From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv3 07/17] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify()
Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2018 15:57:20 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180615125720.r755xaegvfcqfr6x@black.fi.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8c31f6d2-6512-2726-763e-6dd1cbb0350a@intel.com>
On Wed, Jun 13, 2018 at 06:13:03PM +0000, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 06/12/2018 07:39 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > Encrypted VMA will have KeyID stored in vma->vm_page_prot. This way we
>
> "An encrypted VMA..."
>
> > don't need to do anything special to setup encrypted page table entries
> > and don't need to reserve space for KeyID in a VMA.
> >
> > This patch changes _PAGE_CHG_MASK to include KeyID bits. Otherwise they
> > are going to be stripped from vm_page_prot on the first pgprot_modify().
> >
> > Define PTE_PFN_MASK_MAX similar to PTE_PFN_MASK but based on
> > __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT. This way we include whole range of bits
> > architecturally available for PFN without referencing physical_mask and
> > mktme_keyid_mask variables.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 7 ++++++-
> > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> > index 1e5a40673953..e8ebe760b88d 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> > @@ -121,8 +121,13 @@
> > * protection key is treated like _PAGE_RW, for
> > * instance, and is *not* included in this mask since
> > * pte_modify() does modify it.
> > + *
> > + * It includes full range of PFN bits regardless if they were claimed for KeyID
> > + * or not: we want to preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify().
> > */
> > -#define _PAGE_CHG_MASK (PTE_PFN_MASK | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT | \
> > +#define PTE_PFN_MASK_MAX \
> > + (((signed long)PAGE_MASK) & ((1ULL << __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT) - 1))
>
> "signed long" is really unusual to see. Was that intentional?
Yes. That's trick with sign-extension, borrowed from PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK
definition. It helps on 32-bit with PAE properly expand the PAGE_MASK to
64-bit.
I'll add comment.
> > +#define _PAGE_CHG_MASK (PTE_PFN_MASK_MAX | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT | \
> > _PAGE_SPECIAL | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | \
> > _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY)
> > #define _HPAGE_CHG_MASK (_PAGE_CHG_MASK | _PAGE_PSE)
>
> This makes me a bit nervous. We have some places (here) where we
> pretend that the KeyID is part of the paddr and then other places like
> pte_pfn() where it's not.
Other option is to include KeyID mask into _PAGE_CHG_MASK. But it means
_PAGE_CHG_MASK would need to reference *two* variables: physical_mask and
mktme_keyid_mask. I mentioned this in the commit message.
This is more efficient way to achieve the same compile-time without
referencing any variables.
> Seems like something that will come back to bite us.
Any suggestions?
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-06-15 12:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-06-12 14:38 [PATCHv3 00/17] MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:38 ` [PATCHv3 01/17] mm: Do no merge VMAs with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-13 17:45 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-13 20:13 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 02/17] mm/khugepaged: Do not collapse pages in encrypted VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-13 17:50 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-13 20:18 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-13 20:20 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-13 20:38 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 03/17] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-13 17:51 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-13 20:31 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-13 20:35 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-13 20:40 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-13 20:41 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 04/17] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-13 18:07 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-14 15:57 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 05/17] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 06/17] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 07/17] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-13 18:13 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-15 12:57 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2018-06-15 13:43 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-15 15:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-15 15:31 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-15 16:06 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-15 16:58 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-15 20:45 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-15 20:45 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-15 20:55 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 08/17] x86/mm: Implement vma_is_encrypted() and vma_keyid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-13 18:18 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-15 13:14 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 09/17] x86/mm: Implement page_keyid() using page_ext Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-13 18:20 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-18 10:07 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-18 12:54 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-18 13:14 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-22 15:39 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 10/17] x86/mm: Implement prep_encrypted_page() and arch_free_page() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-13 18:26 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-18 10:18 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 11/17] x86/mm: Rename CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 12/17] x86/mm: Allow to disable MKTME after enumeration Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-13 18:30 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-18 10:59 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 13/17] x86/mm: Detect MKTME early Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 14/17] x86/mm: Introduce direct_mapping_size Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:58 ` Mika Penttilä
2018-06-12 20:07 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-13 18:37 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-18 13:12 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-18 13:22 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 15/17] x86/mm: Implement sync_direct_mapping() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-13 18:41 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-18 13:33 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-18 16:28 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-25 9:29 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-25 16:36 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-25 17:00 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 16/17] x86/mm: Handle encrypted memory in page_to_virt() and __pa() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-13 18:43 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-18 13:34 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-18 13:59 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-18 14:41 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-12 14:39 ` [PATCHv3 17/17] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-13 18:46 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-18 13:41 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-28 18:52 ` [PATCHv3 00/17] MKTME enabling Pavel Machek
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20180615125720.r755xaegvfcqfr6x@black.fi.intel.com \
--to=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kai.huang@linux.intel.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox