'm not a big fan of making this worse.
>
> Do I have a better idea? Not really. The best I have is to start being
> more careful about all of the arguments and actually formalize the list
> of things that we need to succeed in an allocation in a struct
> alloc_args or something.
Sounds like a separate project to me :)
> > #define alloc_page(gfp_mask) alloc_pages(gfp_mask, 0)
> > #define alloc_page_vma(gfp_mask, vma, addr) \
> > diff --git a/include/linux/migrate.h b/include/linux/migrate.h
> > index f2b4abbca55e..fede9bfa89d9 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/migrate.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/migrate.h
> > @@ -38,9 +38,15 @@ static inline struct page *new_page_nodemask(struct page *page,
> > unsigned int order = 0;
> > struct page *new_page = NULL;
> >
> > - if (PageHuge(page))
> > + if (PageHuge(page)) {
> > + /*
> > + * HugeTLB doesn't support encryption. We shouldn't see
> > + * such pages.
> > + */
> > + WARN_ON(page_keyid(page));
> > return alloc_huge_page_nodemask(page_hstate(compound_head(page)),
> > preferred_nid, nodemask);
> > + }
>
> Shouldn't we be returning NULL? Seems like failing the allocation is
> much less likely to result in bad things happening.
Okay.
> > if (PageTransHuge(page)) {
> > gfp_mask |= GFP_TRANSHUGE;
> > @@ -50,8 +56,8 @@ static inline struct page *new_page_nodemask(struct page *page,
> > if (PageHighMem(page) || (zone_idx(page_zone(page)) == ZONE_MOVABLE))
> > gfp_mask |= __GFP_HIGHMEM;
> >
> > - new_page = __alloc_pages_nodemask(gfp_mask, order,
> > - preferred_nid, nodemask);
> > + new_page = __alloc_pages_nodemask_keyid(gfp_mask, order,
> > + preferred_nid, nodemask, page_keyid(page));
>
> Needs a comment please. It's totally non-obvious that this is the
> migration case from the context, new_page_nodemask()'s name, or the name
> of 'page'.
>
> /* Allocate a page with the same KeyID as the source page */
Sure.
>
> > diff --git a/mm/compaction.c b/mm/compaction.c
> > index faca45ebe62d..fd51aa32ad96 100644
> > --- a/mm/compaction.c
> > +++ b/mm/compaction.c
> > @@ -1187,6 +1187,7 @@ static struct page *compaction_alloc(struct page *migratepage,
> > list_del(&freepage->lru);
> > cc->nr_freepages--;
> >
> > + prep_encrypted_page(freepage, 0, page_keyid(migratepage), false);
> > return freepage;
> > }
>
> Comments, please.
>
> Why is this here?
/* Prepare the page using the same KeyID as the source page */
> What other code might need prep_encrypted_page()?
Custom pages allocators if these pages can end up in encrypted VMAs.
It this case compaction creates own pool of pages to be used for
allocation during page migration.
> > diff --git a/mm/mempolicy.c b/mm/mempolicy.c
> > index 581b729e05a0..ce7b436444b5 100644
> > --- a/mm/mempolicy.c
> > +++ b/mm/mempolicy.c
> > @@ -921,22 +921,28 @@ static void migrate_page_add(struct page *page, struct list_head *pagelist,
> > /* page allocation callback for NUMA node migration */
> > struct page *alloc_new_node_page(struct page *page, unsigned long node)
> > {
> > - if (PageHuge(page))
> > + if (PageHuge(page)) {
> > + /*
> > + * HugeTLB doesn't support encryption. We shouldn't see
> > + * such pages.
> > + */
> > + WARN_ON(page_keyid(page));
> > return alloc_huge_page_node(page_hstate(compound_head(page)),
> > node);
> > - else if (PageTransHuge(page)) {
> > + } else if (PageTransHuge(page)) {
> > struct page *thp;
> >
> > - thp = alloc_pages_node(node,
> > + thp = alloc_pages_node_keyid(node, page_keyid(page),
> > (GFP_TRANSHUGE | __GFP_THISNODE),
> > HPAGE_PMD_ORDER);
> > if (!thp)
> > return NULL;
> > prep_transhuge_page(thp);
> > return thp;
> > - } else
> > - return __alloc_pages_node(node, GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE |
> > - __GFP_THISNODE, 0);
> > + } else {
> > + return __alloc_pages_node_keyid(node, page_keyid(page),
> > + GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE | __GFP_THISNODE, 0);
> > + }
> > }
> >
> > /*
> > @@ -2013,9 +2019,16 @@ alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp, int order, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> > {
> > struct mempolicy *pol;
> > struct page *page;
> > - int preferred_nid;
> > + bool zero = false;
> > + int keyid, preferred_nid;
> > nodemask_t *nmask;
> >
> > + keyid = vma_keyid(vma);
> > + if (keyid && (gfp & __GFP_ZERO)) {
> > + zero = true;
> > + gfp &= ~__GFP_ZERO;
> > + }
>
> Comments, please. 'zero' should be 'deferred_zero', at least.
>
> Also, can't we hide this a _bit_ better?
>
> if (deferred_page_zero(vma))
> gfp &= ~__GFP_ZERO;
>
> Then, later:
>
> deferred_page_prep(vma, page, order);
>
> and hide everything in deferred_page_zero() and deferred_page_prep().
>
>
> > --- a/mm/page_alloc.c
> > +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
> > @@ -3697,6 +3697,39 @@ should_compact_retry(struct alloc_context *ac, unsigned int order, int alloc_fla
> > }
> > #endif /* CONFIG_COMPACTION */
> >
> > +#ifndef CONFIG_NUMA
> > +struct page *alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp_mask, int order,
> > + struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
> > + int node, bool hugepage)
> > +{
> > + struct page *page;
> > + bool need_zero;
> > + int keyid = vma_keyid(vma);
> > +
> > + need_zero = encrypted_page_needs_zero(keyid, &gfp_mask);
> > + page = alloc_pages(gfp_mask, order);
> > + prep_encrypted_page(page, order, keyid, need_zero);
> > +
> > + return page;
> > +}
> > +#endif
>
> Is there *ever* a VMA-based allocation that doesn't need zeroing?
Sure. Any allocations for CoW.
> > +struct page * __alloc_pages_node_keyid(int nid, int keyid,
> > + gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order)
> > +{
> > + struct page *page;
> > + bool need_zero;
> > +
> > + VM_BUG_ON(nid < 0 || nid >= MAX_NUMNODES);
> > + VM_WARN_ON(!node_online(nid));
> > +
> > + need_zero = encrypted_page_needs_zero(keyid, &gfp_mask);
> > + page = __alloc_pages(gfp_mask, order, nid);
> > + prep_encrypted_page(page, order, keyid, need_zero);
> > +
> > + return page;
> > +}
> > +
> > #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
> > static struct lockdep_map __fs_reclaim_map =
> > STATIC_LOCKDEP_MAP_INIT("fs_reclaim", &__fs_reclaim_map);
> > @@ -4401,6 +4434,20 @@ __alloc_pages_nodemask(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order, int preferred_nid,
> > }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL(__alloc_pages_nodemask);
> >
> > +struct page *
> > +__alloc_pages_nodemask_keyid(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order,
> > + int preferred_nid, nodemask_t *nodemask, int keyid)
> > +{
> > + struct page *page;
> > + bool need_zero;
> > +
> > + need_zero = encrypted_page_needs_zero(keyid, &gfp_mask);
> > + page = __alloc_pages_nodemask(gfp_mask, order, preferred_nid, nodemask);
> > + prep_encrypted_page(page, order, keyid, need_zero);
> > + return page;
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__alloc_pages_nodemask_keyid);
>
> That looks like three duplicates of the same code, wrapping three more
> allocator variants. Do we really have no other alternatives? Can you
> please go ask the folks that gave you the feedback about the allocator
> modifications and ask them if this is OK explicitly?
Michal, any feedback for the patch?
--
G Kirill A. Shutemov
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-07-19 8:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-07-17 11:20 [PATCHv5 00/19] MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 01/19] mm: Do no merge VMAs with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 02/19] mm: Do not use zero page in encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-18 17:36 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 7:16 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-19 13:58 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-20 12:16 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 03/19] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-18 17:38 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 7:32 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-19 14:02 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-20 12:23 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 04/19] mm/page_alloc: Unify alloc_hugepage_vma() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-18 17:43 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 05/19] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-18 23:03 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 8:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2018-07-19 14:05 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-20 12:25 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-26 14:25 ` Michal Hocko
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 06/19] mm/khugepaged: Handle encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-18 23:11 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 8:59 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-19 14:13 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-20 12:29 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 07/19] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-18 23:13 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 9:54 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-19 14:19 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-20 12:31 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 08/19] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-18 23:19 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-19 10:21 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-19 12:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-07-19 13:12 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-19 13:18 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-07-19 13:23 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-19 13:40 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-07-20 12:34 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-20 13:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-07-20 13:40 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-19 14:23 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-20 12:34 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-31 0:08 ` Kai Huang
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 09/19] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-18 23:30 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-20 12:42 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 10/19] x86/mm: Implement page_keyid() using page_ext Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-18 23:38 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-23 9:45 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-23 17:22 ` Alison Schofield
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 11/19] x86/mm: Implement vma_keyid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-18 23:40 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-23 9:47 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 12/19] x86/mm: Implement prep_encrypted_page() and arch_free_page() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-18 23:53 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-23 9:50 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 13/19] x86/mm: Rename CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 14/19] x86/mm: Allow to disable MKTME after enumeration Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 15/19] x86/mm: Detect MKTME early Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 16/19] x86/mm: Calculate direct mapping size Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 17/19] x86/mm: Implement sync_direct_mapping() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-19 0:01 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-23 10:04 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-23 12:25 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 18/19] x86/mm: Handle encrypted memory in page_to_virt() and __pa() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-18 22:21 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-07-23 10:12 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-26 17:26 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-27 13:49 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-17 11:20 ` [PATCHv5 19/19] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-08-15 7:48 ` Pavel Machek
2018-08-17 9:24 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
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